| // Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style |
| // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| package ssh |
| |
| import ( |
| "bytes" |
| "errors" |
| "fmt" |
| "io" |
| "net" |
| "strings" |
| ) |
| |
| // The Permissions type holds fine-grained permissions that are |
| // specific to a user or a specific authentication method for a user. |
| // The Permissions value for a successful authentication attempt is |
| // available in ServerConn, so it can be used to pass information from |
| // the user-authentication phase to the application layer. |
| type Permissions struct { |
| // CriticalOptions indicate restrictions to the default |
| // permissions, and are typically used in conjunction with |
| // user certificates. The standard for SSH certificates |
| // defines "force-command" (only allow the given command to |
| // execute) and "source-address" (only allow connections from |
| // the given address). The SSH package currently only enforces |
| // the "source-address" critical option. It is up to server |
| // implementations to enforce other critical options, such as |
| // "force-command", by checking them after the SSH handshake |
| // is successful. In general, SSH servers should reject |
| // connections that specify critical options that are unknown |
| // or not supported. |
| CriticalOptions map[string]string |
| |
| // Extensions are extra functionality that the server may |
| // offer on authenticated connections. Lack of support for an |
| // extension does not preclude authenticating a user. Common |
| // extensions are "permit-agent-forwarding", |
| // "permit-X11-forwarding". The Go SSH library currently does |
| // not act on any extension, and it is up to server |
| // implementations to honor them. Extensions can be used to |
| // pass data from the authentication callbacks to the server |
| // application layer. |
| Extensions map[string]string |
| } |
| |
| type GSSAPIWithMICConfig struct { |
| // AllowLogin, must be set, is called when gssapi-with-mic |
| // authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3). The srcName is from the |
| // results of the GSS-API authentication. The format is username@DOMAIN. |
| // GSSAPI just guarantees to the server who the user is, but not if they can log in, and with what permissions. |
| // This callback is called after the user identity is established with GSSAPI to decide if the user can login with |
| // which permissions. If the user is allowed to login, it should return a nil error. |
| AllowLogin func(conn ConnMetadata, srcName string) (*Permissions, error) |
| |
| // Server must be set. It's the implementation |
| // of the GSSAPIServer interface. See GSSAPIServer interface for details. |
| Server GSSAPIServer |
| } |
| |
| // ServerConfig holds server specific configuration data. |
| type ServerConfig struct { |
| // Config contains configuration shared between client and server. |
| Config |
| |
| // PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms specifies the supported client public key |
| // authentication algorithms. Note that this should not include certificate |
| // types since those use the underlying algorithm. This list is sent to the |
| // client if it supports the server-sig-algs extension. Order is irrelevant. |
| // If unspecified then a default set of algorithms is used. |
| PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms []string |
| |
| hostKeys []Signer |
| |
| // NoClientAuth is true if clients are allowed to connect without |
| // authenticating. |
| // To determine NoClientAuth at runtime, set NoClientAuth to true |
| // and the optional NoClientAuthCallback to a non-nil value. |
| NoClientAuth bool |
| |
| // NoClientAuthCallback, if non-nil, is called when a user |
| // attempts to authenticate with auth method "none". |
| // NoClientAuth must also be set to true for this be used, or |
| // this func is unused. |
| NoClientAuthCallback func(ConnMetadata) (*Permissions, error) |
| |
| // MaxAuthTries specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts |
| // permitted per connection. If set to a negative number, the number of |
| // attempts are unlimited. If set to zero, the number of attempts are limited |
| // to 6. |
| MaxAuthTries int |
| |
| // PasswordCallback, if non-nil, is called when a user |
| // attempts to authenticate using a password. |
| PasswordCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) |
| |
| // PublicKeyCallback, if non-nil, is called when a client |
| // offers a public key for authentication. It must return a nil error |
| // if the given public key can be used to authenticate the |
| // given user. For example, see CertChecker.Authenticate. A |
| // call to this function does not guarantee that the key |
| // offered is in fact used to authenticate. To record any data |
| // depending on the public key, store it inside a |
| // Permissions.Extensions entry. |
| PublicKeyCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) |
| |
| // KeyboardInteractiveCallback, if non-nil, is called when |
| // keyboard-interactive authentication is selected (RFC |
| // 4256). The client object's Challenge function should be |
| // used to query the user. The callback may offer multiple |
| // Challenge rounds. To avoid information leaks, the client |
| // should be presented a challenge even if the user is |
| // unknown. |
| KeyboardInteractiveCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, client KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) (*Permissions, error) |
| |
| // AuthLogCallback, if non-nil, is called to log all authentication |
| // attempts. |
| AuthLogCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, method string, err error) |
| |
| // ServerVersion is the version identification string to announce in |
| // the public handshake. |
| // If empty, a reasonable default is used. |
| // Note that RFC 4253 section 4.2 requires that this string start with |
| // "SSH-2.0-". |
| ServerVersion string |
| |
| // BannerCallback, if present, is called and the return string is sent to |
| // the client after key exchange completed but before authentication. |
| BannerCallback func(conn ConnMetadata) string |
| |
| // GSSAPIWithMICConfig includes gssapi server and callback, which if both non-nil, is used |
| // when gssapi-with-mic authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3). |
| GSSAPIWithMICConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig |
| } |
| |
| // AddHostKey adds a private key as a host key. If an existing host |
| // key exists with the same public key format, it is replaced. Each server |
| // config must have at least one host key. |
| func (s *ServerConfig) AddHostKey(key Signer) { |
| for i, k := range s.hostKeys { |
| if k.PublicKey().Type() == key.PublicKey().Type() { |
| s.hostKeys[i] = key |
| return |
| } |
| } |
| |
| s.hostKeys = append(s.hostKeys, key) |
| } |
| |
| // cachedPubKey contains the results of querying whether a public key is |
| // acceptable for a user. |
| type cachedPubKey struct { |
| user string |
| pubKeyData []byte |
| result error |
| perms *Permissions |
| } |
| |
| const maxCachedPubKeys = 16 |
| |
| // pubKeyCache caches tests for public keys. Since SSH clients |
| // will query whether a public key is acceptable before attempting to |
| // authenticate with it, we end up with duplicate queries for public |
| // key validity. The cache only applies to a single ServerConn. |
| type pubKeyCache struct { |
| keys []cachedPubKey |
| } |
| |
| // get returns the result for a given user/algo/key tuple. |
| func (c *pubKeyCache) get(user string, pubKeyData []byte) (cachedPubKey, bool) { |
| for _, k := range c.keys { |
| if k.user == user && bytes.Equal(k.pubKeyData, pubKeyData) { |
| return k, true |
| } |
| } |
| return cachedPubKey{}, false |
| } |
| |
| // add adds the given tuple to the cache. |
| func (c *pubKeyCache) add(candidate cachedPubKey) { |
| if len(c.keys) < maxCachedPubKeys { |
| c.keys = append(c.keys, candidate) |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // ServerConn is an authenticated SSH connection, as seen from the |
| // server |
| type ServerConn struct { |
| Conn |
| |
| // If the succeeding authentication callback returned a |
| // non-nil Permissions pointer, it is stored here. |
| Permissions *Permissions |
| } |
| |
| // NewServerConn starts a new SSH server with c as the underlying |
| // transport. It starts with a handshake and, if the handshake is |
| // unsuccessful, it closes the connection and returns an error. The |
| // Request and NewChannel channels must be serviced, or the connection |
| // will hang. |
| // |
| // The returned error may be of type *ServerAuthError for |
| // authentication errors. |
| func NewServerConn(c net.Conn, config *ServerConfig) (*ServerConn, <-chan NewChannel, <-chan *Request, error) { |
| fullConf := *config |
| fullConf.SetDefaults() |
| if fullConf.MaxAuthTries == 0 { |
| fullConf.MaxAuthTries = 6 |
| } |
| if len(fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms) == 0 { |
| fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms = supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos |
| } else { |
| for _, algo := range fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms { |
| if !contains(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos, algo) { |
| c.Close() |
| return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported public key authentication algorithm %s", algo) |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| // Check if the config contains any unsupported key exchanges |
| for _, kex := range fullConf.KeyExchanges { |
| if _, ok := serverForbiddenKexAlgos[kex]; ok { |
| c.Close() |
| return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key exchange %s for server", kex) |
| } |
| } |
| |
| s := &connection{ |
| sshConn: sshConn{conn: c}, |
| } |
| perms, err := s.serverHandshake(&fullConf) |
| if err != nil { |
| c.Close() |
| return nil, nil, nil, err |
| } |
| return &ServerConn{s, perms}, s.mux.incomingChannels, s.mux.incomingRequests, nil |
| } |
| |
| // signAndMarshal signs the data with the appropriate algorithm, |
| // and serializes the result in SSH wire format. algo is the negotiate |
| // algorithm and may be a certificate type. |
| func signAndMarshal(k AlgorithmSigner, rand io.Reader, data []byte, algo string) ([]byte, error) { |
| sig, err := k.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, underlyingAlgo(algo)) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| return Marshal(sig), nil |
| } |
| |
| // handshake performs key exchange and user authentication. |
| func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) { |
| if len(config.hostKeys) == 0 { |
| return nil, errors.New("ssh: server has no host keys") |
| } |
| |
| if !config.NoClientAuth && config.PasswordCallback == nil && config.PublicKeyCallback == nil && |
| config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil && (config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil || |
| config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin == nil || config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server == nil) { |
| return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false") |
| } |
| |
| if config.ServerVersion != "" { |
| s.serverVersion = []byte(config.ServerVersion) |
| } else { |
| s.serverVersion = []byte(packageVersion) |
| } |
| var err error |
| s.clientVersion, err = exchangeVersions(s.sshConn.conn, s.serverVersion) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| tr := newTransport(s.sshConn.conn, config.Rand, false /* not client */) |
| s.transport = newServerTransport(tr, s.clientVersion, s.serverVersion, config) |
| |
| if err := s.transport.waitSession(); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| // We just did the key change, so the session ID is established. |
| s.sessionID = s.transport.getSessionID() |
| |
| var packet []byte |
| if packet, err = s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| var serviceRequest serviceRequestMsg |
| if err = Unmarshal(packet, &serviceRequest); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| if serviceRequest.Service != serviceUserAuth { |
| return nil, errors.New("ssh: requested service '" + serviceRequest.Service + "' before authenticating") |
| } |
| serviceAccept := serviceAcceptMsg{ |
| Service: serviceUserAuth, |
| } |
| if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&serviceAccept)); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| perms, err := s.serverAuthenticate(config) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| s.mux = newMux(s.transport) |
| return perms, err |
| } |
| |
| func checkSourceAddress(addr net.Addr, sourceAddrs string) error { |
| if addr == nil { |
| return errors.New("ssh: no address known for client, but source-address match required") |
| } |
| |
| tcpAddr, ok := addr.(*net.TCPAddr) |
| if !ok { |
| return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not an TCP address when checking source-address match", addr) |
| } |
| |
| for _, sourceAddr := range strings.Split(sourceAddrs, ",") { |
| if allowedIP := net.ParseIP(sourceAddr); allowedIP != nil { |
| if allowedIP.Equal(tcpAddr.IP) { |
| return nil |
| } |
| } else { |
| _, ipNet, err := net.ParseCIDR(sourceAddr) |
| if err != nil { |
| return fmt.Errorf("ssh: error parsing source-address restriction %q: %v", sourceAddr, err) |
| } |
| |
| if ipNet.Contains(tcpAddr.IP) { |
| return nil |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not allowed because of source-address restriction", addr) |
| } |
| |
| func gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig, token []byte, s *connection, |
| sessionID []byte, userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg) (authErr error, perms *Permissions, err error) { |
| gssAPIServer := gssapiConfig.Server |
| defer gssAPIServer.DeleteSecContext() |
| var srcName string |
| for { |
| var ( |
| outToken []byte |
| needContinue bool |
| ) |
| outToken, srcName, needContinue, err = gssAPIServer.AcceptSecContext(token) |
| if err != nil { |
| return err, nil, nil |
| } |
| if len(outToken) != 0 { |
| if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIToken{ |
| Token: outToken, |
| })); err != nil { |
| return nil, nil, err |
| } |
| } |
| if !needContinue { |
| break |
| } |
| packet, err := s.transport.readPacket() |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, nil, err |
| } |
| userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{} |
| if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil { |
| return nil, nil, err |
| } |
| token = userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token |
| } |
| packet, err := s.transport.readPacket() |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, nil, err |
| } |
| userAuthGSSAPIMICReq := &userAuthGSSAPIMIC{} |
| if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq); err != nil { |
| return nil, nil, err |
| } |
| mic := buildMIC(string(sessionID), userAuthReq.User, userAuthReq.Service, userAuthReq.Method) |
| if err := gssAPIServer.VerifyMIC(mic, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq.MIC); err != nil { |
| return err, nil, nil |
| } |
| perms, authErr = gssapiConfig.AllowLogin(s, srcName) |
| return authErr, perms, nil |
| } |
| |
| // isAlgoCompatible checks if the signature format is compatible with the |
| // selected algorithm taking into account edge cases that occur with old |
| // clients. |
| func isAlgoCompatible(algo, sigFormat string) bool { |
| // Compatibility for old clients. |
| // |
| // For certificate authentication with OpenSSH 7.2-7.7 signature format can |
| // be rsa-sha2-256 or rsa-sha2-512 for the algorithm |
| // ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com. |
| // |
| // With gpg-agent < 2.2.6 the algorithm can be rsa-sha2-256 or rsa-sha2-512 |
| // for signature format ssh-rsa. |
| if isRSA(algo) && isRSA(sigFormat) { |
| return true |
| } |
| // Standard case: the underlying algorithm must match the signature format. |
| return underlyingAlgo(algo) == sigFormat |
| } |
| |
| // ServerAuthError represents server authentication errors and is |
| // sometimes returned by NewServerConn. It appends any authentication |
| // errors that may occur, and is returned if all of the authentication |
| // methods provided by the user failed to authenticate. |
| type ServerAuthError struct { |
| // Errors contains authentication errors returned by the authentication |
| // callback methods. The first entry is typically ErrNoAuth. |
| Errors []error |
| } |
| |
| func (l ServerAuthError) Error() string { |
| var errs []string |
| for _, err := range l.Errors { |
| errs = append(errs, err.Error()) |
| } |
| return "[" + strings.Join(errs, ", ") + "]" |
| } |
| |
| // ErrNoAuth is the error value returned if no |
| // authentication method has been passed yet. This happens as a normal |
| // part of the authentication loop, since the client first tries |
| // 'none' authentication to discover available methods. |
| // It is returned in ServerAuthError.Errors from NewServerConn. |
| var ErrNoAuth = errors.New("ssh: no auth passed yet") |
| |
| func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) { |
| sessionID := s.transport.getSessionID() |
| var cache pubKeyCache |
| var perms *Permissions |
| |
| authFailures := 0 |
| var authErrs []error |
| var displayedBanner bool |
| |
| userAuthLoop: |
| for { |
| if authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries && config.MaxAuthTries > 0 { |
| discMsg := &disconnectMsg{ |
| Reason: 2, |
| Message: "too many authentication failures", |
| } |
| |
| if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(discMsg)); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| return nil, discMsg |
| } |
| |
| var userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg |
| if packet, err := s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil { |
| if err == io.EOF { |
| return nil, &ServerAuthError{Errors: authErrs} |
| } |
| return nil, err |
| } else if err = Unmarshal(packet, &userAuthReq); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| if userAuthReq.Service != serviceSSH { |
| return nil, errors.New("ssh: client attempted to negotiate for unknown service: " + userAuthReq.Service) |
| } |
| |
| s.user = userAuthReq.User |
| |
| if !displayedBanner && config.BannerCallback != nil { |
| displayedBanner = true |
| msg := config.BannerCallback(s) |
| if msg != "" { |
| bannerMsg := &userAuthBannerMsg{ |
| Message: msg, |
| } |
| if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(bannerMsg)); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| perms = nil |
| authErr := ErrNoAuth |
| |
| switch userAuthReq.Method { |
| case "none": |
| if config.NoClientAuth { |
| if config.NoClientAuthCallback != nil { |
| perms, authErr = config.NoClientAuthCallback(s) |
| } else { |
| authErr = nil |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // allow initial attempt of 'none' without penalty |
| if authFailures == 0 { |
| authFailures-- |
| } |
| case "password": |
| if config.PasswordCallback == nil { |
| authErr = errors.New("ssh: password auth not configured") |
| break |
| } |
| payload := userAuthReq.Payload |
| if len(payload) < 1 || payload[0] != 0 { |
| return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) |
| } |
| payload = payload[1:] |
| password, payload, ok := parseString(payload) |
| if !ok || len(payload) > 0 { |
| return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) |
| } |
| |
| perms, authErr = config.PasswordCallback(s, password) |
| case "keyboard-interactive": |
| if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil { |
| authErr = errors.New("ssh: keyboard-interactive auth not configured") |
| break |
| } |
| |
| prompter := &sshClientKeyboardInteractive{s} |
| perms, authErr = config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback(s, prompter.Challenge) |
| case "publickey": |
| if config.PublicKeyCallback == nil { |
| authErr = errors.New("ssh: publickey auth not configured") |
| break |
| } |
| payload := userAuthReq.Payload |
| if len(payload) < 1 { |
| return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) |
| } |
| isQuery := payload[0] == 0 |
| payload = payload[1:] |
| algoBytes, payload, ok := parseString(payload) |
| if !ok { |
| return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) |
| } |
| algo := string(algoBytes) |
| if !contains(config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms, underlyingAlgo(algo)) { |
| authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", algo) |
| break |
| } |
| |
| pubKeyData, payload, ok := parseString(payload) |
| if !ok { |
| return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) |
| } |
| |
| pubKey, err := ParsePublicKey(pubKeyData) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| candidate, ok := cache.get(s.user, pubKeyData) |
| if !ok { |
| candidate.user = s.user |
| candidate.pubKeyData = pubKeyData |
| candidate.perms, candidate.result = config.PublicKeyCallback(s, pubKey) |
| if candidate.result == nil && candidate.perms != nil && candidate.perms.CriticalOptions != nil && candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption] != "" { |
| candidate.result = checkSourceAddress( |
| s.RemoteAddr(), |
| candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption]) |
| } |
| cache.add(candidate) |
| } |
| |
| if isQuery { |
| // The client can query if the given public key |
| // would be okay. |
| |
| if len(payload) > 0 { |
| return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) |
| } |
| |
| if candidate.result == nil { |
| okMsg := userAuthPubKeyOkMsg{ |
| Algo: algo, |
| PubKey: pubKeyData, |
| } |
| if err = s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&okMsg)); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| continue userAuthLoop |
| } |
| authErr = candidate.result |
| } else { |
| sig, payload, ok := parseSignature(payload) |
| if !ok || len(payload) > 0 { |
| return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) |
| } |
| // Ensure the declared public key algo is compatible with the |
| // decoded one. This check will ensure we don't accept e.g. |
| // ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com algorithm with ssh-rsa public |
| // key type. The algorithm and public key type must be |
| // consistent: both must be certificate algorithms, or neither. |
| if !contains(algorithmsForKeyFormat(pubKey.Type()), algo) { |
| authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: public key type %q not compatible with selected algorithm %q", |
| pubKey.Type(), algo) |
| break |
| } |
| // Ensure the public key algo and signature algo |
| // are supported. Compare the private key |
| // algorithm name that corresponds to algo with |
| // sig.Format. This is usually the same, but |
| // for certs, the names differ. |
| if !contains(config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms, sig.Format) { |
| authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", sig.Format) |
| break |
| } |
| if !isAlgoCompatible(algo, sig.Format) { |
| authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature %q not compatible with selected algorithm %q", sig.Format, algo) |
| break |
| } |
| |
| signedData := buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID, userAuthReq, algo, pubKeyData) |
| |
| if err := pubKey.Verify(signedData, sig); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| authErr = candidate.result |
| perms = candidate.perms |
| } |
| case "gssapi-with-mic": |
| if config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil { |
| authErr = errors.New("ssh: gssapi-with-mic auth not configured") |
| break |
| } |
| gssapiConfig := config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig |
| userAuthRequestGSSAPI, err := parseGSSAPIPayload(userAuthReq.Payload) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) |
| } |
| // OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication. |
| if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N == 0 { |
| authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: Mechanism negotiation is not supported") |
| break |
| } |
| var i uint32 |
| present := false |
| for i = 0; i < userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N; i++ { |
| if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.OIDS[i].Equal(krb5Mesh) { |
| present = true |
| break |
| } |
| } |
| if !present { |
| authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: GSSAPI authentication must use the Kerberos V5 mechanism") |
| break |
| } |
| // Initial server response, see RFC 4462 section 3.3. |
| if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIResponse{ |
| SupportMech: krb5OID, |
| })); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| // Exchange token, see RFC 4462 section 3.4. |
| packet, err := s.transport.readPacket() |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{} |
| if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| authErr, perms, err = gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token, s, sessionID, |
| userAuthReq) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| default: |
| authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown method %q", userAuthReq.Method) |
| } |
| |
| authErrs = append(authErrs, authErr) |
| |
| if config.AuthLogCallback != nil { |
| config.AuthLogCallback(s, userAuthReq.Method, authErr) |
| } |
| |
| if authErr == nil { |
| break userAuthLoop |
| } |
| |
| authFailures++ |
| if config.MaxAuthTries > 0 && authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries { |
| // If we have hit the max attempts, don't bother sending the |
| // final SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE message, since there are |
| // no more authentication methods which can be attempted, |
| // and this message may cause the client to re-attempt |
| // authentication while we send the disconnect message. |
| // Continue, and trigger the disconnect at the start of |
| // the loop. |
| // |
| // The SSH specification is somewhat confusing about this, |
| // RFC 4252 Section 5.1 requires each authentication failure |
| // be responded to with a respective SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE |
| // message, but Section 4 says the server should disconnect |
| // after some number of attempts, but it isn't explicit which |
| // message should take precedence (i.e. should there be a failure |
| // message than a disconnect message, or if we are going to |
| // disconnect, should we only send that message.) |
| // |
| // Either way, OpenSSH disconnects immediately after the last |
| // failed authnetication attempt, and given they are typically |
| // considered the golden implementation it seems reasonable |
| // to match that behavior. |
| continue |
| } |
| |
| var failureMsg userAuthFailureMsg |
| if config.PasswordCallback != nil { |
| failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "password") |
| } |
| if config.PublicKeyCallback != nil { |
| failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "publickey") |
| } |
| if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback != nil { |
| failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "keyboard-interactive") |
| } |
| if config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig != nil && config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server != nil && |
| config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin != nil { |
| failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "gssapi-with-mic") |
| } |
| |
| if len(failureMsg.Methods) == 0 { |
| return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false") |
| } |
| |
| if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&failureMsg)); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if err := s.transport.writePacket([]byte{msgUserAuthSuccess}); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| return perms, nil |
| } |
| |
| // sshClientKeyboardInteractive implements a ClientKeyboardInteractive by |
| // asking the client on the other side of a ServerConn. |
| type sshClientKeyboardInteractive struct { |
| *connection |
| } |
| |
| func (c *sshClientKeyboardInteractive) Challenge(name, instruction string, questions []string, echos []bool) (answers []string, err error) { |
| if len(questions) != len(echos) { |
| return nil, errors.New("ssh: echos and questions must have equal length") |
| } |
| |
| var prompts []byte |
| for i := range questions { |
| prompts = appendString(prompts, questions[i]) |
| prompts = appendBool(prompts, echos[i]) |
| } |
| |
| if err := c.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthInfoRequestMsg{ |
| Name: name, |
| Instruction: instruction, |
| NumPrompts: uint32(len(questions)), |
| Prompts: prompts, |
| })); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| packet, err := c.transport.readPacket() |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| if packet[0] != msgUserAuthInfoResponse { |
| return nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse, packet[0]) |
| } |
| packet = packet[1:] |
| |
| n, packet, ok := parseUint32(packet) |
| if !ok || int(n) != len(questions) { |
| return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse) |
| } |
| |
| for i := uint32(0); i < n; i++ { |
| ans, rest, ok := parseString(packet) |
| if !ok { |
| return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse) |
| } |
| |
| answers = append(answers, string(ans)) |
| packet = rest |
| } |
| if len(packet) != 0 { |
| return nil, errors.New("ssh: junk at end of message") |
| } |
| |
| return answers, nil |
| } |