| // Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style |
| // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| package tls |
| |
| import ( |
| "bytes" |
| "crypto" |
| "crypto/ecdsa" |
| "crypto/rsa" |
| "crypto/subtle" |
| "crypto/x509" |
| "errors" |
| "fmt" |
| "io" |
| "net" |
| "strconv" |
| ) |
| |
| type clientHandshakeState struct { |
| c *Conn |
| serverHello *serverHelloMsg |
| hello *clientHelloMsg |
| suite *cipherSuite |
| finishedHash finishedHash |
| masterSecret []byte |
| session *ClientSessionState |
| } |
| |
| func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() error { |
| if c.config == nil { |
| c.config = defaultConfig() |
| } |
| |
| if len(c.config.ServerName) == 0 && !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify { |
| return errors.New("tls: either ServerName or InsecureSkipVerify must be specified in the tls.Config") |
| } |
| |
| nextProtosLength := 0 |
| for _, proto := range c.config.NextProtos { |
| if l := len(proto); l == 0 || l > 255 { |
| return errors.New("tls: invalid NextProtos value") |
| } else { |
| nextProtosLength += 1 + l |
| } |
| } |
| if nextProtosLength > 0xffff { |
| return errors.New("tls: NextProtos values too large") |
| } |
| |
| hello := &clientHelloMsg{ |
| vers: c.config.maxVersion(), |
| compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone}, |
| random: make([]byte, 32), |
| ocspStapling: true, |
| serverName: c.config.ServerName, |
| supportedCurves: c.config.curvePreferences(), |
| supportedPoints: []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed}, |
| nextProtoNeg: len(c.config.NextProtos) > 0, |
| secureRenegotiation: true, |
| alpnProtocols: c.config.NextProtos, |
| } |
| |
| possibleCipherSuites := c.config.cipherSuites() |
| hello.cipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(possibleCipherSuites)) |
| |
| NextCipherSuite: |
| for _, suiteId := range possibleCipherSuites { |
| for _, suite := range cipherSuites { |
| if suite.id != suiteId { |
| continue |
| } |
| // Don't advertise TLS 1.2-only cipher suites unless |
| // we're attempting TLS 1.2. |
| if hello.vers < VersionTLS12 && suite.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 { |
| continue |
| } |
| hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, suiteId) |
| continue NextCipherSuite |
| } |
| } |
| |
| _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.random) |
| if err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) |
| return errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error()) |
| } |
| |
| if hello.vers >= VersionTLS12 { |
| hello.signatureAndHashes = supportedSKXSignatureAlgorithms |
| } |
| |
| var session *ClientSessionState |
| var cacheKey string |
| sessionCache := c.config.ClientSessionCache |
| if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled { |
| sessionCache = nil |
| } |
| |
| if sessionCache != nil { |
| hello.ticketSupported = true |
| |
| // Try to resume a previously negotiated TLS session, if |
| // available. |
| cacheKey = clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config) |
| candidateSession, ok := sessionCache.Get(cacheKey) |
| if ok { |
| // Check that the ciphersuite/version used for the |
| // previous session are still valid. |
| cipherSuiteOk := false |
| for _, id := range hello.cipherSuites { |
| if id == candidateSession.cipherSuite { |
| cipherSuiteOk = true |
| break |
| } |
| } |
| |
| versOk := candidateSession.vers >= c.config.minVersion() && |
| candidateSession.vers <= c.config.maxVersion() |
| if versOk && cipherSuiteOk { |
| session = candidateSession |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if session != nil { |
| hello.sessionTicket = session.sessionTicket |
| // A random session ID is used to detect when the |
| // server accepted the ticket and is resuming a session |
| // (see RFC 5077). |
| hello.sessionId = make([]byte, 16) |
| if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.sessionId); err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) |
| return errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error()) |
| } |
| } |
| |
| c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hello.marshal()) |
| |
| msg, err := c.readHandshake() |
| if err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg) |
| if !ok { |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) |
| return unexpectedMessageError(serverHello, msg) |
| } |
| |
| vers, ok := c.config.mutualVersion(serverHello.vers) |
| if !ok || vers < VersionTLS10 { |
| // TLS 1.0 is the minimum version supported as a client. |
| c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) |
| return fmt.Errorf("tls: server selected unsupported protocol version %x", serverHello.vers) |
| } |
| c.vers = vers |
| c.haveVers = true |
| |
| suite := mutualCipherSuite(c.config.cipherSuites(), serverHello.cipherSuite) |
| if suite == nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) |
| return fmt.Errorf("tls: server selected an unsupported cipher suite") |
| } |
| |
| hs := &clientHandshakeState{ |
| c: c, |
| serverHello: serverHello, |
| hello: hello, |
| suite: suite, |
| finishedHash: newFinishedHash(c.vers, suite.tls12Hash), |
| session: session, |
| } |
| |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal()) |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal()) |
| |
| isResume, err := hs.processServerHello() |
| if err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| if isResume { |
| if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| if err := hs.readFinished(c.firstFinished[:]); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| } else { |
| if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| if err := hs.sendFinished(c.firstFinished[:]); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if sessionCache != nil && hs.session != nil && session != hs.session { |
| sessionCache.Put(cacheKey, hs.session) |
| } |
| |
| c.didResume = isResume |
| c.handshakeComplete = true |
| c.cipherSuite = suite.id |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error { |
| c := hs.c |
| |
| msg, err := c.readHandshake() |
| if err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg) |
| if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 { |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) |
| return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg) |
| } |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) |
| |
| certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates)) |
| for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates { |
| cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data) |
| if err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) |
| return errors.New("tls: failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.Error()) |
| } |
| certs[i] = cert |
| } |
| |
| if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify { |
| opts := x509.VerifyOptions{ |
| Roots: c.config.RootCAs, |
| CurrentTime: c.config.time(), |
| DNSName: c.config.ServerName, |
| Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(), |
| } |
| |
| for i, cert := range certs { |
| if i == 0 { |
| continue |
| } |
| opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert) |
| } |
| c.verifiedChains, err = certs[0].Verify(opts) |
| if err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) |
| return err |
| } |
| } |
| |
| switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) { |
| case *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey: |
| break |
| default: |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate) |
| return fmt.Errorf("tls: server's certificate contains an unsupported type of public key: %T", certs[0].PublicKey) |
| } |
| |
| c.peerCertificates = certs |
| |
| if hs.serverHello.ocspStapling { |
| msg, err = c.readHandshake() |
| if err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| cs, ok := msg.(*certificateStatusMsg) |
| if !ok { |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) |
| return unexpectedMessageError(cs, msg) |
| } |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(cs.marshal()) |
| |
| if cs.statusType == statusTypeOCSP { |
| c.ocspResponse = cs.response |
| } |
| } |
| |
| msg, err = c.readHandshake() |
| if err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers) |
| |
| skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg) |
| if ok { |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal()) |
| err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, certs[0], skx) |
| if err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| msg, err = c.readHandshake() |
| if err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| } |
| |
| var chainToSend *Certificate |
| var certRequested bool |
| certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsg) |
| if ok { |
| certRequested = true |
| |
| // RFC 4346 on the certificateAuthorities field: |
| // A list of the distinguished names of acceptable certificate |
| // authorities. These distinguished names may specify a desired |
| // distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA; |
| // thus, this message can be used to describe both known roots |
| // and a desired authorization space. If the |
| // certificate_authorities list is empty then the client MAY |
| // send any certificate of the appropriate |
| // ClientCertificateType, unless there is some external |
| // arrangement to the contrary. |
| |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal()) |
| |
| var rsaAvail, ecdsaAvail bool |
| for _, certType := range certReq.certificateTypes { |
| switch certType { |
| case certTypeRSASign: |
| rsaAvail = true |
| case certTypeECDSASign: |
| ecdsaAvail = true |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // We need to search our list of client certs for one |
| // where SignatureAlgorithm is acceptable to the server and the |
| // Issuer is in certReq.certificateAuthorities |
| findCert: |
| for i, chain := range c.config.Certificates { |
| if !rsaAvail && !ecdsaAvail { |
| continue |
| } |
| |
| for j, cert := range chain.Certificate { |
| x509Cert := chain.Leaf |
| // parse the certificate if this isn't the leaf |
| // node, or if chain.Leaf was nil |
| if j != 0 || x509Cert == nil { |
| if x509Cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(cert); err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) |
| return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate #" + strconv.Itoa(i) + ": " + err.Error()) |
| } |
| } |
| |
| switch { |
| case rsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA: |
| case ecdsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.ECDSA: |
| default: |
| continue findCert |
| } |
| |
| if len(certReq.certificateAuthorities) == 0 { |
| // they gave us an empty list, so just take the |
| // first cert from c.config.Certificates |
| chainToSend = &chain |
| break findCert |
| } |
| |
| for _, ca := range certReq.certificateAuthorities { |
| if bytes.Equal(x509Cert.RawIssuer, ca) { |
| chainToSend = &chain |
| break findCert |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| msg, err = c.readHandshake() |
| if err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| } |
| |
| shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg) |
| if !ok { |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) |
| return unexpectedMessageError(shd, msg) |
| } |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal()) |
| |
| // If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a |
| // Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a |
| // certificate to send. |
| if certRequested { |
| certMsg = new(certificateMsg) |
| if chainToSend != nil { |
| certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate |
| } |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) |
| c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()) |
| } |
| |
| preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, certs[0]) |
| if err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) |
| return err |
| } |
| if ckx != nil { |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal()) |
| c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal()) |
| } |
| |
| if chainToSend != nil { |
| var signed []byte |
| certVerify := &certificateVerifyMsg{ |
| hasSignatureAndHash: c.vers >= VersionTLS12, |
| } |
| |
| key, ok := chainToSend.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer) |
| if !ok { |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) |
| return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate private key of type %T does not implement crypto.Signer", chainToSend.PrivateKey) |
| } |
| switch key.Public().(type) { |
| case *ecdsa.PublicKey: |
| digest, hashFunc, hashId := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(signatureECDSA) |
| signed, err = key.Sign(c.config.rand(), digest, hashFunc) |
| certVerify.signatureAndHash.signature = signatureECDSA |
| certVerify.signatureAndHash.hash = hashId |
| case *rsa.PublicKey: |
| digest, hashFunc, hashId := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(signatureRSA) |
| signed, err = key.Sign(c.config.rand(), digest, hashFunc) |
| certVerify.signatureAndHash.signature = signatureRSA |
| certVerify.signatureAndHash.hash = hashId |
| default: |
| err = fmt.Errorf("tls: unknown client certificate key type: %T", key) |
| } |
| if err != nil { |
| c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) |
| return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake with client certificate: " + err.Error()) |
| } |
| certVerify.signature = signed |
| |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal()) |
| c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal()) |
| } |
| |
| hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite.tls12Hash, preMasterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random) |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| func (hs *clientHandshakeState) establishKeys() error { |
| c := hs.c |
| |
| clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV := |
| keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite.tls12Hash, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen) |
| var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{} |
| var clientHash, serverHash macFunction |
| if hs.suite.cipher != nil { |
| clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */) |
| clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC) |
| serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, true /* for reading */) |
| serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC) |
| } else { |
| clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV) |
| serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV) |
| } |
| |
| c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash) |
| c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash) |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| func (hs *clientHandshakeState) serverResumedSession() bool { |
| // If the server responded with the same sessionId then it means the |
| // sessionTicket is being used to resume a TLS session. |
| return hs.session != nil && hs.hello.sessionId != nil && |
| bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.sessionId, hs.hello.sessionId) |
| } |
| |
| func (hs *clientHandshakeState) processServerHello() (bool, error) { |
| c := hs.c |
| |
| if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone { |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) |
| return false, errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format") |
| } |
| |
| clientDidNPN := hs.hello.nextProtoNeg |
| clientDidALPN := len(hs.hello.alpnProtocols) > 0 |
| serverHasNPN := hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg |
| serverHasALPN := len(hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol) > 0 |
| |
| if !clientDidNPN && serverHasNPN { |
| c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) |
| return false, errors.New("server advertised unrequested NPN extension") |
| } |
| |
| if !clientDidALPN && serverHasALPN { |
| c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) |
| return false, errors.New("server advertised unrequested ALPN extension") |
| } |
| |
| if serverHasNPN && serverHasALPN { |
| c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) |
| return false, errors.New("server advertised both NPN and ALPN extensions") |
| } |
| |
| if serverHasALPN { |
| c.clientProtocol = hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol |
| c.clientProtocolFallback = false |
| } |
| |
| if hs.serverResumedSession() { |
| // Restore masterSecret and peerCerts from previous state |
| hs.masterSecret = hs.session.masterSecret |
| c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates |
| return true, nil |
| } |
| return false, nil |
| } |
| |
| func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error { |
| c := hs.c |
| |
| c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec) |
| if err := c.in.error(); err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| |
| msg, err := c.readHandshake() |
| if err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg) |
| if !ok { |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) |
| return unexpectedMessageError(serverFinished, msg) |
| } |
| |
| verify := hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret) |
| if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) || |
| subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 { |
| c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) |
| return errors.New("tls: server's Finished message was incorrect") |
| } |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(serverFinished.marshal()) |
| copy(out, verify) |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readSessionTicket() error { |
| if !hs.serverHello.ticketSupported { |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| c := hs.c |
| msg, err := c.readHandshake() |
| if err != nil { |
| return err |
| } |
| sessionTicketMsg, ok := msg.(*newSessionTicketMsg) |
| if !ok { |
| c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) |
| return unexpectedMessageError(sessionTicketMsg, msg) |
| } |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(sessionTicketMsg.marshal()) |
| |
| hs.session = &ClientSessionState{ |
| sessionTicket: sessionTicketMsg.ticket, |
| vers: c.vers, |
| cipherSuite: hs.suite.id, |
| masterSecret: hs.masterSecret, |
| serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates, |
| } |
| |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| func (hs *clientHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error { |
| c := hs.c |
| |
| c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}) |
| if hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg { |
| nextProto := new(nextProtoMsg) |
| proto, fallback := mutualProtocol(c.config.NextProtos, hs.serverHello.nextProtos) |
| nextProto.proto = proto |
| c.clientProtocol = proto |
| c.clientProtocolFallback = fallback |
| |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal()) |
| c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, nextProto.marshal()) |
| } |
| |
| finished := new(finishedMsg) |
| finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret) |
| hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal()) |
| c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()) |
| copy(out, finished.verifyData) |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| // clientSessionCacheKey returns a key used to cache sessionTickets that could |
| // be used to resume previously negotiated TLS sessions with a server. |
| func clientSessionCacheKey(serverAddr net.Addr, config *Config) string { |
| if len(config.ServerName) > 0 { |
| return config.ServerName |
| } |
| return serverAddr.String() |
| } |
| |
| // mutualProtocol finds the mutual Next Protocol Negotiation or ALPN protocol |
| // given list of possible protocols and a list of the preference order. The |
| // first list must not be empty. It returns the resulting protocol and flag |
| // indicating if the fallback case was reached. |
| func mutualProtocol(protos, preferenceProtos []string) (string, bool) { |
| for _, s := range preferenceProtos { |
| for _, c := range protos { |
| if s == c { |
| return s, false |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return protos[0], true |
| } |