| // Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. | |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style | |
| // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. | |
| // Package x509 parses X.509-encoded keys and certificates. | |
| package x509 | |
| import ( | |
| "bytes" | |
| "crypto" | |
| "crypto/dsa" | |
| "crypto/ecdsa" | |
| "crypto/ed25519" | |
| "crypto/elliptic" | |
| "crypto/rsa" | |
| "crypto/sha1" | |
| _ "crypto/sha256" | |
| _ "crypto/sha512" | |
| "crypto/x509/pkix" | |
| "encoding/asn1" | |
| "encoding/pem" | |
| "errors" | |
| "fmt" | |
| "io" | |
| "math/big" | |
| "net" | |
| "net/url" | |
| "strconv" | |
| "strings" | |
| "time" | |
| "unicode" | |
| "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte" | |
| cryptobyte_asn1 "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1" | |
| ) | |
| // pkixPublicKey reflects a PKIX public key structure. See SubjectPublicKeyInfo | |
| // in RFC 3280. | |
| type pkixPublicKey struct { | |
| Algo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier | |
| BitString asn1.BitString | |
| } | |
| // ParsePKIXPublicKey parses a public key in PKIX, ASN.1 DER form. | |
| // The encoded public key is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure | |
| // (see RFC 5280, Section 4.1). | |
| // | |
| // It returns a *rsa.PublicKey, *dsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey, or | |
| // ed25519.PublicKey. More types might be supported in the future. | |
| // | |
| // This kind of key is commonly encoded in PEM blocks of type "PUBLIC KEY". | |
| func ParsePKIXPublicKey(derBytes []byte) (pub interface{}, err error) { | |
| var pki publicKeyInfo | |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(derBytes, &pki); err != nil { | |
| if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(derBytes, &pkcs1PublicKey{}); err == nil { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to parse public key (use ParsePKCS1PublicKey instead for this key format)") | |
| } | |
| return nil, err | |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after ASN.1 of public-key") | |
| } | |
| algo := getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(pki.Algorithm.Algorithm) | |
| if algo == UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: unknown public key algorithm") | |
| } | |
| return parsePublicKey(algo, &pki) | |
| } | |
| func marshalPublicKey(pub interface{}) (publicKeyBytes []byte, publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier, err error) { | |
| switch pub := pub.(type) { | |
| case *rsa.PublicKey: | |
| publicKeyBytes, err = asn1.Marshal(pkcs1PublicKey{ | |
| N: pub.N, | |
| E: pub.E, | |
| }) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, err | |
| } | |
| publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyRSA | |
| // This is a NULL parameters value which is required by | |
| // RFC 3279, Section 2.3.1. | |
| publicKeyAlgorithm.Parameters = asn1.NullRawValue | |
| case *ecdsa.PublicKey: | |
| publicKeyBytes = elliptic.Marshal(pub.Curve, pub.X, pub.Y) | |
| oid, ok := oidFromNamedCurve(pub.Curve) | |
| if !ok { | |
| return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, errors.New("x509: unsupported elliptic curve") | |
| } | |
| publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyECDSA | |
| var paramBytes []byte | |
| paramBytes, err = asn1.Marshal(oid) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| publicKeyAlgorithm.Parameters.FullBytes = paramBytes | |
| case ed25519.PublicKey: | |
| publicKeyBytes = pub | |
| publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyEd25519 | |
| default: | |
| return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, fmt.Errorf("x509: unsupported public key type: %T", pub) | |
| } | |
| return publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, nil | |
| } | |
| // MarshalPKIXPublicKey converts a public key to PKIX, ASN.1 DER form. | |
| // The encoded public key is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure | |
| // (see RFC 5280, Section 4.1). | |
| // | |
| // The following key types are currently supported: *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey | |
| // and ed25519.PublicKey. Unsupported key types result in an error. | |
| // | |
| // This kind of key is commonly encoded in PEM blocks of type "PUBLIC KEY". | |
| func MarshalPKIXPublicKey(pub interface{}) ([]byte, error) { | |
| var publicKeyBytes []byte | |
| var publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier | |
| var err error | |
| if publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err = marshalPublicKey(pub); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| pkix := pkixPublicKey{ | |
| Algo: publicKeyAlgorithm, | |
| BitString: asn1.BitString{ | |
| Bytes: publicKeyBytes, | |
| BitLength: 8 * len(publicKeyBytes), | |
| }, | |
| } | |
| ret, _ := asn1.Marshal(pkix) | |
| return ret, nil | |
| } | |
| // These structures reflect the ASN.1 structure of X.509 certificates.: | |
| type certificate struct { | |
| Raw asn1.RawContent | |
| TBSCertificate tbsCertificate | |
| SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier | |
| SignatureValue asn1.BitString | |
| } | |
| type tbsCertificate struct { | |
| Raw asn1.RawContent | |
| Version int `asn1:"optional,explicit,default:0,tag:0"` | |
| SerialNumber *big.Int | |
| SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier | |
| Issuer asn1.RawValue | |
| Validity validity | |
| Subject asn1.RawValue | |
| PublicKey publicKeyInfo | |
| UniqueId asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:1"` | |
| SubjectUniqueId asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:2"` | |
| Extensions []pkix.Extension `asn1:"optional,explicit,tag:3"` | |
| } | |
| type dsaAlgorithmParameters struct { | |
| P, Q, G *big.Int | |
| } | |
| type validity struct { | |
| NotBefore, NotAfter time.Time | |
| } | |
| type publicKeyInfo struct { | |
| Raw asn1.RawContent | |
| Algorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier | |
| PublicKey asn1.BitString | |
| } | |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.1 | |
| type authKeyId struct { | |
| Id []byte `asn1:"optional,tag:0"` | |
| } | |
| type SignatureAlgorithm int | |
| const ( | |
| UnknownSignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm = iota | |
| MD2WithRSA // Unsupported. | |
| MD5WithRSA // Only supported for signing, not verification. | |
| SHA1WithRSA | |
| SHA256WithRSA | |
| SHA384WithRSA | |
| SHA512WithRSA | |
| DSAWithSHA1 // Unsupported. | |
| DSAWithSHA256 // Unsupported. | |
| ECDSAWithSHA1 | |
| ECDSAWithSHA256 | |
| ECDSAWithSHA384 | |
| ECDSAWithSHA512 | |
| SHA256WithRSAPSS | |
| SHA384WithRSAPSS | |
| SHA512WithRSAPSS | |
| PureEd25519 | |
| ) | |
| func (algo SignatureAlgorithm) isRSAPSS() bool { | |
| switch algo { | |
| case SHA256WithRSAPSS, SHA384WithRSAPSS, SHA512WithRSAPSS: | |
| return true | |
| default: | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| } | |
| func (algo SignatureAlgorithm) String() string { | |
| for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails { | |
| if details.algo == algo { | |
| return details.name | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return strconv.Itoa(int(algo)) | |
| } | |
| type PublicKeyAlgorithm int | |
| const ( | |
| UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm PublicKeyAlgorithm = iota | |
| RSA | |
| DSA // Unsupported. | |
| ECDSA | |
| Ed25519 | |
| ) | |
| var publicKeyAlgoName = [...]string{ | |
| RSA: "RSA", | |
| DSA: "DSA", | |
| ECDSA: "ECDSA", | |
| Ed25519: "Ed25519", | |
| } | |
| func (algo PublicKeyAlgorithm) String() string { | |
| if 0 < algo && int(algo) < len(publicKeyAlgoName) { | |
| return publicKeyAlgoName[algo] | |
| } | |
| return strconv.Itoa(int(algo)) | |
| } | |
| // OIDs for signature algorithms | |
| // | |
| // pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { | |
| // iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } | |
| // | |
| // | |
| // RFC 3279 2.2.1 RSA Signature Algorithms | |
| // | |
| // md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 2 } | |
| // | |
| // md5WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 4 } | |
| // | |
| // sha-1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 5 } | |
| // | |
| // dsaWithSha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { | |
| // iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 3 } | |
| // | |
| // RFC 3279 2.2.3 ECDSA Signature Algorithm | |
| // | |
| // ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { | |
| // iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x962(10045) | |
| // signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA1(1)} | |
| // | |
| // | |
| // RFC 4055 5 PKCS #1 Version 1.5 | |
| // | |
| // sha256WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 11 } | |
| // | |
| // sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 12 } | |
| // | |
| // sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 13 } | |
| // | |
| // | |
| // RFC 5758 3.1 DSA Signature Algorithms | |
| // | |
| // dsaWithSha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { | |
| // joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) | |
| // csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 2} | |
| // | |
| // RFC 5758 3.2 ECDSA Signature Algorithm | |
| // | |
| // ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) | |
| // us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 } | |
| // | |
| // ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) | |
| // us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 } | |
| // | |
| // ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) | |
| // us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 } | |
| // | |
| // | |
| // RFC 8410 3 Curve25519 and Curve448 Algorithm Identifiers | |
| // | |
| // id-Ed25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 112 } | |
| var ( | |
| oidSignatureMD2WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 2} | |
| oidSignatureMD5WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 4} | |
| oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 5} | |
| oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 11} | |
| oidSignatureSHA384WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 12} | |
| oidSignatureSHA512WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 13} | |
| oidSignatureRSAPSS = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 10} | |
| oidSignatureDSAWithSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10040, 4, 3} | |
| oidSignatureDSAWithSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 3, 2} | |
| oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 1} | |
| oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 2} | |
| oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 3} | |
| oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 4} | |
| oidSignatureEd25519 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 101, 112} | |
| oidSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 1} | |
| oidSHA384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 2} | |
| oidSHA512 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 3} | |
| oidMGF1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 8} | |
| // oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA means the same as oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA | |
| // but it's specified by ISO. Microsoft's makecert.exe has been known | |
| // to produce certificates with this OID. | |
| oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 14, 3, 2, 29} | |
| ) | |
| var signatureAlgorithmDetails = []struct { | |
| algo SignatureAlgorithm | |
| name string | |
| oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier | |
| pubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm | |
| hash crypto.Hash | |
| }{ | |
| {MD2WithRSA, "MD2-RSA", oidSignatureMD2WithRSA, RSA, crypto.Hash(0) /* no value for MD2 */}, | |
| {MD5WithRSA, "MD5-RSA", oidSignatureMD5WithRSA, RSA, crypto.MD5}, | |
| {SHA1WithRSA, "SHA1-RSA", oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA1}, | |
| {SHA1WithRSA, "SHA1-RSA", oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA1}, | |
| {SHA256WithRSA, "SHA256-RSA", oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA256}, | |
| {SHA384WithRSA, "SHA384-RSA", oidSignatureSHA384WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA384}, | |
| {SHA512WithRSA, "SHA512-RSA", oidSignatureSHA512WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA512}, | |
| {SHA256WithRSAPSS, "SHA256-RSAPSS", oidSignatureRSAPSS, RSA, crypto.SHA256}, | |
| {SHA384WithRSAPSS, "SHA384-RSAPSS", oidSignatureRSAPSS, RSA, crypto.SHA384}, | |
| {SHA512WithRSAPSS, "SHA512-RSAPSS", oidSignatureRSAPSS, RSA, crypto.SHA512}, | |
| {DSAWithSHA1, "DSA-SHA1", oidSignatureDSAWithSHA1, DSA, crypto.SHA1}, | |
| {DSAWithSHA256, "DSA-SHA256", oidSignatureDSAWithSHA256, DSA, crypto.SHA256}, | |
| {ECDSAWithSHA1, "ECDSA-SHA1", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA1, ECDSA, crypto.SHA1}, | |
| {ECDSAWithSHA256, "ECDSA-SHA256", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256, ECDSA, crypto.SHA256}, | |
| {ECDSAWithSHA384, "ECDSA-SHA384", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384, ECDSA, crypto.SHA384}, | |
| {ECDSAWithSHA512, "ECDSA-SHA512", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512, ECDSA, crypto.SHA512}, | |
| {PureEd25519, "Ed25519", oidSignatureEd25519, Ed25519, crypto.Hash(0) /* no pre-hashing */}, | |
| } | |
| // hashToPSSParameters contains the DER encoded RSA PSS parameters for the | |
| // SHA256, SHA384, and SHA512 hashes as defined in RFC 3447, Appendix A.2.3. | |
| // The parameters contain the following values: | |
| // * hashAlgorithm contains the associated hash identifier with NULL parameters | |
| // * maskGenAlgorithm always contains the default mgf1SHA1 identifier | |
| // * saltLength contains the length of the associated hash | |
| // * trailerField always contains the default trailerFieldBC value | |
| var hashToPSSParameters = map[crypto.Hash]asn1.RawValue{ | |
| crypto.SHA256: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: []byte{48, 52, 160, 15, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 1, 5, 0, 161, 28, 48, 26, 6, 9, 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 8, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 1, 5, 0, 162, 3, 2, 1, 32}}, | |
| crypto.SHA384: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: []byte{48, 52, 160, 15, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 2, 5, 0, 161, 28, 48, 26, 6, 9, 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 8, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 2, 5, 0, 162, 3, 2, 1, 48}}, | |
| crypto.SHA512: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: []byte{48, 52, 160, 15, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 3, 5, 0, 161, 28, 48, 26, 6, 9, 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 8, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 3, 5, 0, 162, 3, 2, 1, 64}}, | |
| } | |
| // pssParameters reflects the parameters in an AlgorithmIdentifier that | |
| // specifies RSA PSS. See RFC 3447, Appendix A.2.3. | |
| type pssParameters struct { | |
| // The following three fields are not marked as | |
| // optional because the default values specify SHA-1, | |
| // which is no longer suitable for use in signatures. | |
| Hash pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier `asn1:"explicit,tag:0"` | |
| MGF pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier `asn1:"explicit,tag:1"` | |
| SaltLength int `asn1:"explicit,tag:2"` | |
| TrailerField int `asn1:"optional,explicit,tag:3,default:1"` | |
| } | |
| func getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(ai pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier) SignatureAlgorithm { | |
| if ai.Algorithm.Equal(oidSignatureEd25519) { | |
| // RFC 8410, Section 3 | |
| // > For all of the OIDs, the parameters MUST be absent. | |
| if len(ai.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 { | |
| return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if !ai.Algorithm.Equal(oidSignatureRSAPSS) { | |
| for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails { | |
| if ai.Algorithm.Equal(details.oid) { | |
| return details.algo | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm | |
| } | |
| // RSA PSS is special because it encodes important parameters | |
| // in the Parameters. | |
| var params pssParameters | |
| if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(ai.Parameters.FullBytes, ¶ms); err != nil { | |
| return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm | |
| } | |
| var mgf1HashFunc pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier | |
| if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(params.MGF.Parameters.FullBytes, &mgf1HashFunc); err != nil { | |
| return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm | |
| } | |
| // PSS is greatly overburdened with options. This code forces them into | |
| // three buckets by requiring that the MGF1 hash function always match the | |
| // message hash function (as recommended in RFC 3447, Section 8.1), that the | |
| // salt length matches the hash length, and that the trailer field has the | |
| // default value. | |
| if (len(params.Hash.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 && !bytes.Equal(params.Hash.Parameters.FullBytes, asn1.NullBytes)) || | |
| !params.MGF.Algorithm.Equal(oidMGF1) || | |
| !mgf1HashFunc.Algorithm.Equal(params.Hash.Algorithm) || | |
| (len(mgf1HashFunc.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 && !bytes.Equal(mgf1HashFunc.Parameters.FullBytes, asn1.NullBytes)) || | |
| params.TrailerField != 1 { | |
| return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm | |
| } | |
| switch { | |
| case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA256) && params.SaltLength == 32: | |
| return SHA256WithRSAPSS | |
| case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA384) && params.SaltLength == 48: | |
| return SHA384WithRSAPSS | |
| case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA512) && params.SaltLength == 64: | |
| return SHA512WithRSAPSS | |
| } | |
| return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm | |
| } | |
| // RFC 3279, 2.3 Public Key Algorithms | |
| // | |
| // pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) | |
| // rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } | |
| // | |
| // rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { pkcs1-1 1 } | |
| // | |
| // id-dsa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) | |
| // x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 1 } | |
| // | |
| // RFC 5480, 2.1.1 Unrestricted Algorithm Identifier and Parameters | |
| // | |
| // id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { | |
| // iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 } | |
| var ( | |
| oidPublicKeyRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 1} | |
| oidPublicKeyDSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10040, 4, 1} | |
| oidPublicKeyECDSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 2, 1} | |
| oidPublicKeyEd25519 = oidSignatureEd25519 | |
| ) | |
| func getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) PublicKeyAlgorithm { | |
| switch { | |
| case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyRSA): | |
| return RSA | |
| case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyDSA): | |
| return DSA | |
| case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyECDSA): | |
| return ECDSA | |
| case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyEd25519): | |
| return Ed25519 | |
| } | |
| return UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm | |
| } | |
| // RFC 5480, 2.1.1.1. Named Curve | |
| // | |
| // secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { | |
| // iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 } | |
| // | |
| // secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { | |
| // iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) | |
| // prime(1) 7 } | |
| // | |
| // secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { | |
| // iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 } | |
| // | |
| // secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { | |
| // iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 } | |
| // | |
| // NB: secp256r1 is equivalent to prime256v1 | |
| var ( | |
| oidNamedCurveP224 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 33} | |
| oidNamedCurveP256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 3, 1, 7} | |
| oidNamedCurveP384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 34} | |
| oidNamedCurveP521 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 35} | |
| ) | |
| func namedCurveFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) elliptic.Curve { | |
| switch { | |
| case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP224): | |
| return elliptic.P224() | |
| case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP256): | |
| return elliptic.P256() | |
| case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP384): | |
| return elliptic.P384() | |
| case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP521): | |
| return elliptic.P521() | |
| } | |
| return nil | |
| } | |
| func oidFromNamedCurve(curve elliptic.Curve) (asn1.ObjectIdentifier, bool) { | |
| switch curve { | |
| case elliptic.P224(): | |
| return oidNamedCurveP224, true | |
| case elliptic.P256(): | |
| return oidNamedCurveP256, true | |
| case elliptic.P384(): | |
| return oidNamedCurveP384, true | |
| case elliptic.P521(): | |
| return oidNamedCurveP521, true | |
| } | |
| return nil, false | |
| } | |
| // KeyUsage represents the set of actions that are valid for a given key. It's | |
| // a bitmap of the KeyUsage* constants. | |
| type KeyUsage int | |
| const ( | |
| KeyUsageDigitalSignature KeyUsage = 1 << iota | |
| KeyUsageContentCommitment | |
| KeyUsageKeyEncipherment | |
| KeyUsageDataEncipherment | |
| KeyUsageKeyAgreement | |
| KeyUsageCertSign | |
| KeyUsageCRLSign | |
| KeyUsageEncipherOnly | |
| KeyUsageDecipherOnly | |
| ) | |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.12 Extended Key Usage | |
| // | |
| // anyExtendedKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-extKeyUsage 0 } | |
| // | |
| // id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 } | |
| // | |
| // id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 } | |
| // id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 } | |
| // id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 3 } | |
| // id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 4 } | |
| // id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 } | |
| // id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 } | |
| var ( | |
| oidExtKeyUsageAny = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 5, 29, 37, 0} | |
| oidExtKeyUsageServerAuth = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 1} | |
| oidExtKeyUsageClientAuth = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 2} | |
| oidExtKeyUsageCodeSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 3} | |
| oidExtKeyUsageEmailProtection = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 4} | |
| oidExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 5} | |
| oidExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 6} | |
| oidExtKeyUsageIPSECUser = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 7} | |
| oidExtKeyUsageTimeStamping = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 8} | |
| oidExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 9} | |
| oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 10, 3, 3} | |
| oidExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 113730, 4, 1} | |
| oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 2, 1, 22} | |
| oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 61, 1, 1} | |
| ) | |
| // ExtKeyUsage represents an extended set of actions that are valid for a given key. | |
| // Each of the ExtKeyUsage* constants define a unique action. | |
| type ExtKeyUsage int | |
| const ( | |
| ExtKeyUsageAny ExtKeyUsage = iota | |
| ExtKeyUsageServerAuth | |
| ExtKeyUsageClientAuth | |
| ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning | |
| ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection | |
| ExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem | |
| ExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel | |
| ExtKeyUsageIPSECUser | |
| ExtKeyUsageTimeStamping | |
| ExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning | |
| ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto | |
| ExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto | |
| ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning | |
| ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning | |
| ) | |
| // extKeyUsageOIDs contains the mapping between an ExtKeyUsage and its OID. | |
| var extKeyUsageOIDs = []struct { | |
| extKeyUsage ExtKeyUsage | |
| oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier | |
| }{ | |
| {ExtKeyUsageAny, oidExtKeyUsageAny}, | |
| {ExtKeyUsageServerAuth, oidExtKeyUsageServerAuth}, | |
| {ExtKeyUsageClientAuth, oidExtKeyUsageClientAuth}, | |
| {ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning, oidExtKeyUsageCodeSigning}, | |
| {ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection, oidExtKeyUsageEmailProtection}, | |
| {ExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem}, | |
| {ExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel}, | |
| {ExtKeyUsageIPSECUser, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECUser}, | |
| {ExtKeyUsageTimeStamping, oidExtKeyUsageTimeStamping}, | |
| {ExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning, oidExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning}, | |
| {ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto, oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto}, | |
| {ExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto, oidExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto}, | |
| {ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning, oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning}, | |
| {ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning, oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning}, | |
| } | |
| func extKeyUsageFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) (eku ExtKeyUsage, ok bool) { | |
| for _, pair := range extKeyUsageOIDs { | |
| if oid.Equal(pair.oid) { | |
| return pair.extKeyUsage, true | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return | |
| } | |
| func oidFromExtKeyUsage(eku ExtKeyUsage) (oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier, ok bool) { | |
| for _, pair := range extKeyUsageOIDs { | |
| if eku == pair.extKeyUsage { | |
| return pair.oid, true | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return | |
| } | |
| // A Certificate represents an X.509 certificate. | |
| type Certificate struct { | |
| Raw []byte // Complete ASN.1 DER content (certificate, signature algorithm and signature). | |
| RawTBSCertificate []byte // Certificate part of raw ASN.1 DER content. | |
| RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo []byte // DER encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo. | |
| RawSubject []byte // DER encoded Subject | |
| RawIssuer []byte // DER encoded Issuer | |
| Signature []byte | |
| SignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm | |
| PublicKeyAlgorithm PublicKeyAlgorithm | |
| PublicKey interface{} | |
| Version int | |
| SerialNumber *big.Int | |
| Issuer pkix.Name | |
| Subject pkix.Name | |
| NotBefore, NotAfter time.Time // Validity bounds. | |
| KeyUsage KeyUsage | |
| // Extensions contains raw X.509 extensions. When parsing certificates, | |
| // this can be used to extract non-critical extensions that are not | |
| // parsed by this package. When marshaling certificates, the Extensions | |
| // field is ignored, see ExtraExtensions. | |
| Extensions []pkix.Extension | |
| // ExtraExtensions contains extensions to be copied, raw, into any | |
| // marshaled certificates. Values override any extensions that would | |
| // otherwise be produced based on the other fields. The ExtraExtensions | |
| // field is not populated when parsing certificates, see Extensions. | |
| ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension | |
| // UnhandledCriticalExtensions contains a list of extension IDs that | |
| // were not (fully) processed when parsing. Verify will fail if this | |
| // slice is non-empty, unless verification is delegated to an OS | |
| // library which understands all the critical extensions. | |
| // | |
| // Users can access these extensions using Extensions and can remove | |
| // elements from this slice if they believe that they have been | |
| // handled. | |
| UnhandledCriticalExtensions []asn1.ObjectIdentifier | |
| ExtKeyUsage []ExtKeyUsage // Sequence of extended key usages. | |
| UnknownExtKeyUsage []asn1.ObjectIdentifier // Encountered extended key usages unknown to this package. | |
| // BasicConstraintsValid indicates whether IsCA, MaxPathLen, | |
| // and MaxPathLenZero are valid. | |
| BasicConstraintsValid bool | |
| IsCA bool | |
| // MaxPathLen and MaxPathLenZero indicate the presence and | |
| // value of the BasicConstraints' "pathLenConstraint". | |
| // | |
| // When parsing a certificate, a positive non-zero MaxPathLen | |
| // means that the field was specified, -1 means it was unset, | |
| // and MaxPathLenZero being true mean that the field was | |
| // explicitly set to zero. The case of MaxPathLen==0 with MaxPathLenZero==false | |
| // should be treated equivalent to -1 (unset). | |
| // | |
| // When generating a certificate, an unset pathLenConstraint | |
| // can be requested with either MaxPathLen == -1 or using the | |
| // zero value for both MaxPathLen and MaxPathLenZero. | |
| MaxPathLen int | |
| // MaxPathLenZero indicates that BasicConstraintsValid==true | |
| // and MaxPathLen==0 should be interpreted as an actual | |
| // maximum path length of zero. Otherwise, that combination is | |
| // interpreted as MaxPathLen not being set. | |
| MaxPathLenZero bool | |
| SubjectKeyId []byte | |
| AuthorityKeyId []byte | |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.2.1 (Authority Information Access) | |
| OCSPServer []string | |
| IssuingCertificateURL []string | |
| // Subject Alternate Name values. (Note that these values may not be valid | |
| // if invalid values were contained within a parsed certificate. For | |
| // example, an element of DNSNames may not be a valid DNS domain name.) | |
| DNSNames []string | |
| EmailAddresses []string | |
| IPAddresses []net.IP | |
| URIs []*url.URL | |
| // Name constraints | |
| PermittedDNSDomainsCritical bool // if true then the name constraints are marked critical. | |
| PermittedDNSDomains []string | |
| ExcludedDNSDomains []string | |
| PermittedIPRanges []*net.IPNet | |
| ExcludedIPRanges []*net.IPNet | |
| PermittedEmailAddresses []string | |
| ExcludedEmailAddresses []string | |
| PermittedURIDomains []string | |
| ExcludedURIDomains []string | |
| // CRL Distribution Points | |
| CRLDistributionPoints []string | |
| PolicyIdentifiers []asn1.ObjectIdentifier | |
| } | |
| // ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm results from attempting to perform an operation that | |
| // involves algorithms that are not currently implemented. | |
| var ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm = errors.New("x509: cannot verify signature: algorithm unimplemented") | |
| // An InsecureAlgorithmError | |
| type InsecureAlgorithmError SignatureAlgorithm | |
| func (e InsecureAlgorithmError) Error() string { | |
| return fmt.Sprintf("x509: cannot verify signature: insecure algorithm %v", SignatureAlgorithm(e)) | |
| } | |
| // ConstraintViolationError results when a requested usage is not permitted by | |
| // a certificate. For example: checking a signature when the public key isn't a | |
| // certificate signing key. | |
| type ConstraintViolationError struct{} | |
| func (ConstraintViolationError) Error() string { | |
| return "x509: invalid signature: parent certificate cannot sign this kind of certificate" | |
| } | |
| func (c *Certificate) Equal(other *Certificate) bool { | |
| if c == nil || other == nil { | |
| return c == other | |
| } | |
| return bytes.Equal(c.Raw, other.Raw) | |
| } | |
| func (c *Certificate) hasSANExtension() bool { | |
| return oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectAltName, c.Extensions) | |
| } | |
| // CheckSignatureFrom verifies that the signature on c is a valid signature | |
| // from parent. | |
| func (c *Certificate) CheckSignatureFrom(parent *Certificate) error { | |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.9: | |
| // "If the basic constraints extension is not present in a version 3 | |
| // certificate, or the extension is present but the cA boolean is not | |
| // asserted, then the certified public key MUST NOT be used to verify | |
| // certificate signatures." | |
| if parent.Version == 3 && !parent.BasicConstraintsValid || | |
| parent.BasicConstraintsValid && !parent.IsCA { | |
| return ConstraintViolationError{} | |
| } | |
| if parent.KeyUsage != 0 && parent.KeyUsage&KeyUsageCertSign == 0 { | |
| return ConstraintViolationError{} | |
| } | |
| if parent.PublicKeyAlgorithm == UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm { | |
| return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm | |
| } | |
| // TODO(agl): don't ignore the path length constraint. | |
| return parent.CheckSignature(c.SignatureAlgorithm, c.RawTBSCertificate, c.Signature) | |
| } | |
| // CheckSignature verifies that signature is a valid signature over signed from | |
| // c's public key. | |
| func (c *Certificate) CheckSignature(algo SignatureAlgorithm, signed, signature []byte) error { | |
| return checkSignature(algo, signed, signature, c.PublicKey) | |
| } | |
| func (c *Certificate) hasNameConstraints() bool { | |
| return oidInExtensions(oidExtensionNameConstraints, c.Extensions) | |
| } | |
| func (c *Certificate) getSANExtension() []byte { | |
| for _, e := range c.Extensions { | |
| if e.Id.Equal(oidExtensionSubjectAltName) { | |
| return e.Value | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return nil | |
| } | |
| func signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(expectedPubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm, pubKey interface{}) error { | |
| return fmt.Errorf("x509: signature algorithm specifies an %s public key, but have public key of type %T", expectedPubKeyAlgo.String(), pubKey) | |
| } | |
| // CheckSignature verifies that signature is a valid signature over signed from | |
| // a crypto.PublicKey. | |
| func checkSignature(algo SignatureAlgorithm, signed, signature []byte, publicKey crypto.PublicKey) (err error) { | |
| var hashType crypto.Hash | |
| var pubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm | |
| for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails { | |
| if details.algo == algo { | |
| hashType = details.hash | |
| pubKeyAlgo = details.pubKeyAlgo | |
| } | |
| } | |
| switch hashType { | |
| case crypto.Hash(0): | |
| if pubKeyAlgo != Ed25519 { | |
| return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm | |
| } | |
| case crypto.MD5: | |
| return InsecureAlgorithmError(algo) | |
| default: | |
| if !hashType.Available() { | |
| return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm | |
| } | |
| h := hashType.New() | |
| h.Write(signed) | |
| signed = h.Sum(nil) | |
| } | |
| switch pub := publicKey.(type) { | |
| case *rsa.PublicKey: | |
| if pubKeyAlgo != RSA { | |
| return signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(pubKeyAlgo, pub) | |
| } | |
| if algo.isRSAPSS() { | |
| return rsa.VerifyPSS(pub, hashType, signed, signature, &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash}) | |
| } else { | |
| return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pub, hashType, signed, signature) | |
| } | |
| case *ecdsa.PublicKey: | |
| if pubKeyAlgo != ECDSA { | |
| return signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(pubKeyAlgo, pub) | |
| } | |
| if !ecdsa.VerifyASN1(pub, signed, signature) { | |
| return errors.New("x509: ECDSA verification failure") | |
| } | |
| return | |
| case ed25519.PublicKey: | |
| if pubKeyAlgo != Ed25519 { | |
| return signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(pubKeyAlgo, pub) | |
| } | |
| if !ed25519.Verify(pub, signed, signature) { | |
| return errors.New("x509: Ed25519 verification failure") | |
| } | |
| return | |
| } | |
| return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm | |
| } | |
| // CheckCRLSignature checks that the signature in crl is from c. | |
| func (c *Certificate) CheckCRLSignature(crl *pkix.CertificateList) error { | |
| algo := getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(crl.SignatureAlgorithm) | |
| return c.CheckSignature(algo, crl.TBSCertList.Raw, crl.SignatureValue.RightAlign()) | |
| } | |
| type UnhandledCriticalExtension struct{} | |
| func (h UnhandledCriticalExtension) Error() string { | |
| return "x509: unhandled critical extension" | |
| } | |
| type basicConstraints struct { | |
| IsCA bool `asn1:"optional"` | |
| MaxPathLen int `asn1:"optional,default:-1"` | |
| } | |
| // RFC 5280 4.2.1.4 | |
| type policyInformation struct { | |
| Policy asn1.ObjectIdentifier | |
| // policyQualifiers omitted | |
| } | |
| const ( | |
| nameTypeEmail = 1 | |
| nameTypeDNS = 2 | |
| nameTypeURI = 6 | |
| nameTypeIP = 7 | |
| ) | |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.2.1 | |
| type authorityInfoAccess struct { | |
| Method asn1.ObjectIdentifier | |
| Location asn1.RawValue | |
| } | |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.14 | |
| type distributionPoint struct { | |
| DistributionPoint distributionPointName `asn1:"optional,tag:0"` | |
| Reason asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:1"` | |
| CRLIssuer asn1.RawValue `asn1:"optional,tag:2"` | |
| } | |
| type distributionPointName struct { | |
| FullName []asn1.RawValue `asn1:"optional,tag:0"` | |
| RelativeName pkix.RDNSequence `asn1:"optional,tag:1"` | |
| } | |
| func parsePublicKey(algo PublicKeyAlgorithm, keyData *publicKeyInfo) (interface{}, error) { | |
| asn1Data := keyData.PublicKey.RightAlign() | |
| switch algo { | |
| case RSA: | |
| // RSA public keys must have a NULL in the parameters. | |
| // See RFC 3279, Section 2.3.1. | |
| if !bytes.Equal(keyData.Algorithm.Parameters.FullBytes, asn1.NullBytes) { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: RSA key missing NULL parameters") | |
| } | |
| p := new(pkcs1PublicKey) | |
| rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, p) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after RSA public key") | |
| } | |
| if p.N.Sign() <= 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: RSA modulus is not a positive number") | |
| } | |
| if p.E <= 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: RSA public exponent is not a positive number") | |
| } | |
| pub := &rsa.PublicKey{ | |
| E: p.E, | |
| N: p.N, | |
| } | |
| return pub, nil | |
| case DSA: | |
| var p *big.Int | |
| rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, &p) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after DSA public key") | |
| } | |
| paramsData := keyData.Algorithm.Parameters.FullBytes | |
| params := new(dsaAlgorithmParameters) | |
| rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(paramsData, params) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after DSA parameters") | |
| } | |
| if p.Sign() <= 0 || params.P.Sign() <= 0 || params.Q.Sign() <= 0 || params.G.Sign() <= 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: zero or negative DSA parameter") | |
| } | |
| pub := &dsa.PublicKey{ | |
| Parameters: dsa.Parameters{ | |
| P: params.P, | |
| Q: params.Q, | |
| G: params.G, | |
| }, | |
| Y: p, | |
| } | |
| return pub, nil | |
| case ECDSA: | |
| paramsData := keyData.Algorithm.Parameters.FullBytes | |
| namedCurveOID := new(asn1.ObjectIdentifier) | |
| rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(paramsData, namedCurveOID) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to parse ECDSA parameters as named curve") | |
| } | |
| if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after ECDSA parameters") | |
| } | |
| namedCurve := namedCurveFromOID(*namedCurveOID) | |
| if namedCurve == nil { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: unsupported elliptic curve") | |
| } | |
| x, y := elliptic.Unmarshal(namedCurve, asn1Data) | |
| if x == nil { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to unmarshal elliptic curve point") | |
| } | |
| pub := &ecdsa.PublicKey{ | |
| Curve: namedCurve, | |
| X: x, | |
| Y: y, | |
| } | |
| return pub, nil | |
| case Ed25519: | |
| // RFC 8410, Section 3 | |
| // > For all of the OIDs, the parameters MUST be absent. | |
| if len(keyData.Algorithm.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: Ed25519 key encoded with illegal parameters") | |
| } | |
| if len(asn1Data) != ed25519.PublicKeySize { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: wrong Ed25519 public key size") | |
| } | |
| pub := make([]byte, ed25519.PublicKeySize) | |
| copy(pub, asn1Data) | |
| return ed25519.PublicKey(pub), nil | |
| default: | |
| return nil, nil | |
| } | |
| } | |
| func forEachSAN(extension []byte, callback func(tag int, data []byte) error) error { | |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.6 | |
| // SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames | |
| // | |
| // GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName | |
| // | |
| // GeneralName ::= CHOICE { | |
| // otherName [0] OtherName, | |
| // rfc822Name [1] IA5String, | |
| // dNSName [2] IA5String, | |
| // x400Address [3] ORAddress, | |
| // directoryName [4] Name, | |
| // ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, | |
| // uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, | |
| // iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, | |
| // registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } | |
| var seq asn1.RawValue | |
| rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(extension, &seq) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 extension") | |
| } | |
| if !seq.IsCompound || seq.Tag != 16 || seq.Class != 0 { | |
| return asn1.StructuralError{Msg: "bad SAN sequence"} | |
| } | |
| rest = seq.Bytes | |
| for len(rest) > 0 { | |
| var v asn1.RawValue | |
| rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(rest, &v) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| if err := callback(v.Tag, v.Bytes); err != nil { | |
| return err | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return nil | |
| } | |
| func parseSANExtension(value []byte) (dnsNames, emailAddresses []string, ipAddresses []net.IP, uris []*url.URL, err error) { | |
| err = forEachSAN(value, func(tag int, data []byte) error { | |
| switch tag { | |
| case nameTypeEmail: | |
| email := string(data) | |
| if err := isIA5String(email); err != nil { | |
| return errors.New("x509: SAN rfc822Name is malformed") | |
| } | |
| emailAddresses = append(emailAddresses, email) | |
| case nameTypeDNS: | |
| name := string(data) | |
| if err := isIA5String(name); err != nil { | |
| return errors.New("x509: SAN dNSName is malformed") | |
| } | |
| dnsNames = append(dnsNames, string(name)) | |
| case nameTypeURI: | |
| uriStr := string(data) | |
| if err := isIA5String(uriStr); err != nil { | |
| return errors.New("x509: SAN uniformResourceIdentifier is malformed") | |
| } | |
| uri, err := url.Parse(uriStr) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return fmt.Errorf("x509: cannot parse URI %q: %s", uriStr, err) | |
| } | |
| if len(uri.Host) > 0 { | |
| if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(uri.Host); !ok { | |
| return fmt.Errorf("x509: cannot parse URI %q: invalid domain", uriStr) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| uris = append(uris, uri) | |
| case nameTypeIP: | |
| switch len(data) { | |
| case net.IPv4len, net.IPv6len: | |
| ipAddresses = append(ipAddresses, data) | |
| default: | |
| return errors.New("x509: cannot parse IP address of length " + strconv.Itoa(len(data))) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return nil | |
| }) | |
| return | |
| } | |
| // isValidIPMask reports whether mask consists of zero or more 1 bits, followed by zero bits. | |
| func isValidIPMask(mask []byte) bool { | |
| seenZero := false | |
| for _, b := range mask { | |
| if seenZero { | |
| if b != 0 { | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| continue | |
| } | |
| switch b { | |
| case 0x00, 0x80, 0xc0, 0xe0, 0xf0, 0xf8, 0xfc, 0xfe: | |
| seenZero = true | |
| case 0xff: | |
| default: | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return true | |
| } | |
| func parseNameConstraintsExtension(out *Certificate, e pkix.Extension) (unhandled bool, err error) { | |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.10 | |
| // NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { | |
| // permittedSubtrees [0] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL, | |
| // excludedSubtrees [1] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL } | |
| // | |
| // GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree | |
| // | |
| // GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE { | |
| // base GeneralName, | |
| // minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0, | |
| // maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL } | |
| // | |
| // BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) | |
| outer := cryptobyte.String(e.Value) | |
| var toplevel, permitted, excluded cryptobyte.String | |
| var havePermitted, haveExcluded bool | |
| if !outer.ReadASN1(&toplevel, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) || | |
| !outer.Empty() || | |
| !toplevel.ReadOptionalASN1(&permitted, &havePermitted, cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(0).ContextSpecific().Constructed()) || | |
| !toplevel.ReadOptionalASN1(&excluded, &haveExcluded, cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific().Constructed()) || | |
| !toplevel.Empty() { | |
| return false, errors.New("x509: invalid NameConstraints extension") | |
| } | |
| if !havePermitted && !haveExcluded || len(permitted) == 0 && len(excluded) == 0 { | |
| // From RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.10: | |
| // “either the permittedSubtrees field | |
| // or the excludedSubtrees MUST be | |
| // present” | |
| return false, errors.New("x509: empty name constraints extension") | |
| } | |
| getValues := func(subtrees cryptobyte.String) (dnsNames []string, ips []*net.IPNet, emails, uriDomains []string, err error) { | |
| for !subtrees.Empty() { | |
| var seq, value cryptobyte.String | |
| var tag cryptobyte_asn1.Tag | |
| if !subtrees.ReadASN1(&seq, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) || | |
| !seq.ReadAnyASN1(&value, &tag) { | |
| return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: invalid NameConstraints extension") | |
| } | |
| var ( | |
| dnsTag = cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(2).ContextSpecific() | |
| emailTag = cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific() | |
| ipTag = cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(7).ContextSpecific() | |
| uriTag = cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(6).ContextSpecific() | |
| ) | |
| switch tag { | |
| case dnsTag: | |
| domain := string(value) | |
| if err := isIA5String(domain); err != nil { | |
| return nil, nil, nil, nil, errors.New("x509: invalid constraint value: " + err.Error()) | |
| } | |
| trimmedDomain := domain | |
| if len(trimmedDomain) > 0 && trimmedDomain[0] == '.' { | |
| // constraints can have a leading | |
| // period to exclude the domain | |
| // itself, but that's not valid in a | |
| // normal domain name. | |
| trimmedDomain = trimmedDomain[1:] | |
| } | |
| if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(trimmedDomain); !ok { | |
| return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse dnsName constraint %q", domain) | |
| } | |
| dnsNames = append(dnsNames, domain) | |
| case ipTag: | |
| l := len(value) | |
| var ip, mask []byte | |
| switch l { | |
| case 8: | |
| ip = value[:4] | |
| mask = value[4:] | |
| case 32: | |
| ip = value[:16] | |
| mask = value[16:] | |
| default: | |
| return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: IP constraint contained value of length %d", l) | |
| } | |
| if !isValidIPMask(mask) { | |
| return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: IP constraint contained invalid mask %x", mask) | |
| } | |
| ips = append(ips, &net.IPNet{IP: net.IP(ip), Mask: net.IPMask(mask)}) | |
| case emailTag: | |
| constraint := string(value) | |
| if err := isIA5String(constraint); err != nil { | |
| return nil, nil, nil, nil, errors.New("x509: invalid constraint value: " + err.Error()) | |
| } | |
| // If the constraint contains an @ then | |
| // it specifies an exact mailbox name. | |
| if strings.Contains(constraint, "@") { | |
| if _, ok := parseRFC2821Mailbox(constraint); !ok { | |
| return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse rfc822Name constraint %q", constraint) | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| // Otherwise it's a domain name. | |
| domain := constraint | |
| if len(domain) > 0 && domain[0] == '.' { | |
| domain = domain[1:] | |
| } | |
| if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(domain); !ok { | |
| return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse rfc822Name constraint %q", constraint) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| emails = append(emails, constraint) | |
| case uriTag: | |
| domain := string(value) | |
| if err := isIA5String(domain); err != nil { | |
| return nil, nil, nil, nil, errors.New("x509: invalid constraint value: " + err.Error()) | |
| } | |
| if net.ParseIP(domain) != nil { | |
| return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse URI constraint %q: cannot be IP address", domain) | |
| } | |
| trimmedDomain := domain | |
| if len(trimmedDomain) > 0 && trimmedDomain[0] == '.' { | |
| // constraints can have a leading | |
| // period to exclude the domain itself, | |
| // but that's not valid in a normal | |
| // domain name. | |
| trimmedDomain = trimmedDomain[1:] | |
| } | |
| if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(trimmedDomain); !ok { | |
| return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse URI constraint %q", domain) | |
| } | |
| uriDomains = append(uriDomains, domain) | |
| default: | |
| unhandled = true | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return dnsNames, ips, emails, uriDomains, nil | |
| } | |
| if out.PermittedDNSDomains, out.PermittedIPRanges, out.PermittedEmailAddresses, out.PermittedURIDomains, err = getValues(permitted); err != nil { | |
| return false, err | |
| } | |
| if out.ExcludedDNSDomains, out.ExcludedIPRanges, out.ExcludedEmailAddresses, out.ExcludedURIDomains, err = getValues(excluded); err != nil { | |
| return false, err | |
| } | |
| out.PermittedDNSDomainsCritical = e.Critical | |
| return unhandled, nil | |
| } | |
| func parseCertificate(in *certificate) (*Certificate, error) { | |
| out := new(Certificate) | |
| out.Raw = in.Raw | |
| out.RawTBSCertificate = in.TBSCertificate.Raw | |
| out.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo = in.TBSCertificate.PublicKey.Raw | |
| out.RawSubject = in.TBSCertificate.Subject.FullBytes | |
| out.RawIssuer = in.TBSCertificate.Issuer.FullBytes | |
| out.Signature = in.SignatureValue.RightAlign() | |
| out.SignatureAlgorithm = | |
| getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(in.TBSCertificate.SignatureAlgorithm) | |
| out.PublicKeyAlgorithm = | |
| getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(in.TBSCertificate.PublicKey.Algorithm.Algorithm) | |
| var err error | |
| out.PublicKey, err = parsePublicKey(out.PublicKeyAlgorithm, &in.TBSCertificate.PublicKey) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| out.Version = in.TBSCertificate.Version + 1 | |
| out.SerialNumber = in.TBSCertificate.SerialNumber | |
| var issuer, subject pkix.RDNSequence | |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(in.TBSCertificate.Subject.FullBytes, &subject); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 subject") | |
| } | |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(in.TBSCertificate.Issuer.FullBytes, &issuer); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 issuer") | |
| } | |
| out.Issuer.FillFromRDNSequence(&issuer) | |
| out.Subject.FillFromRDNSequence(&subject) | |
| out.NotBefore = in.TBSCertificate.Validity.NotBefore | |
| out.NotAfter = in.TBSCertificate.Validity.NotAfter | |
| for _, e := range in.TBSCertificate.Extensions { | |
| out.Extensions = append(out.Extensions, e) | |
| unhandled := false | |
| if len(e.Id) == 4 && e.Id[0] == 2 && e.Id[1] == 5 && e.Id[2] == 29 { | |
| switch e.Id[3] { | |
| case 15: | |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.3 | |
| var usageBits asn1.BitString | |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &usageBits); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 KeyUsage") | |
| } | |
| var usage int | |
| for i := 0; i < 9; i++ { | |
| if usageBits.At(i) != 0 { | |
| usage |= 1 << uint(i) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| out.KeyUsage = KeyUsage(usage) | |
| case 19: | |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.9 | |
| var constraints basicConstraints | |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &constraints); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 BasicConstraints") | |
| } | |
| out.BasicConstraintsValid = true | |
| out.IsCA = constraints.IsCA | |
| out.MaxPathLen = constraints.MaxPathLen | |
| out.MaxPathLenZero = out.MaxPathLen == 0 | |
| // TODO: map out.MaxPathLen to 0 if it has the -1 default value? (Issue 19285) | |
| case 17: | |
| out.DNSNames, out.EmailAddresses, out.IPAddresses, out.URIs, err = parseSANExtension(e.Value) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| if len(out.DNSNames) == 0 && len(out.EmailAddresses) == 0 && len(out.IPAddresses) == 0 && len(out.URIs) == 0 { | |
| // If we didn't parse anything then we do the critical check, below. | |
| unhandled = true | |
| } | |
| case 30: | |
| unhandled, err = parseNameConstraintsExtension(out, e) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| case 31: | |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.13 | |
| // CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint | |
| // | |
| // DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { | |
| // distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, | |
| // reasons [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, | |
| // cRLIssuer [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL } | |
| // | |
| // DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE { | |
| // fullName [0] GeneralNames, | |
| // nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName } | |
| var cdp []distributionPoint | |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &cdp); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 CRL distribution point") | |
| } | |
| for _, dp := range cdp { | |
| // Per RFC 5280, 4.2.1.13, one of distributionPoint or cRLIssuer may be empty. | |
| if len(dp.DistributionPoint.FullName) == 0 { | |
| continue | |
| } | |
| for _, fullName := range dp.DistributionPoint.FullName { | |
| if fullName.Tag == 6 { | |
| out.CRLDistributionPoints = append(out.CRLDistributionPoints, string(fullName.Bytes)) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| case 35: | |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.1 | |
| var a authKeyId | |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &a); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 authority key-id") | |
| } | |
| out.AuthorityKeyId = a.Id | |
| case 37: | |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage | |
| // id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 37 } | |
| // | |
| // ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId | |
| // | |
| // KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER | |
| var keyUsage []asn1.ObjectIdentifier | |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &keyUsage); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 ExtendedKeyUsage") | |
| } | |
| for _, u := range keyUsage { | |
| if extKeyUsage, ok := extKeyUsageFromOID(u); ok { | |
| out.ExtKeyUsage = append(out.ExtKeyUsage, extKeyUsage) | |
| } else { | |
| out.UnknownExtKeyUsage = append(out.UnknownExtKeyUsage, u) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| case 14: | |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.2 | |
| var keyid []byte | |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &keyid); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 key-id") | |
| } | |
| out.SubjectKeyId = keyid | |
| case 32: | |
| // RFC 5280 4.2.1.4: Certificate Policies | |
| var policies []policyInformation | |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &policies); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 certificate policies") | |
| } | |
| out.PolicyIdentifiers = make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, len(policies)) | |
| for i, policy := range policies { | |
| out.PolicyIdentifiers[i] = policy.Policy | |
| } | |
| default: | |
| // Unknown extensions are recorded if critical. | |
| unhandled = true | |
| } | |
| } else if e.Id.Equal(oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess) { | |
| // RFC 5280 4.2.2.1: Authority Information Access | |
| var aia []authorityInfoAccess | |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &aia); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 authority information") | |
| } | |
| for _, v := range aia { | |
| // GeneralName: uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String | |
| if v.Location.Tag != 6 { | |
| continue | |
| } | |
| if v.Method.Equal(oidAuthorityInfoAccessOcsp) { | |
| out.OCSPServer = append(out.OCSPServer, string(v.Location.Bytes)) | |
| } else if v.Method.Equal(oidAuthorityInfoAccessIssuers) { | |
| out.IssuingCertificateURL = append(out.IssuingCertificateURL, string(v.Location.Bytes)) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| // Unknown extensions are recorded if critical. | |
| unhandled = true | |
| } | |
| if e.Critical && unhandled { | |
| out.UnhandledCriticalExtensions = append(out.UnhandledCriticalExtensions, e.Id) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return out, nil | |
| } | |
| // ParseCertificate parses a single certificate from the given ASN.1 DER data. | |
| func ParseCertificate(asn1Data []byte) (*Certificate, error) { | |
| var cert certificate | |
| rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, &cert) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| if len(rest) > 0 { | |
| return nil, asn1.SyntaxError{Msg: "trailing data"} | |
| } | |
| return parseCertificate(&cert) | |
| } | |
| // ParseCertificates parses one or more certificates from the given ASN.1 DER | |
| // data. The certificates must be concatenated with no intermediate padding. | |
| func ParseCertificates(asn1Data []byte) ([]*Certificate, error) { | |
| var v []*certificate | |
| for len(asn1Data) > 0 { | |
| cert := new(certificate) | |
| var err error | |
| asn1Data, err = asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, cert) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| v = append(v, cert) | |
| } | |
| ret := make([]*Certificate, len(v)) | |
| for i, ci := range v { | |
| cert, err := parseCertificate(ci) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| ret[i] = cert | |
| } | |
| return ret, nil | |
| } | |
| func reverseBitsInAByte(in byte) byte { | |
| b1 := in>>4 | in<<4 | |
| b2 := b1>>2&0x33 | b1<<2&0xcc | |
| b3 := b2>>1&0x55 | b2<<1&0xaa | |
| return b3 | |
| } | |
| // asn1BitLength returns the bit-length of bitString by considering the | |
| // most-significant bit in a byte to be the "first" bit. This convention | |
| // matches ASN.1, but differs from almost everything else. | |
| func asn1BitLength(bitString []byte) int { | |
| bitLen := len(bitString) * 8 | |
| for i := range bitString { | |
| b := bitString[len(bitString)-i-1] | |
| for bit := uint(0); bit < 8; bit++ { | |
| if (b>>bit)&1 == 1 { | |
| return bitLen | |
| } | |
| bitLen-- | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 0 | |
| } | |
| var ( | |
| oidExtensionSubjectKeyId = []int{2, 5, 29, 14} | |
| oidExtensionKeyUsage = []int{2, 5, 29, 15} | |
| oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage = []int{2, 5, 29, 37} | |
| oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId = []int{2, 5, 29, 35} | |
| oidExtensionBasicConstraints = []int{2, 5, 29, 19} | |
| oidExtensionSubjectAltName = []int{2, 5, 29, 17} | |
| oidExtensionCertificatePolicies = []int{2, 5, 29, 32} | |
| oidExtensionNameConstraints = []int{2, 5, 29, 30} | |
| oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints = []int{2, 5, 29, 31} | |
| oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess = []int{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 1} | |
| oidExtensionCRLNumber = []int{2, 5, 29, 20} | |
| ) | |
| var ( | |
| oidAuthorityInfoAccessOcsp = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 1} | |
| oidAuthorityInfoAccessIssuers = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 2} | |
| ) | |
| // oidNotInExtensions reports whether an extension with the given oid exists in | |
| // extensions. | |
| func oidInExtensions(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier, extensions []pkix.Extension) bool { | |
| for _, e := range extensions { | |
| if e.Id.Equal(oid) { | |
| return true | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return false | |
| } | |
| // marshalSANs marshals a list of addresses into a the contents of an X.509 | |
| // SubjectAlternativeName extension. | |
| func marshalSANs(dnsNames, emailAddresses []string, ipAddresses []net.IP, uris []*url.URL) (derBytes []byte, err error) { | |
| var rawValues []asn1.RawValue | |
| for _, name := range dnsNames { | |
| if err := isIA5String(name); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeDNS, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)}) | |
| } | |
| for _, email := range emailAddresses { | |
| if err := isIA5String(email); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeEmail, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(email)}) | |
| } | |
| for _, rawIP := range ipAddresses { | |
| // If possible, we always want to encode IPv4 addresses in 4 bytes. | |
| ip := rawIP.To4() | |
| if ip == nil { | |
| ip = rawIP | |
| } | |
| rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeIP, Class: 2, Bytes: ip}) | |
| } | |
| for _, uri := range uris { | |
| uriStr := uri.String() | |
| if err := isIA5String(uriStr); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeURI, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(uriStr)}) | |
| } | |
| return asn1.Marshal(rawValues) | |
| } | |
| func isIA5String(s string) error { | |
| for _, r := range s { | |
| // Per RFC5280 "IA5String is limited to the set of ASCII characters" | |
| if r > unicode.MaxASCII { | |
| return fmt.Errorf("x509: %q cannot be encoded as an IA5String", s) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return nil | |
| } | |
| func buildExtensions(template *Certificate, subjectIsEmpty bool, authorityKeyId []byte, subjectKeyId []byte) (ret []pkix.Extension, err error) { | |
| ret = make([]pkix.Extension, 10 /* maximum number of elements. */) | |
| n := 0 | |
| if template.KeyUsage != 0 && | |
| !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionKeyUsage, template.ExtraExtensions) { | |
| ret[n].Id = oidExtensionKeyUsage | |
| ret[n].Critical = true | |
| var a [2]byte | |
| a[0] = reverseBitsInAByte(byte(template.KeyUsage)) | |
| a[1] = reverseBitsInAByte(byte(template.KeyUsage >> 8)) | |
| l := 1 | |
| if a[1] != 0 { | |
| l = 2 | |
| } | |
| bitString := a[:l] | |
| ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(asn1.BitString{Bytes: bitString, BitLength: asn1BitLength(bitString)}) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| n++ | |
| } | |
| if (len(template.ExtKeyUsage) > 0 || len(template.UnknownExtKeyUsage) > 0) && | |
| !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage, template.ExtraExtensions) { | |
| ret[n].Id = oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage | |
| var oids []asn1.ObjectIdentifier | |
| for _, u := range template.ExtKeyUsage { | |
| if oid, ok := oidFromExtKeyUsage(u); ok { | |
| oids = append(oids, oid) | |
| } else { | |
| err = errors.New("x509: unknown extended key usage") | |
| return | |
| } | |
| } | |
| oids = append(oids, template.UnknownExtKeyUsage...) | |
| ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(oids) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| n++ | |
| } | |
| if template.BasicConstraintsValid && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionBasicConstraints, template.ExtraExtensions) { | |
| // Leaving MaxPathLen as zero indicates that no maximum path | |
| // length is desired, unless MaxPathLenZero is set. A value of | |
| // -1 causes encoding/asn1 to omit the value as desired. | |
| maxPathLen := template.MaxPathLen | |
| if maxPathLen == 0 && !template.MaxPathLenZero { | |
| maxPathLen = -1 | |
| } | |
| ret[n].Id = oidExtensionBasicConstraints | |
| ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(basicConstraints{template.IsCA, maxPathLen}) | |
| ret[n].Critical = true | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| n++ | |
| } | |
| if len(subjectKeyId) > 0 && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectKeyId, template.ExtraExtensions) { | |
| ret[n].Id = oidExtensionSubjectKeyId | |
| ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(subjectKeyId) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| n++ | |
| } | |
| if len(authorityKeyId) > 0 && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId, template.ExtraExtensions) { | |
| ret[n].Id = oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId | |
| ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{authorityKeyId}) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| n++ | |
| } | |
| if (len(template.OCSPServer) > 0 || len(template.IssuingCertificateURL) > 0) && | |
| !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess, template.ExtraExtensions) { | |
| ret[n].Id = oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess | |
| var aiaValues []authorityInfoAccess | |
| for _, name := range template.OCSPServer { | |
| aiaValues = append(aiaValues, authorityInfoAccess{ | |
| Method: oidAuthorityInfoAccessOcsp, | |
| Location: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)}, | |
| }) | |
| } | |
| for _, name := range template.IssuingCertificateURL { | |
| aiaValues = append(aiaValues, authorityInfoAccess{ | |
| Method: oidAuthorityInfoAccessIssuers, | |
| Location: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)}, | |
| }) | |
| } | |
| ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(aiaValues) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| n++ | |
| } | |
| if (len(template.DNSNames) > 0 || len(template.EmailAddresses) > 0 || len(template.IPAddresses) > 0 || len(template.URIs) > 0) && | |
| !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectAltName, template.ExtraExtensions) { | |
| ret[n].Id = oidExtensionSubjectAltName | |
| // From RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.6: | |
| // “If the subject field contains an empty sequence ... then | |
| // subjectAltName extension ... is marked as critical” | |
| ret[n].Critical = subjectIsEmpty | |
| ret[n].Value, err = marshalSANs(template.DNSNames, template.EmailAddresses, template.IPAddresses, template.URIs) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| n++ | |
| } | |
| if len(template.PolicyIdentifiers) > 0 && | |
| !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionCertificatePolicies, template.ExtraExtensions) { | |
| ret[n].Id = oidExtensionCertificatePolicies | |
| policies := make([]policyInformation, len(template.PolicyIdentifiers)) | |
| for i, policy := range template.PolicyIdentifiers { | |
| policies[i].Policy = policy | |
| } | |
| ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(policies) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| n++ | |
| } | |
| if (len(template.PermittedDNSDomains) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedDNSDomains) > 0 || | |
| len(template.PermittedIPRanges) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedIPRanges) > 0 || | |
| len(template.PermittedEmailAddresses) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedEmailAddresses) > 0 || | |
| len(template.PermittedURIDomains) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedURIDomains) > 0) && | |
| !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionNameConstraints, template.ExtraExtensions) { | |
| ret[n].Id = oidExtensionNameConstraints | |
| ret[n].Critical = template.PermittedDNSDomainsCritical | |
| ipAndMask := func(ipNet *net.IPNet) []byte { | |
| maskedIP := ipNet.IP.Mask(ipNet.Mask) | |
| ipAndMask := make([]byte, 0, len(maskedIP)+len(ipNet.Mask)) | |
| ipAndMask = append(ipAndMask, maskedIP...) | |
| ipAndMask = append(ipAndMask, ipNet.Mask...) | |
| return ipAndMask | |
| } | |
| serialiseConstraints := func(dns []string, ips []*net.IPNet, emails []string, uriDomains []string) (der []byte, err error) { | |
| var b cryptobyte.Builder | |
| for _, name := range dns { | |
| if err = isIA5String(name); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { | |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(2).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { | |
| b.AddBytes([]byte(name)) | |
| }) | |
| }) | |
| } | |
| for _, ipNet := range ips { | |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { | |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(7).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { | |
| b.AddBytes(ipAndMask(ipNet)) | |
| }) | |
| }) | |
| } | |
| for _, email := range emails { | |
| if err = isIA5String(email); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { | |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { | |
| b.AddBytes([]byte(email)) | |
| }) | |
| }) | |
| } | |
| for _, uriDomain := range uriDomains { | |
| if err = isIA5String(uriDomain); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { | |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(6).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { | |
| b.AddBytes([]byte(uriDomain)) | |
| }) | |
| }) | |
| } | |
| return b.Bytes() | |
| } | |
| permitted, err := serialiseConstraints(template.PermittedDNSDomains, template.PermittedIPRanges, template.PermittedEmailAddresses, template.PermittedURIDomains) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| excluded, err := serialiseConstraints(template.ExcludedDNSDomains, template.ExcludedIPRanges, template.ExcludedEmailAddresses, template.ExcludedURIDomains) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| var b cryptobyte.Builder | |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { | |
| if len(permitted) > 0 { | |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(0).ContextSpecific().Constructed(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { | |
| b.AddBytes(permitted) | |
| }) | |
| } | |
| if len(excluded) > 0 { | |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific().Constructed(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { | |
| b.AddBytes(excluded) | |
| }) | |
| } | |
| }) | |
| ret[n].Value, err = b.Bytes() | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| n++ | |
| } | |
| if len(template.CRLDistributionPoints) > 0 && | |
| !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints, template.ExtraExtensions) { | |
| ret[n].Id = oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints | |
| var crlDp []distributionPoint | |
| for _, name := range template.CRLDistributionPoints { | |
| dp := distributionPoint{ | |
| DistributionPoint: distributionPointName{ | |
| FullName: []asn1.RawValue{ | |
| {Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)}, | |
| }, | |
| }, | |
| } | |
| crlDp = append(crlDp, dp) | |
| } | |
| ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(crlDp) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| n++ | |
| } | |
| // Adding another extension here? Remember to update the maximum number | |
| // of elements in the make() at the top of the function and the list of | |
| // template fields used in CreateCertificate documentation. | |
| return append(ret[:n], template.ExtraExtensions...), nil | |
| } | |
| func subjectBytes(cert *Certificate) ([]byte, error) { | |
| if len(cert.RawSubject) > 0 { | |
| return cert.RawSubject, nil | |
| } | |
| return asn1.Marshal(cert.Subject.ToRDNSequence()) | |
| } | |
| // signingParamsForPublicKey returns the parameters to use for signing with | |
| // priv. If requestedSigAlgo is not zero then it overrides the default | |
| // signature algorithm. | |
| func signingParamsForPublicKey(pub interface{}, requestedSigAlgo SignatureAlgorithm) (hashFunc crypto.Hash, sigAlgo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier, err error) { | |
| var pubType PublicKeyAlgorithm | |
| switch pub := pub.(type) { | |
| case *rsa.PublicKey: | |
| pubType = RSA | |
| hashFunc = crypto.SHA256 | |
| sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA | |
| sigAlgo.Parameters = asn1.NullRawValue | |
| case *ecdsa.PublicKey: | |
| pubType = ECDSA | |
| switch pub.Curve { | |
| case elliptic.P224(), elliptic.P256(): | |
| hashFunc = crypto.SHA256 | |
| sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256 | |
| case elliptic.P384(): | |
| hashFunc = crypto.SHA384 | |
| sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384 | |
| case elliptic.P521(): | |
| hashFunc = crypto.SHA512 | |
| sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512 | |
| default: | |
| err = errors.New("x509: unknown elliptic curve") | |
| } | |
| case ed25519.PublicKey: | |
| pubType = Ed25519 | |
| sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureEd25519 | |
| default: | |
| err = errors.New("x509: only RSA, ECDSA and Ed25519 keys supported") | |
| } | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| if requestedSigAlgo == 0 { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| found := false | |
| for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails { | |
| if details.algo == requestedSigAlgo { | |
| if details.pubKeyAlgo != pubType { | |
| err = errors.New("x509: requested SignatureAlgorithm does not match private key type") | |
| return | |
| } | |
| sigAlgo.Algorithm, hashFunc = details.oid, details.hash | |
| if hashFunc == 0 && pubType != Ed25519 { | |
| err = errors.New("x509: cannot sign with hash function requested") | |
| return | |
| } | |
| if requestedSigAlgo.isRSAPSS() { | |
| sigAlgo.Parameters = hashToPSSParameters[hashFunc] | |
| } | |
| found = true | |
| break | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if !found { | |
| err = errors.New("x509: unknown SignatureAlgorithm") | |
| } | |
| return | |
| } | |
| // emptyASN1Subject is the ASN.1 DER encoding of an empty Subject, which is | |
| // just an empty SEQUENCE. | |
| var emptyASN1Subject = []byte{0x30, 0} | |
| // CreateCertificate creates a new X.509v3 certificate based on a template. | |
| // The following members of template are used: | |
| // | |
| // - AuthorityKeyId | |
| // - BasicConstraintsValid | |
| // - CRLDistributionPoints | |
| // - DNSNames | |
| // - EmailAddresses | |
| // - ExcludedDNSDomains | |
| // - ExcludedEmailAddresses | |
| // - ExcludedIPRanges | |
| // - ExcludedURIDomains | |
| // - ExtKeyUsage | |
| // - ExtraExtensions | |
| // - IPAddresses | |
| // - IsCA | |
| // - IssuingCertificateURL | |
| // - KeyUsage | |
| // - MaxPathLen | |
| // - MaxPathLenZero | |
| // - NotAfter | |
| // - NotBefore | |
| // - OCSPServer | |
| // - PermittedDNSDomains | |
| // - PermittedDNSDomainsCritical | |
| // - PermittedEmailAddresses | |
| // - PermittedIPRanges | |
| // - PermittedURIDomains | |
| // - PolicyIdentifiers | |
| // - SerialNumber | |
| // - SignatureAlgorithm | |
| // - Subject | |
| // - SubjectKeyId | |
| // - URIs | |
| // - UnknownExtKeyUsage | |
| // | |
| // The certificate is signed by parent. If parent is equal to template then the | |
| // certificate is self-signed. The parameter pub is the public key of the | |
| // signee and priv is the private key of the signer. | |
| // | |
| // The returned slice is the certificate in DER encoding. | |
| // | |
| // The currently supported key types are *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey and | |
| // ed25519.PublicKey. pub must be a supported key type, and priv must be a | |
| // crypto.Signer with a supported public key. | |
| // | |
| // The AuthorityKeyId will be taken from the SubjectKeyId of parent, if any, | |
| // unless the resulting certificate is self-signed. Otherwise the value from | |
| // template will be used. | |
| // | |
| // If SubjectKeyId from template is empty and the template is a CA, SubjectKeyId | |
| // will be generated from the hash of the public key. | |
| func CreateCertificate(rand io.Reader, template, parent *Certificate, pub, priv interface{}) (cert []byte, err error) { | |
| key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer) | |
| if !ok { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer") | |
| } | |
| if template.SerialNumber == nil { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: no SerialNumber given") | |
| } | |
| if template.BasicConstraintsValid && !template.IsCA && template.MaxPathLen != -1 && (template.MaxPathLen != 0 || template.MaxPathLenZero) { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: only CAs are allowed to specify MaxPathLen") | |
| } | |
| hashFunc, signatureAlgorithm, err := signingParamsForPublicKey(key.Public(), template.SignatureAlgorithm) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err := marshalPublicKey(pub) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| asn1Issuer, err := subjectBytes(parent) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| asn1Subject, err := subjectBytes(template) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| authorityKeyId := template.AuthorityKeyId | |
| if !bytes.Equal(asn1Issuer, asn1Subject) && len(parent.SubjectKeyId) > 0 { | |
| authorityKeyId = parent.SubjectKeyId | |
| } | |
| subjectKeyId := template.SubjectKeyId | |
| if len(subjectKeyId) == 0 && template.IsCA { | |
| // SubjectKeyId generated using method 1 in RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.2: | |
| // (1) The keyIdentifier is composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the | |
| // value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey (excluding the tag, | |
| // length, and number of unused bits). | |
| h := sha1.Sum(publicKeyBytes) | |
| subjectKeyId = h[:] | |
| } | |
| extensions, err := buildExtensions(template, bytes.Equal(asn1Subject, emptyASN1Subject), authorityKeyId, subjectKeyId) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| encodedPublicKey := asn1.BitString{BitLength: len(publicKeyBytes) * 8, Bytes: publicKeyBytes} | |
| c := tbsCertificate{ | |
| Version: 2, | |
| SerialNumber: template.SerialNumber, | |
| SignatureAlgorithm: signatureAlgorithm, | |
| Issuer: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Issuer}, | |
| Validity: validity{template.NotBefore.UTC(), template.NotAfter.UTC()}, | |
| Subject: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Subject}, | |
| PublicKey: publicKeyInfo{nil, publicKeyAlgorithm, encodedPublicKey}, | |
| Extensions: extensions, | |
| } | |
| tbsCertContents, err := asn1.Marshal(c) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| c.Raw = tbsCertContents | |
| signed := tbsCertContents | |
| if hashFunc != 0 { | |
| h := hashFunc.New() | |
| h.Write(signed) | |
| signed = h.Sum(nil) | |
| } | |
| var signerOpts crypto.SignerOpts = hashFunc | |
| if template.SignatureAlgorithm != 0 && template.SignatureAlgorithm.isRSAPSS() { | |
| signerOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{ | |
| SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, | |
| Hash: hashFunc, | |
| } | |
| } | |
| var signature []byte | |
| signature, err = key.Sign(rand, signed, signerOpts) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| signedCert, err := asn1.Marshal(certificate{ | |
| nil, | |
| c, | |
| signatureAlgorithm, | |
| asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8}, | |
| }) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| // Check the signature to ensure the crypto.Signer behaved correctly. | |
| // We skip this check if the signature algorithm is MD5WithRSA as we | |
| // only support this algorithm for signing, and not verification. | |
| if sigAlg := getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(signatureAlgorithm); sigAlg != MD5WithRSA { | |
| if err := checkSignature(sigAlg, c.Raw, signature, key.Public()); err != nil { | |
| return nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: signature over certificate returned by signer is invalid: %w", err) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return signedCert, nil | |
| } | |
| // pemCRLPrefix is the magic string that indicates that we have a PEM encoded | |
| // CRL. | |
| var pemCRLPrefix = []byte("-----BEGIN X509 CRL") | |
| // pemType is the type of a PEM encoded CRL. | |
| var pemType = "X509 CRL" | |
| // ParseCRL parses a CRL from the given bytes. It's often the case that PEM | |
| // encoded CRLs will appear where they should be DER encoded, so this function | |
| // will transparently handle PEM encoding as long as there isn't any leading | |
| // garbage. | |
| func ParseCRL(crlBytes []byte) (*pkix.CertificateList, error) { | |
| if bytes.HasPrefix(crlBytes, pemCRLPrefix) { | |
| block, _ := pem.Decode(crlBytes) | |
| if block != nil && block.Type == pemType { | |
| crlBytes = block.Bytes | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return ParseDERCRL(crlBytes) | |
| } | |
| // ParseDERCRL parses a DER encoded CRL from the given bytes. | |
| func ParseDERCRL(derBytes []byte) (*pkix.CertificateList, error) { | |
| certList := new(pkix.CertificateList) | |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(derBytes, certList); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after CRL") | |
| } | |
| return certList, nil | |
| } | |
| // CreateCRL returns a DER encoded CRL, signed by this Certificate, that | |
| // contains the given list of revoked certificates. | |
| // | |
| // Note: this method does not generate an RFC 5280 conformant X.509 v2 CRL. | |
| // To generate a standards compliant CRL, use CreateRevocationList instead. | |
| func (c *Certificate) CreateCRL(rand io.Reader, priv interface{}, revokedCerts []pkix.RevokedCertificate, now, expiry time.Time) (crlBytes []byte, err error) { | |
| key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer) | |
| if !ok { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer") | |
| } | |
| hashFunc, signatureAlgorithm, err := signingParamsForPublicKey(key.Public(), 0) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| // Force revocation times to UTC per RFC 5280. | |
| revokedCertsUTC := make([]pkix.RevokedCertificate, len(revokedCerts)) | |
| for i, rc := range revokedCerts { | |
| rc.RevocationTime = rc.RevocationTime.UTC() | |
| revokedCertsUTC[i] = rc | |
| } | |
| tbsCertList := pkix.TBSCertificateList{ | |
| Version: 1, | |
| Signature: signatureAlgorithm, | |
| Issuer: c.Subject.ToRDNSequence(), | |
| ThisUpdate: now.UTC(), | |
| NextUpdate: expiry.UTC(), | |
| RevokedCertificates: revokedCertsUTC, | |
| } | |
| // Authority Key Id | |
| if len(c.SubjectKeyId) > 0 { | |
| var aki pkix.Extension | |
| aki.Id = oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId | |
| aki.Value, err = asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{Id: c.SubjectKeyId}) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| tbsCertList.Extensions = append(tbsCertList.Extensions, aki) | |
| } | |
| tbsCertListContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCertList) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| signed := tbsCertListContents | |
| if hashFunc != 0 { | |
| h := hashFunc.New() | |
| h.Write(signed) | |
| signed = h.Sum(nil) | |
| } | |
| var signature []byte | |
| signature, err = key.Sign(rand, signed, hashFunc) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| return asn1.Marshal(pkix.CertificateList{ | |
| TBSCertList: tbsCertList, | |
| SignatureAlgorithm: signatureAlgorithm, | |
| SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8}, | |
| }) | |
| } | |
| // CertificateRequest represents a PKCS #10, certificate signature request. | |
| type CertificateRequest struct { | |
| Raw []byte // Complete ASN.1 DER content (CSR, signature algorithm and signature). | |
| RawTBSCertificateRequest []byte // Certificate request info part of raw ASN.1 DER content. | |
| RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo []byte // DER encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo. | |
| RawSubject []byte // DER encoded Subject. | |
| Version int | |
| Signature []byte | |
| SignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm | |
| PublicKeyAlgorithm PublicKeyAlgorithm | |
| PublicKey interface{} | |
| Subject pkix.Name | |
| // Attributes contains the CSR attributes that can parse as | |
| // pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET. | |
| // | |
| // Deprecated: Use Extensions and ExtraExtensions instead for parsing and | |
| // generating the requestedExtensions attribute. | |
| Attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET | |
| // Extensions contains all requested extensions, in raw form. When parsing | |
| // CSRs, this can be used to extract extensions that are not parsed by this | |
| // package. | |
| Extensions []pkix.Extension | |
| // ExtraExtensions contains extensions to be copied, raw, into any CSR | |
| // marshaled by CreateCertificateRequest. Values override any extensions | |
| // that would otherwise be produced based on the other fields but are | |
| // overridden by any extensions specified in Attributes. | |
| // | |
| // The ExtraExtensions field is not populated by ParseCertificateRequest, | |
| // see Extensions instead. | |
| ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension | |
| // Subject Alternate Name values. | |
| DNSNames []string | |
| EmailAddresses []string | |
| IPAddresses []net.IP | |
| URIs []*url.URL | |
| } | |
| // These structures reflect the ASN.1 structure of X.509 certificate | |
| // signature requests (see RFC 2986): | |
| type tbsCertificateRequest struct { | |
| Raw asn1.RawContent | |
| Version int | |
| Subject asn1.RawValue | |
| PublicKey publicKeyInfo | |
| RawAttributes []asn1.RawValue `asn1:"tag:0"` | |
| } | |
| type certificateRequest struct { | |
| Raw asn1.RawContent | |
| TBSCSR tbsCertificateRequest | |
| SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier | |
| SignatureValue asn1.BitString | |
| } | |
| // oidExtensionRequest is a PKCS #9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER that indicates requested | |
| // extensions in a CSR. | |
| var oidExtensionRequest = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9, 14} | |
| // newRawAttributes converts AttributeTypeAndValueSETs from a template | |
| // CertificateRequest's Attributes into tbsCertificateRequest RawAttributes. | |
| func newRawAttributes(attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET) ([]asn1.RawValue, error) { | |
| var rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue | |
| b, err := asn1.Marshal(attributes) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(b, &rawAttributes) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to unmarshal raw CSR Attributes") | |
| } | |
| return rawAttributes, nil | |
| } | |
| // parseRawAttributes Unmarshals RawAttributes into AttributeTypeAndValueSETs. | |
| func parseRawAttributes(rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue) []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET { | |
| var attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET | |
| for _, rawAttr := range rawAttributes { | |
| var attr pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET | |
| rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(rawAttr.FullBytes, &attr) | |
| // Ignore attributes that don't parse into pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET | |
| // (i.e.: challengePassword or unstructuredName). | |
| if err == nil && len(rest) == 0 { | |
| attributes = append(attributes, attr) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return attributes | |
| } | |
| // parseCSRExtensions parses the attributes from a CSR and extracts any | |
| // requested extensions. | |
| func parseCSRExtensions(rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue) ([]pkix.Extension, error) { | |
| // pkcs10Attribute reflects the Attribute structure from RFC 2986, Section 4.1. | |
| type pkcs10Attribute struct { | |
| Id asn1.ObjectIdentifier | |
| Values []asn1.RawValue `asn1:"set"` | |
| } | |
| var ret []pkix.Extension | |
| for _, rawAttr := range rawAttributes { | |
| var attr pkcs10Attribute | |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(rawAttr.FullBytes, &attr); err != nil || len(rest) != 0 || len(attr.Values) == 0 { | |
| // Ignore attributes that don't parse. | |
| continue | |
| } | |
| if !attr.Id.Equal(oidExtensionRequest) { | |
| continue | |
| } | |
| var extensions []pkix.Extension | |
| if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(attr.Values[0].FullBytes, &extensions); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| ret = append(ret, extensions...) | |
| } | |
| return ret, nil | |
| } | |
| // CreateCertificateRequest creates a new certificate request based on a | |
| // template. The following members of template are used: | |
| // | |
| // - SignatureAlgorithm | |
| // - Subject | |
| // - DNSNames | |
| // - EmailAddresses | |
| // - IPAddresses | |
| // - URIs | |
| // - ExtraExtensions | |
| // - Attributes (deprecated) | |
| // | |
| // priv is the private key to sign the CSR with, and the corresponding public | |
| // key will be included in the CSR. It must implement crypto.Signer and its | |
| // Public() method must return a *rsa.PublicKey or a *ecdsa.PublicKey or a | |
| // ed25519.PublicKey. (A *rsa.PrivateKey, *ecdsa.PrivateKey or | |
| // ed25519.PrivateKey satisfies this.) | |
| // | |
| // The returned slice is the certificate request in DER encoding. | |
| func CreateCertificateRequest(rand io.Reader, template *CertificateRequest, priv interface{}) (csr []byte, err error) { | |
| key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer) | |
| if !ok { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer") | |
| } | |
| var hashFunc crypto.Hash | |
| var sigAlgo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier | |
| hashFunc, sigAlgo, err = signingParamsForPublicKey(key.Public(), template.SignatureAlgorithm) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| var publicKeyBytes []byte | |
| var publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier | |
| publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err = marshalPublicKey(key.Public()) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| var extensions []pkix.Extension | |
| if (len(template.DNSNames) > 0 || len(template.EmailAddresses) > 0 || len(template.IPAddresses) > 0 || len(template.URIs) > 0) && | |
| !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectAltName, template.ExtraExtensions) { | |
| sanBytes, err := marshalSANs(template.DNSNames, template.EmailAddresses, template.IPAddresses, template.URIs) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| extensions = append(extensions, pkix.Extension{ | |
| Id: oidExtensionSubjectAltName, | |
| Value: sanBytes, | |
| }) | |
| } | |
| extensions = append(extensions, template.ExtraExtensions...) | |
| // Make a copy of template.Attributes because we may alter it below. | |
| attributes := make([]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET, 0, len(template.Attributes)) | |
| for _, attr := range template.Attributes { | |
| values := make([][]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue, len(attr.Value)) | |
| copy(values, attr.Value) | |
| attributes = append(attributes, pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET{ | |
| Type: attr.Type, | |
| Value: values, | |
| }) | |
| } | |
| extensionsAppended := false | |
| if len(extensions) > 0 { | |
| // Append the extensions to an existing attribute if possible. | |
| for _, atvSet := range attributes { | |
| if !atvSet.Type.Equal(oidExtensionRequest) || len(atvSet.Value) == 0 { | |
| continue | |
| } | |
| // specifiedExtensions contains all the extensions that we | |
| // found specified via template.Attributes. | |
| specifiedExtensions := make(map[string]bool) | |
| for _, atvs := range atvSet.Value { | |
| for _, atv := range atvs { | |
| specifiedExtensions[atv.Type.String()] = true | |
| } | |
| } | |
| newValue := make([]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue, 0, len(atvSet.Value[0])+len(extensions)) | |
| newValue = append(newValue, atvSet.Value[0]...) | |
| for _, e := range extensions { | |
| if specifiedExtensions[e.Id.String()] { | |
| // Attributes already contained a value for | |
| // this extension and it takes priority. | |
| continue | |
| } | |
| newValue = append(newValue, pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue{ | |
| // There is no place for the critical | |
| // flag in an AttributeTypeAndValue. | |
| Type: e.Id, | |
| Value: e.Value, | |
| }) | |
| } | |
| atvSet.Value[0] = newValue | |
| extensionsAppended = true | |
| break | |
| } | |
| } | |
| rawAttributes, err := newRawAttributes(attributes) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| // If not included in attributes, add a new attribute for the | |
| // extensions. | |
| if len(extensions) > 0 && !extensionsAppended { | |
| attr := struct { | |
| Type asn1.ObjectIdentifier | |
| Value [][]pkix.Extension `asn1:"set"` | |
| }{ | |
| Type: oidExtensionRequest, | |
| Value: [][]pkix.Extension{extensions}, | |
| } | |
| b, err := asn1.Marshal(attr) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to serialise extensions attribute: " + err.Error()) | |
| } | |
| var rawValue asn1.RawValue | |
| if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(b, &rawValue); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| rawAttributes = append(rawAttributes, rawValue) | |
| } | |
| asn1Subject := template.RawSubject | |
| if len(asn1Subject) == 0 { | |
| asn1Subject, err = asn1.Marshal(template.Subject.ToRDNSequence()) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| } | |
| tbsCSR := tbsCertificateRequest{ | |
| Version: 0, // PKCS #10, RFC 2986 | |
| Subject: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Subject}, | |
| PublicKey: publicKeyInfo{ | |
| Algorithm: publicKeyAlgorithm, | |
| PublicKey: asn1.BitString{ | |
| Bytes: publicKeyBytes, | |
| BitLength: len(publicKeyBytes) * 8, | |
| }, | |
| }, | |
| RawAttributes: rawAttributes, | |
| } | |
| tbsCSRContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCSR) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| tbsCSR.Raw = tbsCSRContents | |
| signed := tbsCSRContents | |
| if hashFunc != 0 { | |
| h := hashFunc.New() | |
| h.Write(signed) | |
| signed = h.Sum(nil) | |
| } | |
| var signature []byte | |
| signature, err = key.Sign(rand, signed, hashFunc) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return | |
| } | |
| return asn1.Marshal(certificateRequest{ | |
| TBSCSR: tbsCSR, | |
| SignatureAlgorithm: sigAlgo, | |
| SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{ | |
| Bytes: signature, | |
| BitLength: len(signature) * 8, | |
| }, | |
| }) | |
| } | |
| // ParseCertificateRequest parses a single certificate request from the | |
| // given ASN.1 DER data. | |
| func ParseCertificateRequest(asn1Data []byte) (*CertificateRequest, error) { | |
| var csr certificateRequest | |
| rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, &csr) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, asn1.SyntaxError{Msg: "trailing data"} | |
| } | |
| return parseCertificateRequest(&csr) | |
| } | |
| func parseCertificateRequest(in *certificateRequest) (*CertificateRequest, error) { | |
| out := &CertificateRequest{ | |
| Raw: in.Raw, | |
| RawTBSCertificateRequest: in.TBSCSR.Raw, | |
| RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo: in.TBSCSR.PublicKey.Raw, | |
| RawSubject: in.TBSCSR.Subject.FullBytes, | |
| Signature: in.SignatureValue.RightAlign(), | |
| SignatureAlgorithm: getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(in.SignatureAlgorithm), | |
| PublicKeyAlgorithm: getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(in.TBSCSR.PublicKey.Algorithm.Algorithm), | |
| Version: in.TBSCSR.Version, | |
| Attributes: parseRawAttributes(in.TBSCSR.RawAttributes), | |
| } | |
| var err error | |
| out.PublicKey, err = parsePublicKey(out.PublicKeyAlgorithm, &in.TBSCSR.PublicKey) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| var subject pkix.RDNSequence | |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(in.TBSCSR.Subject.FullBytes, &subject); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 Subject") | |
| } | |
| out.Subject.FillFromRDNSequence(&subject) | |
| if out.Extensions, err = parseCSRExtensions(in.TBSCSR.RawAttributes); err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| for _, extension := range out.Extensions { | |
| if extension.Id.Equal(oidExtensionSubjectAltName) { | |
| out.DNSNames, out.EmailAddresses, out.IPAddresses, out.URIs, err = parseSANExtension(extension.Value) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return out, nil | |
| } | |
| // CheckSignature reports whether the signature on c is valid. | |
| func (c *CertificateRequest) CheckSignature() error { | |
| return checkSignature(c.SignatureAlgorithm, c.RawTBSCertificateRequest, c.Signature, c.PublicKey) | |
| } | |
| // RevocationList contains the fields used to create an X.509 v2 Certificate | |
| // Revocation list with CreateRevocationList. | |
| type RevocationList struct { | |
| // SignatureAlgorithm is used to determine the signature algorithm to be | |
| // used when signing the CRL. If 0 the default algorithm for the signing | |
| // key will be used. | |
| SignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm | |
| // RevokedCertificates is used to populate the revokedCertificates | |
| // sequence in the CRL, it may be empty. RevokedCertificates may be nil, | |
| // in which case an empty CRL will be created. | |
| RevokedCertificates []pkix.RevokedCertificate | |
| // Number is used to populate the X.509 v2 cRLNumber extension in the CRL, | |
| // which should be a monotonically increasing sequence number for a given | |
| // CRL scope and CRL issuer. | |
| Number *big.Int | |
| // ThisUpdate is used to populate the thisUpdate field in the CRL, which | |
| // indicates the issuance date of the CRL. | |
| ThisUpdate time.Time | |
| // NextUpdate is used to populate the nextUpdate field in the CRL, which | |
| // indicates the date by which the next CRL will be issued. NextUpdate | |
| // must be greater than ThisUpdate. | |
| NextUpdate time.Time | |
| // ExtraExtensions contains any additional extensions to add directly to | |
| // the CRL. | |
| ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension | |
| } | |
| // CreateRevocationList creates a new X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation List, | |
| // according to RFC 5280, based on template. | |
| // | |
| // The CRL is signed by priv which should be the private key associated with | |
| // the public key in the issuer certificate. | |
| // | |
| // The issuer may not be nil, and the crlSign bit must be set in KeyUsage in | |
| // order to use it as a CRL issuer. | |
| // | |
| // The issuer distinguished name CRL field and authority key identifier | |
| // extension are populated using the issuer certificate. issuer must have | |
| // SubjectKeyId set. | |
| func CreateRevocationList(rand io.Reader, template *RevocationList, issuer *Certificate, priv crypto.Signer) ([]byte, error) { | |
| if template == nil { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: template can not be nil") | |
| } | |
| if issuer == nil { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer can not be nil") | |
| } | |
| if (issuer.KeyUsage & KeyUsageCRLSign) == 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer must have the crlSign key usage bit set") | |
| } | |
| if len(issuer.SubjectKeyId) == 0 { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer certificate doesn't contain a subject key identifier") | |
| } | |
| if template.NextUpdate.Before(template.ThisUpdate) { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: template.ThisUpdate is after template.NextUpdate") | |
| } | |
| if template.Number == nil { | |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: template contains nil Number field") | |
| } | |
| hashFunc, signatureAlgorithm, err := signingParamsForPublicKey(priv.Public(), template.SignatureAlgorithm) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| // Force revocation times to UTC per RFC 5280. | |
| revokedCertsUTC := make([]pkix.RevokedCertificate, len(template.RevokedCertificates)) | |
| for i, rc := range template.RevokedCertificates { | |
| rc.RevocationTime = rc.RevocationTime.UTC() | |
| revokedCertsUTC[i] = rc | |
| } | |
| aki, err := asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{Id: issuer.SubjectKeyId}) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| crlNum, err := asn1.Marshal(template.Number) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| tbsCertList := pkix.TBSCertificateList{ | |
| Version: 1, // v2 | |
| Signature: signatureAlgorithm, | |
| Issuer: issuer.Subject.ToRDNSequence(), | |
| ThisUpdate: template.ThisUpdate.UTC(), | |
| NextUpdate: template.NextUpdate.UTC(), | |
| Extensions: []pkix.Extension{ | |
| { | |
| Id: oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId, | |
| Value: aki, | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| Id: oidExtensionCRLNumber, | |
| Value: crlNum, | |
| }, | |
| }, | |
| } | |
| if len(revokedCertsUTC) > 0 { | |
| tbsCertList.RevokedCertificates = revokedCertsUTC | |
| } | |
| if len(template.ExtraExtensions) > 0 { | |
| tbsCertList.Extensions = append(tbsCertList.Extensions, template.ExtraExtensions...) | |
| } | |
| tbsCertListContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCertList) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| input := tbsCertListContents | |
| if hashFunc != 0 { | |
| h := hashFunc.New() | |
| h.Write(tbsCertListContents) | |
| input = h.Sum(nil) | |
| } | |
| var signerOpts crypto.SignerOpts = hashFunc | |
| if template.SignatureAlgorithm.isRSAPSS() { | |
| signerOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{ | |
| SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, | |
| Hash: hashFunc, | |
| } | |
| } | |
| signature, err := priv.Sign(rand, input, signerOpts) | |
| if err != nil { | |
| return nil, err | |
| } | |
| return asn1.Marshal(pkix.CertificateList{ | |
| TBSCertList: tbsCertList, | |
| SignatureAlgorithm: signatureAlgorithm, | |
| SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8}, | |
| }) | |
| } |