| // Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. | |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style | |
| // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. | |
| package cipher | |
| import ( | |
| "crypto/subtle" | |
| "errors" | |
| ) | |
| // AEAD is a cipher mode providing authenticated encryption with associated | |
| // data. For a description of the methodology, see | |
| // https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_encryption | |
| type AEAD interface { | |
| // NonceSize returns the size of the nonce that must be passed to Seal | |
| // and Open. | |
| NonceSize() int | |
| // Overhead returns the maximum difference between the lengths of a | |
| // plaintext and its ciphertext. | |
| Overhead() int | |
| // Seal encrypts and authenticates plaintext, authenticates the | |
| // additional data and appends the result to dst, returning the updated | |
| // slice. The nonce must be NonceSize() bytes long and unique for all | |
| // time, for a given key. | |
| // | |
| // The plaintext and dst may alias exactly or not at all. To reuse | |
| // plaintext's storage for the encrypted output, use plaintext[:0] as dst. | |
| Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte | |
| // Open decrypts and authenticates ciphertext, authenticates the | |
| // additional data and, if successful, appends the resulting plaintext | |
| // to dst, returning the updated slice. The nonce must be NonceSize() | |
| // bytes long and both it and the additional data must match the | |
| // value passed to Seal. | |
| // | |
| // The ciphertext and dst may alias exactly or not at all. To reuse | |
| // ciphertext's storage for the decrypted output, use ciphertext[:0] as dst. | |
| // | |
| // Even if the function fails, the contents of dst, up to its capacity, | |
| // may be overwritten. | |
| Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) | |
| } | |
| // gcmAble is an interface implemented by ciphers that have a specific optimized | |
| // implementation of GCM, like crypto/aes. NewGCM will check for this interface | |
| // and return the specific AEAD if found. | |
| type gcmAble interface { | |
| NewGCM(int) (AEAD, error) | |
| } | |
| // gcmFieldElement represents a value in GF(2¹²⁸). In order to reflect the GCM | |
| // standard and make getUint64 suitable for marshaling these values, the bits | |
| // are stored backwards. For example: | |
| // the coefficient of x⁰ can be obtained by v.low >> 63. | |
| // the coefficient of x⁶³ can be obtained by v.low & 1. | |
| // the coefficient of x⁶⁴ can be obtained by v.high >> 63. | |
| // the coefficient of x¹²⁷ can be obtained by v.high & 1. | |
| type gcmFieldElement struct { | |
| low, high uint64 | |
| } | |
| // gcm represents a Galois Counter Mode with a specific key. See | |
| // http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/gcm/gcm-revised-spec.pdf | |
| type gcm struct { | |
| cipher Block | |
| nonceSize int | |
| // productTable contains the first sixteen powers of the key, H. | |
| // However, they are in bit reversed order. See NewGCMWithNonceSize. | |
| productTable [16]gcmFieldElement | |
| } | |
| // NewGCM returns the given 128-bit, block cipher wrapped in Galois Counter Mode | |
| // with the standard nonce length. | |
| func NewGCM(cipher Block) (AEAD, error) { | |
| return NewGCMWithNonceSize(cipher, gcmStandardNonceSize) | |
| } | |
| // NewGCMWithNonceSize returns the given 128-bit, block cipher wrapped in Galois | |
| // Counter Mode, which accepts nonces of the given length. | |
| // | |
| // Only use this function if you require compatibility with an existing | |
| // cryptosystem that uses non-standard nonce lengths. All other users should use | |
| // NewGCM, which is faster and more resistant to misuse. | |
| func NewGCMWithNonceSize(cipher Block, size int) (AEAD, error) { | |
| if cipher, ok := cipher.(gcmAble); ok { | |
| return cipher.NewGCM(size) | |
| } | |
| if cipher.BlockSize() != gcmBlockSize { | |
| return nil, errors.New("cipher: NewGCM requires 128-bit block cipher") | |
| } | |
| var key [gcmBlockSize]byte | |
| cipher.Encrypt(key[:], key[:]) | |
| g := &gcm{cipher: cipher, nonceSize: size} | |
| // We precompute 16 multiples of |key|. However, when we do lookups | |
| // into this table we'll be using bits from a field element and | |
| // therefore the bits will be in the reverse order. So normally one | |
| // would expect, say, 4*key to be in index 4 of the table but due to | |
| // this bit ordering it will actually be in index 0010 (base 2) = 2. | |
| x := gcmFieldElement{ | |
| getUint64(key[:8]), | |
| getUint64(key[8:]), | |
| } | |
| g.productTable[reverseBits(1)] = x | |
| for i := 2; i < 16; i += 2 { | |
| g.productTable[reverseBits(i)] = gcmDouble(&g.productTable[reverseBits(i/2)]) | |
| g.productTable[reverseBits(i+1)] = gcmAdd(&g.productTable[reverseBits(i)], &x) | |
| } | |
| return g, nil | |
| } | |
| const ( | |
| gcmBlockSize = 16 | |
| gcmTagSize = 16 | |
| gcmStandardNonceSize = 12 | |
| ) | |
| func (g *gcm) NonceSize() int { | |
| return g.nonceSize | |
| } | |
| func (*gcm) Overhead() int { | |
| return gcmTagSize | |
| } | |
| func (g *gcm) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte { | |
| if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize { | |
| panic("cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM") | |
| } | |
| if uint64(len(plaintext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*uint64(g.cipher.BlockSize()) { | |
| panic("cipher: message too large for GCM") | |
| } | |
| ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+gcmTagSize) | |
| var counter, tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte | |
| g.deriveCounter(&counter, nonce) | |
| g.cipher.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:]) | |
| gcmInc32(&counter) | |
| g.counterCrypt(out, plaintext, &counter) | |
| g.auth(out[len(plaintext):], out[:len(plaintext)], data, &tagMask) | |
| return ret | |
| } | |
| var errOpen = errors.New("cipher: message authentication failed") | |
| func (g *gcm) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error) { | |
| if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize { | |
| panic("cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM") | |
| } | |
| if len(ciphertext) < gcmTagSize { | |
| return nil, errOpen | |
| } | |
| if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*uint64(g.cipher.BlockSize())+gcmTagSize { | |
| return nil, errOpen | |
| } | |
| tag := ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-gcmTagSize:] | |
| ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-gcmTagSize] | |
| var counter, tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte | |
| g.deriveCounter(&counter, nonce) | |
| g.cipher.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:]) | |
| gcmInc32(&counter) | |
| var expectedTag [gcmTagSize]byte | |
| g.auth(expectedTag[:], ciphertext, data, &tagMask) | |
| ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext)) | |
| if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedTag[:], tag) != 1 { | |
| // The AESNI code decrypts and authenticates concurrently, and | |
| // so overwrites dst in the event of a tag mismatch. That | |
| // behaviour is mimicked here in order to be consistent across | |
| // platforms. | |
| for i := range out { | |
| out[i] = 0 | |
| } | |
| return nil, errOpen | |
| } | |
| g.counterCrypt(out, ciphertext, &counter) | |
| return ret, nil | |
| } | |
| // reverseBits reverses the order of the bits of 4-bit number in i. | |
| func reverseBits(i int) int { | |
| i = ((i << 2) & 0xc) | ((i >> 2) & 0x3) | |
| i = ((i << 1) & 0xa) | ((i >> 1) & 0x5) | |
| return i | |
| } | |
| // gcmAdd adds two elements of GF(2¹²⁸) and returns the sum. | |
| func gcmAdd(x, y *gcmFieldElement) gcmFieldElement { | |
| // Addition in a characteristic 2 field is just XOR. | |
| return gcmFieldElement{x.low ^ y.low, x.high ^ y.high} | |
| } | |
| // gcmDouble returns the result of doubling an element of GF(2¹²⁸). | |
| func gcmDouble(x *gcmFieldElement) (double gcmFieldElement) { | |
| msbSet := x.high&1 == 1 | |
| // Because of the bit-ordering, doubling is actually a right shift. | |
| double.high = x.high >> 1 | |
| double.high |= x.low << 63 | |
| double.low = x.low >> 1 | |
| // If the most-significant bit was set before shifting then it, | |
| // conceptually, becomes a term of x^128. This is greater than the | |
| // irreducible polynomial so the result has to be reduced. The | |
| // irreducible polynomial is 1+x+x^2+x^7+x^128. We can subtract that to | |
| // eliminate the term at x^128 which also means subtracting the other | |
| // four terms. In characteristic 2 fields, subtraction == addition == | |
| // XOR. | |
| if msbSet { | |
| double.low ^= 0xe100000000000000 | |
| } | |
| return | |
| } | |
| var gcmReductionTable = []uint16{ | |
| 0x0000, 0x1c20, 0x3840, 0x2460, 0x7080, 0x6ca0, 0x48c0, 0x54e0, | |
| 0xe100, 0xfd20, 0xd940, 0xc560, 0x9180, 0x8da0, 0xa9c0, 0xb5e0, | |
| } | |
| // mul sets y to y*H, where H is the GCM key, fixed during NewGCMWithNonceSize. | |
| func (g *gcm) mul(y *gcmFieldElement) { | |
| var z gcmFieldElement | |
| for i := 0; i < 2; i++ { | |
| word := y.high | |
| if i == 1 { | |
| word = y.low | |
| } | |
| // Multiplication works by multiplying z by 16 and adding in | |
| // one of the precomputed multiples of H. | |
| for j := 0; j < 64; j += 4 { | |
| msw := z.high & 0xf | |
| z.high >>= 4 | |
| z.high |= z.low << 60 | |
| z.low >>= 4 | |
| z.low ^= uint64(gcmReductionTable[msw]) << 48 | |
| // the values in |table| are ordered for | |
| // little-endian bit positions. See the comment | |
| // in NewGCMWithNonceSize. | |
| t := &g.productTable[word&0xf] | |
| z.low ^= t.low | |
| z.high ^= t.high | |
| word >>= 4 | |
| } | |
| } | |
| *y = z | |
| } | |
| // updateBlocks extends y with more polynomial terms from blocks, based on | |
| // Horner's rule. There must be a multiple of gcmBlockSize bytes in blocks. | |
| func (g *gcm) updateBlocks(y *gcmFieldElement, blocks []byte) { | |
| for len(blocks) > 0 { | |
| y.low ^= getUint64(blocks) | |
| y.high ^= getUint64(blocks[8:]) | |
| g.mul(y) | |
| blocks = blocks[gcmBlockSize:] | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // update extends y with more polynomial terms from data. If data is not a | |
| // multiple of gcmBlockSize bytes long then the remainder is zero padded. | |
| func (g *gcm) update(y *gcmFieldElement, data []byte) { | |
| fullBlocks := (len(data) >> 4) << 4 | |
| g.updateBlocks(y, data[:fullBlocks]) | |
| if len(data) != fullBlocks { | |
| var partialBlock [gcmBlockSize]byte | |
| copy(partialBlock[:], data[fullBlocks:]) | |
| g.updateBlocks(y, partialBlock[:]) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // gcmInc32 treats the final four bytes of counterBlock as a big-endian value | |
| // and increments it. | |
| func gcmInc32(counterBlock *[16]byte) { | |
| for i := gcmBlockSize - 1; i >= gcmBlockSize-4; i-- { | |
| counterBlock[i]++ | |
| if counterBlock[i] != 0 { | |
| break | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // sliceForAppend takes a slice and a requested number of bytes. It returns a | |
| // slice with the contents of the given slice followed by that many bytes and a | |
| // second slice that aliases into it and contains only the extra bytes. If the | |
| // original slice has sufficient capacity then no allocation is performed. | |
| func sliceForAppend(in []byte, n int) (head, tail []byte) { | |
| if total := len(in) + n; cap(in) >= total { | |
| head = in[:total] | |
| } else { | |
| head = make([]byte, total) | |
| copy(head, in) | |
| } | |
| tail = head[len(in):] | |
| return | |
| } | |
| // counterCrypt crypts in to out using g.cipher in counter mode. | |
| func (g *gcm) counterCrypt(out, in []byte, counter *[gcmBlockSize]byte) { | |
| var mask [gcmBlockSize]byte | |
| for len(in) >= gcmBlockSize { | |
| g.cipher.Encrypt(mask[:], counter[:]) | |
| gcmInc32(counter) | |
| xorWords(out, in, mask[:]) | |
| out = out[gcmBlockSize:] | |
| in = in[gcmBlockSize:] | |
| } | |
| if len(in) > 0 { | |
| g.cipher.Encrypt(mask[:], counter[:]) | |
| gcmInc32(counter) | |
| xorBytes(out, in, mask[:]) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // deriveCounter computes the initial GCM counter state from the given nonce. | |
| // See NIST SP 800-38D, section 7.1. This assumes that counter is filled with | |
| // zeros on entry. | |
| func (g *gcm) deriveCounter(counter *[gcmBlockSize]byte, nonce []byte) { | |
| // GCM has two modes of operation with respect to the initial counter | |
| // state: a "fast path" for 96-bit (12-byte) nonces, and a "slow path" | |
| // for nonces of other lengths. For a 96-bit nonce, the nonce, along | |
| // with a four-byte big-endian counter starting at one, is used | |
| // directly as the starting counter. For other nonce sizes, the counter | |
| // is computed by passing it through the GHASH function. | |
| if len(nonce) == gcmStandardNonceSize { | |
| copy(counter[:], nonce) | |
| counter[gcmBlockSize-1] = 1 | |
| } else { | |
| var y gcmFieldElement | |
| g.update(&y, nonce) | |
| y.high ^= uint64(len(nonce)) * 8 | |
| g.mul(&y) | |
| putUint64(counter[:8], y.low) | |
| putUint64(counter[8:], y.high) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // auth calculates GHASH(ciphertext, additionalData), masks the result with | |
| // tagMask and writes the result to out. | |
| func (g *gcm) auth(out, ciphertext, additionalData []byte, tagMask *[gcmTagSize]byte) { | |
| var y gcmFieldElement | |
| g.update(&y, additionalData) | |
| g.update(&y, ciphertext) | |
| y.low ^= uint64(len(additionalData)) * 8 | |
| y.high ^= uint64(len(ciphertext)) * 8 | |
| g.mul(&y) | |
| putUint64(out, y.low) | |
| putUint64(out[8:], y.high) | |
| xorWords(out, out, tagMask[:]) | |
| } | |
| func getUint64(data []byte) uint64 { | |
| r := uint64(data[0])<<56 | | |
| uint64(data[1])<<48 | | |
| uint64(data[2])<<40 | | |
| uint64(data[3])<<32 | | |
| uint64(data[4])<<24 | | |
| uint64(data[5])<<16 | | |
| uint64(data[6])<<8 | | |
| uint64(data[7]) | |
| return r | |
| } | |
| func putUint64(out []byte, v uint64) { | |
| out[0] = byte(v >> 56) | |
| out[1] = byte(v >> 48) | |
| out[2] = byte(v >> 40) | |
| out[3] = byte(v >> 32) | |
| out[4] = byte(v >> 24) | |
| out[5] = byte(v >> 16) | |
| out[6] = byte(v >> 8) | |
| out[7] = byte(v) | |
| } |