| // Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. | |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style | |
| // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. | |
| package tls | |
| import ( | |
| "context" | |
| "crypto" | |
| "crypto/ecdsa" | |
| "crypto/ed25519" | |
| "crypto/rsa" | |
| "crypto/subtle" | |
| "crypto/x509" | |
| "errors" | |
| "fmt" | |
| "hash" | |
| "io" | |
| "sync/atomic" | |
| "time" | |
| ) | |
| // serverHandshakeState contains details of a server handshake in progress. | |
| // It's discarded once the handshake has completed. | |
| type serverHandshakeState struct { | |
| c *Conn | |
| ctx context.Context | |
| clientHello *clientHelloMsg | |
| hello *serverHelloMsg | |
| suite *cipherSuite | |
| ecdheOk bool | |
| ecSignOk bool | |
| rsaDecryptOk bool | |
| rsaSignOk bool | |
| sessionState *sessionState | |
| finishedHash finishedHash | |
| masterSecret []byte | |
| cert *Certificate | |
| } | |
| // serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server. | |
| func (c *Conn) serverHandshake(ctx context.Context) error { | |
| clientHello, err := c.readClientHello(ctx) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if c.vers == VersionTLS13 { | |
| hs := serverHandshakeStateTLS13{ | |
| c: c, | |
| ctx: ctx, | |
| clientHello: clientHello, | |
| } | |
| return hs.handshake() | |
| } | |
| hs := serverHandshakeState{ | |
| c: c, | |
| ctx: ctx, | |
| clientHello: clientHello, | |
| } | |
| return hs.handshake() | |
| } | |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error { | |
| c := hs.c | |
| if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| // For an overview of TLS handshaking, see RFC 5246, Section 7.3. | |
| c.buffering = true | |
| if hs.checkForResumption() { | |
| // The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake. | |
| c.didResume = true | |
| if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false | |
| if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| // The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't | |
| // valid so we do a full handshake. | |
| if err := hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true | |
| c.buffering = true | |
| if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| } | |
| c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random) | |
| atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1) | |
| return nil | |
| } | |
| // readClientHello reads a ClientHello message and selects the protocol version. | |
| func (c *Conn) readClientHello(ctx context.Context) (*clientHelloMsg, error) { | |
| msg, err := c.readHandshake() | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg) | |
| if !ok { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) | |
| return nil, unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg) | |
| } | |
| var configForClient *Config | |
| originalConfig := c.config | |
| if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil { | |
| chi := clientHelloInfo(ctx, c, clientHello) | |
| if configForClient, err = c.config.GetConfigForClient(chi); err != nil { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) | |
| return nil, err | |
| } else if configForClient != nil { | |
| c.config = configForClient | |
| } | |
| } | |
| c.ticketKeys = originalConfig.ticketKeys(configForClient) | |
| clientVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions | |
| if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 { | |
| clientVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers) | |
| } | |
| c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(roleServer, clientVersions) | |
| if !ok { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) | |
| return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered only unsupported versions: %x", clientVersions) | |
| } | |
| c.haveVers = true | |
| c.in.version = c.vers | |
| c.out.version = c.vers | |
| return clientHello, nil | |
| } | |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processClientHello() error { | |
| c := hs.c | |
| hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg) | |
| hs.hello.vers = c.vers | |
| foundCompression := false | |
| // We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it. | |
| for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods { | |
| if compression == compressionNone { | |
| foundCompression = true | |
| break | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if !foundCompression { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) | |
| return errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections") | |
| } | |
| hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32) | |
| serverRandom := hs.hello.random | |
| // Downgrade protection canaries. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.3. | |
| maxVers := c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) | |
| if maxVers >= VersionTLS12 && c.vers < maxVers || testingOnlyForceDowngradeCanary { | |
| if c.vers == VersionTLS12 { | |
| copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS12) | |
| } else { | |
| copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS11) | |
| } | |
| serverRandom = serverRandom[:24] | |
| } | |
| _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), serverRandom) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) | |
| return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension") | |
| } | |
| hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported | |
| hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone | |
| if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 { | |
| c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName | |
| } | |
| selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol) | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto | |
| c.clientProtocol = selectedProto | |
| hs.cert, err = c.config.getCertificate(clientHelloInfo(hs.ctx, c, hs.clientHello)) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| if err == errNoCertificates { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnrecognizedName) | |
| } else { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) | |
| } | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if hs.clientHello.scts { | |
| hs.hello.scts = hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps | |
| } | |
| hs.ecdheOk = supportsECDHE(c.config, hs.clientHello.supportedCurves, hs.clientHello.supportedPoints) | |
| if hs.ecdheOk { | |
| // Although omitting the ec_point_formats extension is permitted, some | |
| // old OpenSSL version will refuse to handshake if not present. | |
| // | |
| // Per RFC 4492, section 5.1.2, implementations MUST support the | |
| // uncompressed point format. See golang.org/issue/31943. | |
| hs.hello.supportedPoints = []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed} | |
| } | |
| if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok { | |
| switch priv.Public().(type) { | |
| case *ecdsa.PublicKey: | |
| hs.ecSignOk = true | |
| case ed25519.PublicKey: | |
| hs.ecSignOk = true | |
| case *rsa.PublicKey: | |
| hs.rsaSignOk = true | |
| default: | |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) | |
| return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported signing key type (%T)", priv.Public()) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter); ok { | |
| switch priv.Public().(type) { | |
| case *rsa.PublicKey: | |
| hs.rsaDecryptOk = true | |
| default: | |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) | |
| return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported decryption key type (%T)", priv.Public()) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return nil | |
| } | |
| // negotiateALPN picks a shared ALPN protocol that both sides support in server | |
| // preference order. If ALPN is not configured or the peer doesn't support it, | |
| // it returns "" and no error. | |
| func negotiateALPN(serverProtos, clientProtos []string) (string, error) { | |
| if len(serverProtos) == 0 || len(clientProtos) == 0 { | |
| return "", nil | |
| } | |
| var http11fallback bool | |
| for _, s := range serverProtos { | |
| for _, c := range clientProtos { | |
| if s == c { | |
| return s, nil | |
| } | |
| if s == "h2" && c == "http/1.1" { | |
| http11fallback = true | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // As a special case, let http/1.1 clients connect to h2 servers as if they | |
| // didn't support ALPN. We used not to enforce protocol overlap, so over | |
| // time a number of HTTP servers were configured with only "h2", but | |
| // expected to accept connections from "http/1.1" clients. See Issue 46310. | |
| if http11fallback { | |
| return "", nil | |
| } | |
| return "", fmt.Errorf("tls: client requested unsupported application protocols (%s)", clientProtos) | |
| } | |
| // supportsECDHE returns whether ECDHE key exchanges can be used with this | |
| // pre-TLS 1.3 client. | |
| func supportsECDHE(c *Config, supportedCurves []CurveID, supportedPoints []uint8) bool { | |
| supportsCurve := false | |
| for _, curve := range supportedCurves { | |
| if c.supportsCurve(curve) { | |
| supportsCurve = true | |
| break | |
| } | |
| } | |
| supportsPointFormat := false | |
| for _, pointFormat := range supportedPoints { | |
| if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed { | |
| supportsPointFormat = true | |
| break | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return supportsCurve && supportsPointFormat | |
| } | |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error { | |
| c := hs.c | |
| preferenceOrder := cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder | |
| if !hasAESGCMHardwareSupport || !aesgcmPreferred(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites) { | |
| preferenceOrder = cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES | |
| } | |
| configCipherSuites := c.config.cipherSuites() | |
| preferenceList := make([]uint16, 0, len(configCipherSuites)) | |
| for _, suiteID := range preferenceOrder { | |
| for _, id := range configCipherSuites { | |
| if id == suiteID { | |
| preferenceList = append(preferenceList, id) | |
| break | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| hs.suite = selectCipherSuite(preferenceList, hs.clientHello.cipherSuites, hs.cipherSuiteOk) | |
| if hs.suite == nil { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) | |
| return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server") | |
| } | |
| c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id | |
| for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites { | |
| if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV { | |
| // The client is doing a fallback connection. See RFC 7507. | |
| if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback) | |
| return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback") | |
| } | |
| break | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return nil | |
| } | |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) cipherSuiteOk(c *cipherSuite) bool { | |
| if c.flags&suiteECDHE != 0 { | |
| if !hs.ecdheOk { | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| if c.flags&suiteECSign != 0 { | |
| if !hs.ecSignOk { | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| } else if !hs.rsaSignOk { | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| } else if !hs.rsaDecryptOk { | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| if hs.c.vers < VersionTLS12 && c.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 { | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| return true | |
| } | |
| // checkForResumption reports whether we should perform resumption on this connection. | |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkForResumption() bool { | |
| c := hs.c | |
| if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled { | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| plaintext, usedOldKey := c.decryptTicket(hs.clientHello.sessionTicket) | |
| if plaintext == nil { | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| hs.sessionState = &sessionState{usedOldKey: usedOldKey} | |
| ok := hs.sessionState.unmarshal(plaintext) | |
| if !ok { | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| createdAt := time.Unix(int64(hs.sessionState.createdAt), 0) | |
| if c.config.time().Sub(createdAt) > maxSessionTicketLifetime { | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| // Never resume a session for a different TLS version. | |
| if c.vers != hs.sessionState.vers { | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| cipherSuiteOk := false | |
| // Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session. | |
| for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites { | |
| if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite { | |
| cipherSuiteOk = true | |
| break | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if !cipherSuiteOk { | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| // Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session. | |
| hs.suite = selectCipherSuite([]uint16{hs.sessionState.cipherSuite}, | |
| c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.cipherSuiteOk) | |
| if hs.suite == nil { | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0 | |
| needClientCerts := requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth) | |
| if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts { | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert { | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| return true | |
| } | |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error { | |
| c := hs.c | |
| hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id | |
| c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id | |
| // We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know | |
| // that we're doing a resumption. | |
| hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId | |
| hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey | |
| hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite) | |
| hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() | |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal()) | |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal()) | |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{ | |
| Certificate: hs.sessionState.certificates, | |
| }); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil { | |
| if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| } | |
| hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret | |
| return nil | |
| } | |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error { | |
| c := hs.c | |
| if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 { | |
| hs.hello.ocspStapling = true | |
| } | |
| hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled | |
| hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id | |
| hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(hs.c.vers, hs.suite) | |
| if c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert { | |
| // No need to keep a full record of the handshake if client | |
| // certificates won't be used. | |
| hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() | |
| } | |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal()) | |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal()) | |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| certMsg := new(certificateMsg) | |
| certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate | |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) | |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if hs.hello.ocspStapling { | |
| certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg) | |
| certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple | |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(certStatus.marshal()) | |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal()); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| } | |
| keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers) | |
| skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, hs.clientHello, hs.hello) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if skx != nil { | |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal()) | |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal()); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| } | |
| var certReq *certificateRequestMsg | |
| if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert { | |
| // Request a client certificate | |
| certReq = new(certificateRequestMsg) | |
| certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{ | |
| byte(certTypeRSASign), | |
| byte(certTypeECDSASign), | |
| } | |
| if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 { | |
| certReq.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true | |
| certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms() | |
| } | |
| // An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to | |
| // the client that it may send any certificate in response | |
| // to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then | |
| // we can send them down, so that the client can choose | |
| // an appropriate certificate to give to us. | |
| if c.config.ClientCAs != nil { | |
| certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects() | |
| } | |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal()) | |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| } | |
| helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg) | |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal()) | |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal()); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any | |
| msg, err := c.readHandshake() | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| // If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a | |
| // certificate message, even if it's empty. | |
| if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert { | |
| certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg) | |
| if !ok { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) | |
| return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg) | |
| } | |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) | |
| if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{ | |
| Certificate: certMsg.certificates, | |
| }); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if len(certMsg.certificates) != 0 { | |
| pub = c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey | |
| } | |
| msg, err = c.readHandshake() | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil { | |
| if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // Get client key exchange | |
| ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg) | |
| if !ok { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) | |
| return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg) | |
| } | |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal()) | |
| preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random) | |
| if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, hs.clientHello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| // If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message, | |
| // the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the | |
| // clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding | |
| // handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding | |
| // to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in | |
| // possession of the private key of the certificate. | |
| if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 { | |
| msg, err = c.readHandshake() | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg) | |
| if !ok { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) | |
| return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg) | |
| } | |
| var sigType uint8 | |
| var sigHash crypto.Hash | |
| if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 { | |
| if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) | |
| return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm") | |
| } | |
| sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| } | |
| signed := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, sigHash, hs.masterSecret) | |
| if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, pub, sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError) | |
| return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error()) | |
| } | |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal()) | |
| } | |
| hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() | |
| return nil | |
| } | |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) establishKeys() error { | |
| c := hs.c | |
| clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV := | |
| keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen) | |
| var clientCipher, serverCipher any | |
| var clientHash, serverHash hash.Hash | |
| if hs.suite.aead == nil { | |
| clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */) | |
| clientHash = hs.suite.mac(clientMAC) | |
| serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */) | |
| serverHash = hs.suite.mac(serverMAC) | |
| } else { | |
| clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV) | |
| serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV) | |
| } | |
| c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash) | |
| c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash) | |
| return nil | |
| } | |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error { | |
| c := hs.c | |
| if err := c.readChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| msg, err := c.readHandshake() | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg) | |
| if !ok { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) | |
| return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg) | |
| } | |
| verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret) | |
| if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) || | |
| subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) | |
| return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect") | |
| } | |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal()) | |
| copy(out, verify) | |
| return nil | |
| } | |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error { | |
| // ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the | |
| // ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session | |
| // ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent. | |
| if !hs.hello.ticketSupported { | |
| return nil | |
| } | |
| c := hs.c | |
| m := new(newSessionTicketMsg) | |
| createdAt := uint64(c.config.time().Unix()) | |
| if hs.sessionState != nil { | |
| // If this is re-wrapping an old key, then keep | |
| // the original time it was created. | |
| createdAt = hs.sessionState.createdAt | |
| } | |
| var certsFromClient [][]byte | |
| for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates { | |
| certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw) | |
| } | |
| state := sessionState{ | |
| vers: c.vers, | |
| cipherSuite: hs.suite.id, | |
| createdAt: createdAt, | |
| masterSecret: hs.masterSecret, | |
| certificates: certsFromClient, | |
| } | |
| var err error | |
| m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(state.marshal()) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(m.marshal()) | |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| return nil | |
| } | |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error { | |
| c := hs.c | |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| finished := new(finishedMsg) | |
| finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret) | |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal()) | |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| copy(out, finished.verifyData) | |
| return nil | |
| } | |
| // processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a | |
| // Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns | |
| // the public key of the leaf certificate. | |
| func (c *Conn) processCertsFromClient(certificate Certificate) error { | |
| certificates := certificate.Certificate | |
| certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates)) | |
| var err error | |
| for i, asn1Data := range certificates { | |
| if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) | |
| return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error()) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if len(certs) == 0 && requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth) { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) | |
| return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate") | |
| } | |
| if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 { | |
| opts := x509.VerifyOptions{ | |
| IsBoring: isBoringCertificate, | |
| Roots: c.config.ClientCAs, | |
| CurrentTime: c.config.time(), | |
| Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(), | |
| KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth}, | |
| } | |
| for _, cert := range certs[1:] { | |
| opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert) | |
| } | |
| chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) | |
| return errors.New("tls: failed to verify client certificate: " + err.Error()) | |
| } | |
| c.verifiedChains = chains | |
| } | |
| c.peerCertificates = certs | |
| c.ocspResponse = certificate.OCSPStaple | |
| c.scts = certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps | |
| if len(certs) > 0 { | |
| switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) { | |
| case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey, ed25519.PublicKey: | |
| default: | |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate) | |
| return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil { | |
| if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil { | |
| c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return nil | |
| } | |
| func clientHelloInfo(ctx context.Context, c *Conn, clientHello *clientHelloMsg) *ClientHelloInfo { | |
| supportedVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions | |
| if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 { | |
| supportedVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers) | |
| } | |
| return &ClientHelloInfo{ | |
| CipherSuites: clientHello.cipherSuites, | |
| ServerName: clientHello.serverName, | |
| SupportedCurves: clientHello.supportedCurves, | |
| SupportedPoints: clientHello.supportedPoints, | |
| SignatureSchemes: clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, | |
| SupportedProtos: clientHello.alpnProtocols, | |
| SupportedVersions: supportedVersions, | |
| Conn: c.conn, | |
| config: c.config, | |
| ctx: ctx, | |
| } | |
| } |