internal/genericosv/testdata/yaml/GHSA-7943-82jg-wmw5.yaml - vulndb - Git at Google

 id: GO-TEST-ID
 modules:
     - module: github.com/argoproj/argo-cd
       versions:
         - introduced: 0.4.0
           fixed: 2.2.11
     - module: github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2
       versions:
         - introduced: 2.3.0
           fixed: 2.3.6
         - introduced: 2.4.0
           fixed: 2.4.5
       vulnerable_at: 2.4.4
 summary: Argo CD certificate verification is skipped for connections to OIDC providers
 description: |-
     ### Impact

     All versions of Argo CD starting with v0.4.0 are vulnerable to an improper
     certificate validation bug which could cause Argo CD to trust a malicious (or
     otherwise untrustworthy) OIDC provider.

     (Note: external OIDC provider support was added in v0.11.0. Before that version,
     the notes below apply only to the bundled Dex instance.)

     You are impacted if 1) have SSO enabled and 2) insecure mode is _not_ enabled on
     the API server. In this case, certificate verification is skipped when
     connecting to your OIDC provider for the following tasks: verifying auth tokens
     on API requests and handling SSO login flows. If you are using the bundled Dex
     instance but have _not_ set the `--dex-server` flag on the API server to an
     HTTPS address, then certificate verification is not being skipped (because [TLS
     is not enabled by default for the bundled Dex
     instance](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/issues/9424)).

     Argo CD sends requests to the configured OIDC provider (either the bundled Dex
     instance or an external provider) to 1) retrieve the [OpenID
     configuration](https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html#ProviderConfig),
     2) to retrieve the OIDC provider's key set (at the location determined by the
     [OIDC provider's configured
     `jwks_uri`](https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html#ProviderMetadata)),
     and 3) (during an SSO login) to exchange an authorization code for a token.

     (Note: Starting with v2.3.0, certificate verification is _not_ skipped when
     handling an SSO login flow if 1) you are not using the bundled Dex OIDC provider
     and 2) you have set `oidc.config.rootCA` in the `argocd-cm` ConfigMap.
     Certificate verification is still skipped when verifying tokens on API calls.)

     Skipping certificate verification when communicating with the OIDC provider
     opens Argo CD to a variety of risks. For example, if an attacker can
     successfully intercept, decrypt, and respond to requests bound for the
     configured OIDC provider (a machine-in-the-middle attack), they could
     theoretically issue a "valid" admin token. Verifying the OIDC provider's
     certificate provides an extra layer of protection against such an attack.

     ### Patches

     A patch for this vulnerability has been released in the following Argo CD
     versions:

     * v2.4.5
     * v2.3.6
     * v2.2.11

     **Note:**

     To preserve backwards compatibility, this patch adds a
     `oidc.tls.insecure.skip.verify` option to the `argocd-cm` ConfigMap. The default
     is `"false"`. Before resorting to setting this, you should try to get
     certificate verification to work. If you are using the bundled Dex instance,
     user your Argo CD API server's [TLS
     configuration](https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/tls/)
     since the API server acts as a reverse proxy to Dex. If you are using an
     external OIDC provider, [set the `rootCA`
     config](https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/user-management/#configuring-a-custom-root-ca-certificate-for-communicating-with-the-oidc-provider).

     If these fail, be sure you are aware of the risks before setting
     `oidc.tls.insecure.skip.verify: "true"`.

     ### Workarounds

     There is no complete workaround besides upgrading.

     #### Partial mitigation when using an external OIDC provider

     If you are using an external OIDC provider (not the bundled Dex instance), then
     you can mitigate the issue by setting the `oidc.config.rootCA` field in the
     `argocd-cm` ConfigMap. If your OIDC provider's certificate is self-signed or
     otherwise invalid, you must set the rootCA to a certificate that enables
     verification. If the OIDC provider's certificate passes _without_ an additional
     root CA, then you can set `oidc.config.rootCA` to a bogus non-empty string such
     as `"force cert verification"`. The API server will log a warning, but otherwise
     things should work fine.

     Example:

     ```yaml metadata: name: argocd-cm data: oidc.config: | ... rootCA: | force cert
     verification ```

     This mitigation _only_ forces certificate validation when the API server handles
     login flows. It does not force certificate verification when verifying tokens on
     API calls. To fully resolve the vulnerability, you must upgrade.

     ### References

     * [Argo CD SSO configuration
     documentation](https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/user-management/#sso)

     ### Credits

     @jannfis and @crenshaw-dev discovered the vulnerability when reviewing notes
     from ADA Logics' security audit of the Argo project sponsored by CNCF and
     facilitated by OSTIF. Thanks to Adam Korczynski and David Korczynski for their
     work on the audit.

     ### For more information

     * Open an issue in [the Argo CD issue
     tracker](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/issues) or
     [discussions](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/discussions)
     * Join us on [Slack](https://argoproj.github.io/community/join-slack) in channel
     #argo-cd
 cves:
     - CVE-2022-31105
 ghsas:
     - GHSA-7943-82jg-wmw5
 references:
     - advisory: https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/security/advisories/GHSA-7943-82jg-wmw5
     - advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31105
     - web: https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/releases/tag/v2.3.6
     - web: https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/releases/tag/v2.4.5
 notes:
     - lint: 'description: possible markdown formatting (found ### )'
     - lint: 'description: possible markdown formatting (found [discussions](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/discussions))'
     - lint: 'description: possible markdown formatting (found `--dex-server`)'
     - lint: 'modules[0] "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd": version 2.2.11 does not exist'
     - lint: 'references: too many advisories (found 2, want <=1)'
     - lint: 'summary: must contain an affected module or package path (e.g. "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd")'
	id: GO-TEST-ID
	modules:
	- module: github.com/argoproj/argo-cd
	versions:
	- introduced: 0.4.0
	fixed: 2.2.11
	- module: github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2
	versions:
	- introduced: 2.3.0
	fixed: 2.3.6
	- introduced: 2.4.0
	fixed: 2.4.5
	vulnerable_at: 2.4.4
	summary: Argo CD certificate verification is skipped for connections to OIDC providers
	description: \|-
	### Impact

	All versions of Argo CD starting with v0.4.0 are vulnerable to an improper
	certificate validation bug which could cause Argo CD to trust a malicious (or
	otherwise untrustworthy) OIDC provider.

	(Note: external OIDC provider support was added in v0.11.0. Before that version,
	the notes below apply only to the bundled Dex instance.)

	You are impacted if 1) have SSO enabled and 2) insecure mode is _not_ enabled on
	the API server. In this case, certificate verification is skipped when
	connecting to your OIDC provider for the following tasks: verifying auth tokens
	on API requests and handling SSO login flows. If you are using the bundled Dex
	instance but have _not_ set the `--dex-server` flag on the API server to an
	HTTPS address, then certificate verification is not being skipped (because [TLS
	is not enabled by default for the bundled Dex
	instance](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/issues/9424)).

	Argo CD sends requests to the configured OIDC provider (either the bundled Dex
	instance or an external provider) to 1) retrieve the [OpenID
	configuration](https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html#ProviderConfig),
	2) to retrieve the OIDC provider's key set (at the location determined by the
	[OIDC provider's configured
	`jwks_uri`](https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html#ProviderMetadata)),
	and 3) (during an SSO login) to exchange an authorization code for a token.

	(Note: Starting with v2.3.0, certificate verification is _not_ skipped when
	handling an SSO login flow if 1) you are not using the bundled Dex OIDC provider
	and 2) you have set `oidc.config.rootCA` in the `argocd-cm` ConfigMap.
	Certificate verification is still skipped when verifying tokens on API calls.)

	Skipping certificate verification when communicating with the OIDC provider
	opens Argo CD to a variety of risks. For example, if an attacker can
	successfully intercept, decrypt, and respond to requests bound for the
	configured OIDC provider (a machine-in-the-middle attack), they could
	theoretically issue a "valid" admin token. Verifying the OIDC provider's
	certificate provides an extra layer of protection against such an attack.

	### Patches

	A patch for this vulnerability has been released in the following Argo CD
	versions:

	* v2.4.5
	* v2.3.6
	* v2.2.11

	Note:

	To preserve backwards compatibility, this patch adds a
	`oidc.tls.insecure.skip.verify` option to the `argocd-cm` ConfigMap. The default
	is `"false"`. Before resorting to setting this, you should try to get
	certificate verification to work. If you are using the bundled Dex instance,
	user your Argo CD API server's [TLS
	configuration](https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/tls/)
	since the API server acts as a reverse proxy to Dex. If you are using an
	external OIDC provider, [set the `rootCA`
	config](https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/user-management/#configuring-a-custom-root-ca-certificate-for-communicating-with-the-oidc-provider).

	If these fail, be sure you are aware of the risks before setting
	`oidc.tls.insecure.skip.verify: "true"`.

	### Workarounds

	There is no complete workaround besides upgrading.

	#### Partial mitigation when using an external OIDC provider

	If you are using an external OIDC provider (not the bundled Dex instance), then
	you can mitigate the issue by setting the `oidc.config.rootCA` field in the
	`argocd-cm` ConfigMap. If your OIDC provider's certificate is self-signed or
	otherwise invalid, you must set the rootCA to a certificate that enables
	verification. If the OIDC provider's certificate passes _without_ an additional
	root CA, then you can set `oidc.config.rootCA` to a bogus non-empty string such
	as `"force cert verification"`. The API server will log a warning, but otherwise
	things should work fine.

	Example:

	```yaml metadata: name: argocd-cm data: oidc.config: \| ... rootCA: \| force cert
	verification ```

	This mitigation _only_ forces certificate validation when the API server handles
	login flows. It does not force certificate verification when verifying tokens on
	API calls. To fully resolve the vulnerability, you must upgrade.

	### References

	* [Argo CD SSO configuration
	documentation](https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/user-management/#sso)

	### Credits

	@jannfis and @crenshaw-dev discovered the vulnerability when reviewing notes
	from ADA Logics' security audit of the Argo project sponsored by CNCF and
	facilitated by OSTIF. Thanks to Adam Korczynski and David Korczynski for their
	work on the audit.

	### For more information

	* Open an issue in [the Argo CD issue
	tracker](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/issues) or
	[discussions](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/discussions)
	* Join us on [Slack](https://argoproj.github.io/community/join-slack) in channel
	#argo-cd
	cves:
	- CVE-2022-31105
	ghsas:
	- GHSA-7943-82jg-wmw5
	references:
	- advisory: https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/security/advisories/GHSA-7943-82jg-wmw5
	- advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31105
	- web: https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/releases/tag/v2.3.6
	- web: https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/releases/tag/v2.4.5
	notes:
	- lint: 'description: possible markdown formatting (found ### )'
	- lint: 'description: possible markdown formatting (found [discussions](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/discussions))'
	- lint: 'description: possible markdown formatting (found `--dex-server`)'
	- lint: 'modules[0] "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd": version 2.2.11 does not exist'
	- lint: 'references: too many advisories (found 2, want <=1)'
	- lint: 'summary: must contain an affected module or package path (e.g. "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd")'