| // Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style |
| // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| package tls |
| |
| import ( |
| "context" |
| "crypto" |
| "crypto/ecdsa" |
| "crypto/ed25519" |
| "crypto/rsa" |
| "crypto/subtle" |
| "crypto/x509" |
| "errors" |
| "fmt" |
| "hash" |
| "io" |
| "sync/atomic" |
| "time" |
| ) |
| |
| // serverHandshakeState contains details of a server handshake in progress. |
| // It's discarded once the handshake has completed. |
| type serverHandshakeState struct { |
| c *Conn |
| ctx context.Context |
| clientHello *clientHelloMsg |
| hello *serverHelloMsg |
| suite *cipherSuite |
| ecdheOk bool |
| ecSignOk bool |
| rsaDecryptOk bool |
| rsaSignOk bool |
| sessionState *sessionState |
| finishedHash finishedHash |
| masterSecret []byte |
| cert *Certificate |
| } |
| |
| // serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server. |
| func (c *Conn) serverHandshake(ctx context.Context) error { |
| clientHello, err := c.readClientHello(ctx) |
| if err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| if c.vers == VersionTLS13 { |
| hs := serverHandshakeStateTLS13{ |
| c: c, |
| ctx: ctx, |
| clientHello: clientHello, |
| } |
| return hs.handshake() |
| } |
| |
| hs := serverHandshakeState{ |
| c: c, |
| ctx: ctx, |
| clientHello: clientHello, |
| } |
| return hs.handshake() |
| } |
| |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error { |
| c := hs.c |
| |
| if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| // For an overview of TLS handshaking, see RFC 5246, Section 7.3. |
| c.buffering = true |
| if hs.checkForResumption() { |
| // The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake. |
| c.didResume = true |
| if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false |
| if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| } else { |
| // The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't |
| // valid so we do a full handshake. |
| if err := hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true |
| c.buffering = true |
| if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| } |
| |
| c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random) |
| atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1) |
| |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| // readClientHello reads a ClientHello message and selects the protocol version. |
| func (c *Conn) readClientHello(ctx context.Context) (*clientHelloMsg, error) { |
| msg, err := c.readHandshake() |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg) |
| if !ok { |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) |
| return nil, unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg) |
| } |
| |
| var configForClient *Config |
| originalConfig := c.config |
| if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil { |
| chi := clientHelloInfo(ctx, c, clientHello) |
| if configForClient, err = c.config.GetConfigForClient(chi); err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) |
| return nil, err |
| } else if configForClient != nil { |
| c.config = configForClient |
| } |
| } |
| c.ticketKeys = originalConfig.ticketKeys(configForClient) |
| |
| clientVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions |
| if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 { |
| clientVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers) |
| } |
| c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(clientVersions) |
| if !ok { |
| c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) |
| return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered only unsupported versions: %x", clientVersions) |
| } |
| c.haveVers = true |
| c.in.version = c.vers |
| c.out.version = c.vers |
| |
| return clientHello, nil |
| } |
| |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processClientHello() error { |
| c := hs.c |
| |
| hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg) |
| hs.hello.vers = c.vers |
| |
| foundCompression := false |
| // We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it. |
| for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods { |
| if compression == compressionNone { |
| foundCompression = true |
| break |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if !foundCompression { |
| c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) |
| return errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections") |
| } |
| |
| hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32) |
| serverRandom := hs.hello.random |
| // Downgrade protection canaries. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.3. |
| maxVers := c.config.maxSupportedVersion() |
| if maxVers >= VersionTLS12 && c.vers < maxVers || testingOnlyForceDowngradeCanary { |
| if c.vers == VersionTLS12 { |
| copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS12) |
| } else { |
| copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS11) |
| } |
| serverRandom = serverRandom[:24] |
| } |
| _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), serverRandom) |
| if err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 { |
| c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) |
| return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension") |
| } |
| |
| hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported |
| hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone |
| if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 { |
| c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName |
| } |
| |
| if len(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols) > 0 { |
| if selectedProto := mutualProtocol(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, c.config.NextProtos); selectedProto != "" { |
| hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto |
| c.clientProtocol = selectedProto |
| } |
| } |
| |
| hs.cert, err = c.config.getCertificate(clientHelloInfo(hs.ctx, c, hs.clientHello)) |
| if err != nil { |
| if err == errNoCertificates { |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnrecognizedName) |
| } else { |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) |
| } |
| return err |
| } |
| if hs.clientHello.scts { |
| hs.hello.scts = hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps |
| } |
| |
| hs.ecdheOk = supportsECDHE(c.config, hs.clientHello.supportedCurves, hs.clientHello.supportedPoints) |
| |
| if hs.ecdheOk { |
| // Although omitting the ec_point_formats extension is permitted, some |
| // old OpenSSL version will refuse to handshake if not present. |
| // |
| // Per RFC 4492, section 5.1.2, implementations MUST support the |
| // uncompressed point format. See golang.org/issue/31943. |
| hs.hello.supportedPoints = []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed} |
| } |
| |
| if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok { |
| switch priv.Public().(type) { |
| case *ecdsa.PublicKey: |
| hs.ecSignOk = true |
| case ed25519.PublicKey: |
| hs.ecSignOk = true |
| case *rsa.PublicKey: |
| hs.rsaSignOk = true |
| default: |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) |
| return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported signing key type (%T)", priv.Public()) |
| } |
| } |
| if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter); ok { |
| switch priv.Public().(type) { |
| case *rsa.PublicKey: |
| hs.rsaDecryptOk = true |
| default: |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) |
| return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported decryption key type (%T)", priv.Public()) |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| // supportsECDHE returns whether ECDHE key exchanges can be used with this |
| // pre-TLS 1.3 client. |
| func supportsECDHE(c *Config, supportedCurves []CurveID, supportedPoints []uint8) bool { |
| supportsCurve := false |
| for _, curve := range supportedCurves { |
| if c.supportsCurve(curve) { |
| supportsCurve = true |
| break |
| } |
| } |
| |
| supportsPointFormat := false |
| for _, pointFormat := range supportedPoints { |
| if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed { |
| supportsPointFormat = true |
| break |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return supportsCurve && supportsPointFormat |
| } |
| |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error { |
| c := hs.c |
| |
| var preferenceList, supportedList []uint16 |
| if c.config.PreferServerCipherSuites { |
| preferenceList = c.config.cipherSuites() |
| supportedList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites |
| |
| // If the client does not seem to have hardware support for AES-GCM, |
| // and the application did not specify a cipher suite preference order, |
| // prefer other AEAD ciphers even if we prioritized AES-GCM ciphers |
| // by default. |
| if c.config.CipherSuites == nil && !aesgcmPreferred(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites) { |
| preferenceList = deprioritizeAES(preferenceList) |
| } |
| } else { |
| preferenceList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites |
| supportedList = c.config.cipherSuites() |
| |
| // If we don't have hardware support for AES-GCM, prefer other AEAD |
| // ciphers even if the client prioritized AES-GCM. |
| if !hasAESGCMHardwareSupport { |
| preferenceList = deprioritizeAES(preferenceList) |
| } |
| } |
| |
| hs.suite = selectCipherSuite(preferenceList, supportedList, hs.cipherSuiteOk) |
| if hs.suite == nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) |
| return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server") |
| } |
| c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id |
| |
| for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites { |
| if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV { |
| // The client is doing a fallback connection. See RFC 7507. |
| if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.maxSupportedVersion() { |
| c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback) |
| return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback") |
| } |
| break |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) cipherSuiteOk(c *cipherSuite) bool { |
| if c.flags&suiteECDHE != 0 { |
| if !hs.ecdheOk { |
| return false |
| } |
| if c.flags&suiteECSign != 0 { |
| if !hs.ecSignOk { |
| return false |
| } |
| } else if !hs.rsaSignOk { |
| return false |
| } |
| } else if !hs.rsaDecryptOk { |
| return false |
| } |
| if hs.c.vers < VersionTLS12 && c.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 { |
| return false |
| } |
| return true |
| } |
| |
| // checkForResumption reports whether we should perform resumption on this connection. |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkForResumption() bool { |
| c := hs.c |
| |
| if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled { |
| return false |
| } |
| |
| plaintext, usedOldKey := c.decryptTicket(hs.clientHello.sessionTicket) |
| if plaintext == nil { |
| return false |
| } |
| hs.sessionState = &sessionState{usedOldKey: usedOldKey} |
| ok := hs.sessionState.unmarshal(plaintext) |
| if !ok { |
| return false |
| } |
| |
| createdAt := time.Unix(int64(hs.sessionState.createdAt), 0) |
| if c.config.time().Sub(createdAt) > maxSessionTicketLifetime { |
| return false |
| } |
| |
| // Never resume a session for a different TLS version. |
| if c.vers != hs.sessionState.vers { |
| return false |
| } |
| |
| cipherSuiteOk := false |
| // Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session. |
| for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites { |
| if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite { |
| cipherSuiteOk = true |
| break |
| } |
| } |
| if !cipherSuiteOk { |
| return false |
| } |
| |
| // Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session. |
| hs.suite = selectCipherSuite([]uint16{hs.sessionState.cipherSuite}, |
| c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.cipherSuiteOk) |
| if hs.suite == nil { |
| return false |
| } |
| |
| sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0 |
| needClientCerts := requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth) |
| if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts { |
| return false |
| } |
| if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert { |
| return false |
| } |
| |
| return true |
| } |
| |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error { |
| c := hs.c |
| |
| hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id |
| c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id |
| // We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know |
| // that we're doing a resumption. |
| hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId |
| hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey |
| hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite) |
| hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal()) |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal()) |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{ |
| Certificate: hs.sessionState.certificates, |
| }); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil { |
| if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) |
| return err |
| } |
| } |
| |
| hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret |
| |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error { |
| c := hs.c |
| |
| if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 { |
| hs.hello.ocspStapling = true |
| } |
| |
| hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled |
| hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id |
| |
| hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(hs.c.vers, hs.suite) |
| if c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert { |
| // No need to keep a full record of the handshake if client |
| // certificates won't be used. |
| hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() |
| } |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal()) |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal()) |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| certMsg := new(certificateMsg) |
| certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| if hs.hello.ocspStapling { |
| certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg) |
| certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(certStatus.marshal()) |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal()); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| } |
| |
| keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers) |
| skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, hs.clientHello, hs.hello) |
| if err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) |
| return err |
| } |
| if skx != nil { |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal()) |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal()); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| } |
| |
| var certReq *certificateRequestMsg |
| if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert { |
| // Request a client certificate |
| certReq = new(certificateRequestMsg) |
| certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{ |
| byte(certTypeRSASign), |
| byte(certTypeECDSASign), |
| } |
| if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 { |
| certReq.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true |
| certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms |
| } |
| |
| // An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to |
| // the client that it may send any certificate in response |
| // to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then |
| // we can send them down, so that the client can choose |
| // an appropriate certificate to give to us. |
| if c.config.ClientCAs != nil { |
| certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects() |
| } |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal()) |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| } |
| |
| helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg) |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal()) |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal()); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any |
| |
| msg, err := c.readHandshake() |
| if err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| // If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a |
| // certificate message, even if it's empty. |
| if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert { |
| certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg) |
| if !ok { |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) |
| return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg) |
| } |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) |
| |
| if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{ |
| Certificate: certMsg.certificates, |
| }); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| if len(certMsg.certificates) != 0 { |
| pub = c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey |
| } |
| |
| msg, err = c.readHandshake() |
| if err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| } |
| if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil { |
| if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) |
| return err |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Get client key exchange |
| ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg) |
| if !ok { |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) |
| return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg) |
| } |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal()) |
| |
| preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers) |
| if err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) |
| return err |
| } |
| hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random) |
| if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, hs.clientHello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| // If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message, |
| // the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the |
| // clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding |
| // handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding |
| // to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in |
| // possession of the private key of the certificate. |
| if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 { |
| msg, err = c.readHandshake() |
| if err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg) |
| if !ok { |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) |
| return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg) |
| } |
| |
| var sigType uint8 |
| var sigHash crypto.Hash |
| if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 { |
| if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) { |
| c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) |
| return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm") |
| } |
| sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm) |
| if err != nil { |
| return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) |
| } |
| } else { |
| sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub) |
| if err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) |
| return err |
| } |
| } |
| |
| signed := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, sigHash, hs.masterSecret) |
| if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, pub, sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError) |
| return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error()) |
| } |
| |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal()) |
| } |
| |
| hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() |
| |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) establishKeys() error { |
| c := hs.c |
| |
| clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV := |
| keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen) |
| |
| var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{} |
| var clientHash, serverHash hash.Hash |
| |
| if hs.suite.aead == nil { |
| clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */) |
| clientHash = hs.suite.mac(clientMAC) |
| serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */) |
| serverHash = hs.suite.mac(serverMAC) |
| } else { |
| clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV) |
| serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV) |
| } |
| |
| c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash) |
| c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash) |
| |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error { |
| c := hs.c |
| |
| if err := c.readChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| msg, err := c.readHandshake() |
| if err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg) |
| if !ok { |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) |
| return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg) |
| } |
| |
| verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret) |
| if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) || |
| subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 { |
| c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) |
| return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect") |
| } |
| |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal()) |
| copy(out, verify) |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error { |
| // ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the |
| // ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session |
| // ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent. |
| if !hs.hello.ticketSupported { |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| c := hs.c |
| m := new(newSessionTicketMsg) |
| |
| createdAt := uint64(c.config.time().Unix()) |
| if hs.sessionState != nil { |
| // If this is re-wrapping an old key, then keep |
| // the original time it was created. |
| createdAt = hs.sessionState.createdAt |
| } |
| |
| var certsFromClient [][]byte |
| for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates { |
| certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw) |
| } |
| state := sessionState{ |
| vers: c.vers, |
| cipherSuite: hs.suite.id, |
| createdAt: createdAt, |
| masterSecret: hs.masterSecret, |
| certificates: certsFromClient, |
| } |
| var err error |
| m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(state.marshal()) |
| if err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(m.marshal()) |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error { |
| c := hs.c |
| |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| finished := new(finishedMsg) |
| finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret) |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal()) |
| if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| copy(out, finished.verifyData) |
| |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| // processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a |
| // Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns |
| // the public key of the leaf certificate. |
| func (c *Conn) processCertsFromClient(certificate Certificate) error { |
| certificates := certificate.Certificate |
| certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates)) |
| var err error |
| for i, asn1Data := range certificates { |
| if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) |
| return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error()) |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if len(certs) == 0 && requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth) { |
| c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) |
| return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate") |
| } |
| |
| if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 { |
| opts := x509.VerifyOptions{ |
| Roots: c.config.ClientCAs, |
| CurrentTime: c.config.time(), |
| Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(), |
| KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth}, |
| } |
| |
| for _, cert := range certs[1:] { |
| opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert) |
| } |
| |
| chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts) |
| if err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) |
| return errors.New("tls: failed to verify client certificate: " + err.Error()) |
| } |
| |
| c.verifiedChains = chains |
| } |
| |
| c.peerCertificates = certs |
| c.ocspResponse = certificate.OCSPStaple |
| c.scts = certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps |
| |
| if len(certs) > 0 { |
| switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) { |
| case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey, ed25519.PublicKey: |
| default: |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate) |
| return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey) |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil { |
| if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) |
| return err |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| func clientHelloInfo(ctx context.Context, c *Conn, clientHello *clientHelloMsg) *ClientHelloInfo { |
| supportedVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions |
| if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 { |
| supportedVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers) |
| } |
| |
| return &ClientHelloInfo{ |
| CipherSuites: clientHello.cipherSuites, |
| ServerName: clientHello.serverName, |
| SupportedCurves: clientHello.supportedCurves, |
| SupportedPoints: clientHello.supportedPoints, |
| SignatureSchemes: clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, |
| SupportedProtos: clientHello.alpnProtocols, |
| SupportedVersions: supportedVersions, |
| Conn: c.conn, |
| config: c.config, |
| ctx: ctx, |
| } |
| } |