| // Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style |
| // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| // Package poly1305 implements Poly1305 one-time message authentication code as |
| // specified in https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf. |
| // |
| // Poly1305 is a fast, one-time authentication function. It is infeasible for an |
| // attacker to generate an authenticator for a message without the key. However, a |
| // key must only be used for a single message. Authenticating two different |
| // messages with the same key allows an attacker to forge authenticators for other |
| // messages with the same key. |
| // |
| // Poly1305 was originally coupled with AES in order to make Poly1305-AES. AES was |
| // used with a fixed key in order to generate one-time keys from an nonce. |
| // However, in this package AES isn't used and the one-time key is specified |
| // directly. |
| package poly1305 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305" |
| |
| import "crypto/subtle" |
| |
| // TagSize is the size, in bytes, of a poly1305 authenticator. |
| const TagSize = 16 |
| |
| // Sum generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and puts the |
| // 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same |
| // key allows an attacker to forge messages at will. |
| func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { |
| h := New(key) |
| h.Write(m) |
| h.Sum(out[:0]) |
| } |
| |
| // Verify returns true if mac is a valid authenticator for m with the given key. |
| func Verify(mac *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) bool { |
| var tmp [16]byte |
| Sum(&tmp, m, key) |
| return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(tmp[:], mac[:]) == 1 |
| } |
| |
| // New returns a new MAC computing an authentication |
| // tag of all data written to it with the given key. |
| // This allows writing the message progressively instead |
| // of passing it as a single slice. Common users should use |
| // the Sum function instead. |
| // |
| // The key must be unique for each message, as authenticating |
| // two different messages with the same key allows an attacker |
| // to forge messages at will. |
| func New(key *[32]byte) *MAC { |
| m := &MAC{} |
| initialize(key, &m.macState) |
| return m |
| } |
| |
| // MAC is an io.Writer computing an authentication tag |
| // of the data written to it. |
| // |
| // MAC cannot be used like common hash.Hash implementations, |
| // because using a poly1305 key twice breaks its security. |
| // Therefore writing data to a running MAC after calling |
| // Sum or Verify causes it to panic. |
| type MAC struct { |
| mac // platform-dependent implementation |
| |
| finalized bool |
| } |
| |
| // Size returns the number of bytes Sum will return. |
| func (h *MAC) Size() int { return TagSize } |
| |
| // Write adds more data to the running message authentication code. |
| // It never returns an error. |
| // |
| // It must not be called after the first call of Sum or Verify. |
| func (h *MAC) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) { |
| if h.finalized { |
| panic("poly1305: write to MAC after Sum or Verify") |
| } |
| return h.mac.Write(p) |
| } |
| |
| // Sum computes the authenticator of all data written to the |
| // message authentication code. |
| func (h *MAC) Sum(b []byte) []byte { |
| var mac [TagSize]byte |
| h.mac.Sum(&mac) |
| h.finalized = true |
| return append(b, mac[:]...) |
| } |
| |
| // Verify returns whether the authenticator of all data written to |
| // the message authentication code matches the expected value. |
| func (h *MAC) Verify(expected []byte) bool { |
| var mac [TagSize]byte |
| h.mac.Sum(&mac) |
| h.finalized = true |
| return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expected, mac[:]) == 1 |
| } |