| // Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. | |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style | |
| // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. | |
| /* | |
| Package html is a specialization of package template that automates the | |
| construction of HTML output that is safe against code injection. | |
| Introduction | |
| To use this package, invoke the standard template package to parse a template | |
| set, and then use this package’s EscapeSet function to secure the set. | |
| The arguments to EscapeSet are the template set and the names of all templates | |
| that will be passed to Execute. | |
| set, err := new(template.Set).Parse(...) | |
| set, err = EscapeSet(set, "templateName0", ...) | |
| If successful, set will now be injection-safe. Otherwise, the returned set will | |
| be nil and an error, described below, will explain the problem. | |
| The template names do not need to include helper templates but should include | |
| all names x used thus: | |
| set.Execute(out, x, ...) | |
| EscapeSet modifies the named templates in place to treat data values as plain | |
| text safe for embedding in an HTML document. The escaping is contextual, so | |
| actions can appear within JavaScript, CSS, and URI contexts without introducing'hazards. | |
| The security model used by this package assumes that template authors are | |
| trusted, while Execute's data parameter is not. More details are provided below. | |
| Example | |
| tmpls, err := new(template.Set).Parse(`{{define "t'}}Hello, {{.}}!{{end}}`) | |
| when used by itself | |
| tmpls.Execute(out, "t", "<script>alert('you have been pwned')</script>") | |
| produces | |
| Hello, <script>alert('you have been pwned')</script>! | |
| but after securing with EscapeSet like this, | |
| tmpls, err := EscapeSet(tmpls, "t") | |
| tmpls.Execute(out, "t", ...) | |
| produces the safe, escaped HTML output | |
| Hello, <script>alert('you have been pwned')</script>! | |
| Contexts | |
| EscapeSet understands HTML, CSS, JavaScript, and URIs. It adds sanitizing | |
| functions to each simple action pipeline, so given the excerpt | |
| <a href="/search?q={{.}}">{{.}}</a> | |
| EscapeSet will rewrite each {{.}} to add escaping functions where necessary, | |
| in this case, | |
| <a href="/search?q={{. | urlquery}}">{{. | html}}</a> | |
| Errors | |
| See the documentation of ErrorCode for details. | |
| A fuller picture | |
| The rest of this package comment may be skipped on first reading; it includes | |
| details necessary to understand escaping contexts and error messages. Most users | |
| will not need to understand these details. | |
| Contexts | |
| Assuming {{.}} is `O'Reilly: How are <i>you</i>?`, the table below shows | |
| how {{.}} appears when used in the context to the left. | |
| Context {{.}} After | |
| {{.}} O'Reilly: How are <i>you</i>? | |
| <a title='{{.}}'> O'Reilly: How are you? | |
| <a href="/{{.}}"> O'Reilly: How are %3ci%3eyou%3c/i%3e? | |
| <a href="?q={{.}}"> O'Reilly%3a%20How%20are%3ci%3e...%3f | |
| <a onx='f("{{.}}")'> O\x27Reilly: How are \x3ci\x3eyou...? | |
| <a onx='f({{.}})'> "O\x27Reilly: How are \x3ci\x3eyou...?" | |
| <a onx='pattern = /{{.}}/;'> O\x27Reilly: How are \x3ci\x3eyou...\x3f | |
| If used in an unsafe context, then the value might be filtered out: | |
| Context {{.}} After | |
| <a href="{{.}}"> #ZgotmplZ | |
| since "O'Reilly:" is not an allowed protocol like "http:". | |
| If {{.}} is the innocuous word, `left`, then it can appear more widely, | |
| Context {{.}} After | |
| {{.}} left | |
| <a title='{{.}}'> left | |
| <a href='{{.}}'> left | |
| <a href='/{{.}}'> left | |
| <a href='?dir={{.}}'> left | |
| <a style="border-{{.}}: 4px"> left | |
| <a style="align: {{.}}"> left | |
| <a style="background: '{{.}}'> left | |
| <a style="background: url('{{.}}')> left | |
| <style>p.{{.}} {color:red}</style> left | |
| Non-string values can be used in JavaScript contexts. | |
| If {{.}} is | |
| []struct{A,B string}{ "foo", "bar" } | |
| in the escaped template | |
| <script>var pair = {{.}};</script> | |
| then the template output is | |
| <script>var pair = {"A": "foo", "B": "bar"};</script> | |
| See package json to understand how non-string content is marshalled for | |
| embedding in JavaScript contexts. | |
| Typed Strings | |
| By default, EscapeSet assumes all pipelines produce a plain text string. It | |
| adds escaping pipeline stages necessary to correctly and safely embed that | |
| plain text string in the appropriate context. | |
| When a data value is not plain text, you can make sure it is not over-escaped | |
| by marking it with its type. | |
| Types HTML, JS, URL, and others from content.go can carry safe content that is | |
| exempted from escaping. | |
| The template | |
| Hello, {{.}}! | |
| can be invoked with | |
| tmpl.Execute(out, HTML(`<b>World</b>`)) | |
| to produce | |
| Hello, <b>World</b>! | |
| instead of the | |
| Hello, <b>World<b>! | |
| that would have been produced if {{.}} was a regular string. | |
| Security Model | |
| http://js-quasis-libraries-and-repl.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/safetemplate.html#problem_definition defines "safe" as used by this package. | |
| This package assumes that template authors are trusted, that Execute's data | |
| parameter is not, and seeks to preserve the properties below in the face | |
| of untrusted data: | |
| Structure Preservation Property | |
| "... when a template author writes an HTML tag in a safe templating language, | |
| the browser will interpret the corresponding portion of the output as a tag | |
| regardless of the values of untrusted data, and similarly for other structures | |
| such as attribute boundaries and JS and CSS string boundaries." | |
| Code Effect Property | |
| "... only code specified by the template author should run as a result of | |
| injecting the template output into a page and all code specified by the | |
| template author should run as a result of the same." | |
| Least Surprise Property | |
| "A developer (or code reviewer) familiar with HTML, CSS, and JavaScript; | |
| who knows that EscapeSet is applied should be able to look at a {{.}} | |
| and correctly infer what sanitization happens." | |
| */ | |
| package html |