src/pkg/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go - go - Git at Google

 // Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.

 package rsa

 import (
 	"crypto"
 	"crypto/subtle"
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"math/big"
 )

 // This file implements encryption and decryption using PKCS#1 v1.5 padding.

 // EncryptPKCS1v15 encrypts the given message with RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS#1 v1.5.
 // The message must be no longer than the length of the public modulus minus 11 bytes.
 // WARNING: use of this function to encrypt plaintexts other than session keys
 // is dangerous. Use RSA OAEP in new protocols.
 func EncryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte) (out []byte, err error) {
 	if err := checkPub(pub); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	k := (pub.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
 	if len(msg) > k-11 {
 		err = ErrMessageTooLong
 		return
 	}

 	// EM = 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 || M
 	em := make([]byte, k)
 	em[1] = 2
 	ps, mm := em[2:len(em)-len(msg)-1], em[len(em)-len(msg):]
 	err = nonZeroRandomBytes(ps, rand)
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}
 	em[len(em)-len(msg)-1] = 0
 	copy(mm, msg)

 	m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)
 	c := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, m)

 	copyWithLeftPad(em, c.Bytes())
 	out = em
 	return
 }

 // DecryptPKCS1v15 decrypts a plaintext using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS#1 v1.5.
 // If rand != nil, it uses RSA blinding to avoid timing side-channel attacks.
 func DecryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte) (out []byte, err error) {
 	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	valid, out, err := decryptPKCS1v15(rand, priv, ciphertext)
 	if err == nil && valid == 0 {
 		err = ErrDecryption
 	}

 	return
 }

 // DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey decrypts a session key using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS#1 v1.5.
 // If rand != nil, it uses RSA blinding to avoid timing side-channel attacks.
 // It returns an error if the ciphertext is the wrong length or if the
 // ciphertext is greater than the public modulus. Otherwise, no error is
 // returned. If the padding is valid, the resulting plaintext message is copied
 // into key. Otherwise, key is unchanged. These alternatives occur in constant
 // time. It is intended that the user of this function generate a random
 // session key beforehand and continue the protocol with the resulting value.
 // This will remove any possibility that an attacker can learn any information
 // about the plaintext.
 // See ``Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
 // Encryption Standard PKCS #1'', Daniel Bleichenbacher, Advances in Cryptology
 // (Crypto '98).
 func DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte, key []byte) (err error) {
 	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 	k := (priv.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
 	if k-(len(key)+3+8) < 0 {
 		err = ErrDecryption
 		return
 	}

 	valid, msg, err := decryptPKCS1v15(rand, priv, ciphertext)
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}

 	valid &= subtle.ConstantTimeEq(int32(len(msg)), int32(len(key)))
 	subtle.ConstantTimeCopy(valid, key, msg)
 	return
 }

 func decryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte) (valid int, msg []byte, err error) {
 	k := (priv.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
 	if k < 11 {
 		err = ErrDecryption
 		return
 	}

 	c := new(big.Int).SetBytes(ciphertext)
 	m, err := decrypt(rand, priv, c)
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}

 	em := leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)
 	firstByteIsZero := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
 	secondByteIsTwo := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[1], 2)

 	// The remainder of the plaintext must be a string of non-zero random
 	// octets, followed by a 0, followed by the message.
 	//   lookingForIndex: 1 iff we are still looking for the zero.
 	//   index: the offset of the first zero byte.
 	var lookingForIndex, index int
 	lookingForIndex = 1

 	for i := 2; i < len(em); i++ {
 		equals0 := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[i], 0)
 		index = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(lookingForIndex&equals0, i, index)
 		lookingForIndex = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(equals0, 0, lookingForIndex)
 	}

 	// The PS padding must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two
 	// bytes into em.
 	validPS := subtle.ConstantTimeLessOrEq(2+8, index)

 	valid = firstByteIsZero & secondByteIsTwo & (^lookingForIndex & 1) & validPS
 	msg = em[index+1:]
 	return
 }

 // nonZeroRandomBytes fills the given slice with non-zero random octets.
 func nonZeroRandomBytes(s []byte, rand io.Reader) (err error) {
 	_, err = io.ReadFull(rand, s)
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}

 	for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
 		for s[i] == 0 {
 			_, err = io.ReadFull(rand, s[i:i+1])
 			if err != nil {
 				return
 			}
 			// In tests, the PRNG may return all zeros so we do
 			// this to break the loop.
 			s[i] ^= 0x42
 		}
 	}

 	return
 }

 // These are ASN1 DER structures:
 //   DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
 //     digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
 //     digest OCTET STRING
 //   }
 // For performance, we don't use the generic ASN1 encoder. Rather, we
 // precompute a prefix of the digest value that makes a valid ASN1 DER string
 // with the correct contents.
 var hashPrefixes = map[crypto.Hash][]byte{
 	crypto.MD5:       {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10},
 	crypto.SHA1:      {0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14},
 	crypto.SHA224:    {0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c},
 	crypto.SHA256:    {0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20},
 	crypto.SHA384:    {0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30},
 	crypto.SHA512:    {0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40},
 	crypto.MD5SHA1:   {}, // A special TLS case which doesn't use an ASN1 prefix.
 	crypto.RIPEMD160: {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x28, 0xcf, 0x06, 0x03, 0x00, 0x31, 0x04, 0x14},
 }

 // SignPKCS1v15 calculates the signature of hashed using RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN from RSA PKCS#1 v1.5.
 // Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the
 // given hash function. If hash is zero, hashed is signed directly. This isn't
 // advisable except for interoperability.
 func SignPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte) (s []byte, err error) {
 	hashLen, prefix, err := pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash, len(hashed))
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}

 	tLen := len(prefix) + hashLen
 	k := (priv.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
 	if k < tLen+11 {
 		return nil, ErrMessageTooLong
 	}

 	// EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T
 	em := make([]byte, k)
 	em[1] = 1
 	for i := 2; i < k-tLen-1; i++ {
 		em[i] = 0xff
 	}
 	copy(em[k-tLen:k-hashLen], prefix)
 	copy(em[k-hashLen:k], hashed)

 	m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)
 	c, err := decrypt(rand, priv, m)
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}

 	copyWithLeftPad(em, c.Bytes())
 	s = em
 	return
 }

 // VerifyPKCS1v15 verifies an RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature.
 // hashed is the result of hashing the input message using the given hash
 // function and sig is the signature. A valid signature is indicated by
 // returning a nil error. If hash is zero then hashed is used directly. This
 // isn't advisable except for interopability.
 func VerifyPKCS1v15(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte) (err error) {
 	hashLen, prefix, err := pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash, len(hashed))
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}

 	tLen := len(prefix) + hashLen
 	k := (pub.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
 	if k < tLen+11 {
 		err = ErrVerification
 		return
 	}

 	c := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig)
 	m := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, c)
 	em := leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)
 	// EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T

 	ok := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
 	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[1], 1)
 	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(em[k-hashLen:k], hashed)
 	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(em[k-tLen:k-hashLen], prefix)
 	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[k-tLen-1], 0)

 	for i := 2; i < k-tLen-1; i++ {
 		ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[i], 0xff)
 	}

 	if ok != 1 {
 		return ErrVerification
 	}

 	return nil
 }

 func pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash crypto.Hash, inLen int) (hashLen int, prefix []byte, err error) {
 	// Special case: crypto.Hash(0) is used to indicate that the data is
 	// signed directly.
 	if hash == 0 {
 		return inLen, nil, nil
 	}

 	hashLen = hash.Size()
 	if inLen != hashLen {
 		return 0, nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: input must be hashed message")
 	}
 	prefix, ok := hashPrefixes[hash]
 	if !ok {
 		return 0, nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: unsupported hash function")
 	}
 	return
 }

 // copyWithLeftPad copies src to the end of dest, padding with zero bytes as
 // needed.
 func copyWithLeftPad(dest, src []byte) {
 	numPaddingBytes := len(dest) - len(src)
 	for i := 0; i < numPaddingBytes; i++ {
 		dest[i] = 0
 	}
 	copy(dest[numPaddingBytes:], src)
 }
	// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
	// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
	// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.

	package rsa

	import (
	"crypto"
	"crypto/subtle"
	"errors"
	"io"
	"math/big"
	)

	// This file implements encryption and decryption using PKCS#1 v1.5 padding.

	// EncryptPKCS1v15 encrypts the given message with RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS#1 v1.5.
	// The message must be no longer than the length of the public modulus minus 11 bytes.
	// WARNING: use of this function to encrypt plaintexts other than session keys
	// is dangerous. Use RSA OAEP in new protocols.
	func EncryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte) (out []byte, err error) {
	if err := checkPub(pub); err != nil {
	return nil, err
	}
	k := (pub.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
	if len(msg) > k-11 {
	err = ErrMessageTooLong
	return
	}

	// EM = 0x00 \|\| 0x02 \|\| PS \|\| 0x00 \|\| M
	em := make([]byte, k)
	em[1] = 2
	ps, mm := em[2:len(em)-len(msg)-1], em[len(em)-len(msg):]
	err = nonZeroRandomBytes(ps, rand)
	if err != nil {
	return
	}
	em[len(em)-len(msg)-1] = 0
	copy(mm, msg)

	m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)
	c := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, m)

	copyWithLeftPad(em, c.Bytes())
	out = em
	return
	}

	// DecryptPKCS1v15 decrypts a plaintext using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS#1 v1.5.
	// If rand != nil, it uses RSA blinding to avoid timing side-channel attacks.
	func DecryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte) (out []byte, err error) {
	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
	return nil, err
	}
	valid, out, err := decryptPKCS1v15(rand, priv, ciphertext)
	if err == nil && valid == 0 {
	err = ErrDecryption
	}

	return
	}

	// DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey decrypts a session key using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS#1 v1.5.
	// If rand != nil, it uses RSA blinding to avoid timing side-channel attacks.
	// It returns an error if the ciphertext is the wrong length or if the
	// ciphertext is greater than the public modulus. Otherwise, no error is
	// returned. If the padding is valid, the resulting plaintext message is copied
	// into key. Otherwise, key is unchanged. These alternatives occur in constant
	// time. It is intended that the user of this function generate a random
	// session key beforehand and continue the protocol with the resulting value.
	// This will remove any possibility that an attacker can learn any information
	// about the plaintext.
	// See ``Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
	// Encryption Standard PKCS #1'', Daniel Bleichenbacher, Advances in Cryptology
	// (Crypto '98).
	func DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte, key []byte) (err error) {
	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
	return err
	}
	k := (priv.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
	if k-(len(key)+3+8) < 0 {
	err = ErrDecryption
	return
	}

	valid, msg, err := decryptPKCS1v15(rand, priv, ciphertext)
	if err != nil {
	return
	}

	valid &= subtle.ConstantTimeEq(int32(len(msg)), int32(len(key)))
	subtle.ConstantTimeCopy(valid, key, msg)
	return
	}

	func decryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte) (valid int, msg []byte, err error) {
	k := (priv.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
	if k < 11 {
	err = ErrDecryption
	return
	}

	c := new(big.Int).SetBytes(ciphertext)
	m, err := decrypt(rand, priv, c)
	if err != nil {
	return
	}

	em := leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)
	firstByteIsZero := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
	secondByteIsTwo := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[1], 2)

	// The remainder of the plaintext must be a string of non-zero random
	// octets, followed by a 0, followed by the message.
	// lookingForIndex: 1 iff we are still looking for the zero.
	// index: the offset of the first zero byte.
	var lookingForIndex, index int
	lookingForIndex = 1

	for i := 2; i < len(em); i++ {
	equals0 := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[i], 0)
	index = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(lookingForIndex&equals0, i, index)
	lookingForIndex = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(equals0, 0, lookingForIndex)
	}

	// The PS padding must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two
	// bytes into em.
	validPS := subtle.ConstantTimeLessOrEq(2+8, index)

	valid = firstByteIsZero & secondByteIsTwo & (^lookingForIndex & 1) & validPS
	msg = em[index+1:]
	return
	}

	// nonZeroRandomBytes fills the given slice with non-zero random octets.
	func nonZeroRandomBytes(s []byte, rand io.Reader) (err error) {
	_, err = io.ReadFull(rand, s)
	if err != nil {
	return
	}

	for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
	for s[i] == 0 {
	_, err = io.ReadFull(rand, s[i:i+1])
	if err != nil {
	return
	}
	// In tests, the PRNG may return all zeros so we do
	// this to break the loop.
	s[i] ^= 0x42
	}
	}

	return
	}

	// These are ASN1 DER structures:
	// DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	// digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
	// digest OCTET STRING
	// }
	// For performance, we don't use the generic ASN1 encoder. Rather, we
	// precompute a prefix of the digest value that makes a valid ASN1 DER string
	// with the correct contents.
	var hashPrefixes = map[crypto.Hash][]byte{
	crypto.MD5: {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10},
	crypto.SHA1: {0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14},
	crypto.SHA224: {0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c},
	crypto.SHA256: {0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20},
	crypto.SHA384: {0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30},
	crypto.SHA512: {0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40},
	crypto.MD5SHA1: {}, // A special TLS case which doesn't use an ASN1 prefix.
	crypto.RIPEMD160: {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x28, 0xcf, 0x06, 0x03, 0x00, 0x31, 0x04, 0x14},
	}

	// SignPKCS1v15 calculates the signature of hashed using RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN from RSA PKCS#1 v1.5.
	// Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the
	// given hash function. If hash is zero, hashed is signed directly. This isn't
	// advisable except for interoperability.
	func SignPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte) (s []byte, err error) {
	hashLen, prefix, err := pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash, len(hashed))
	if err != nil {
	return
	}

	tLen := len(prefix) + hashLen
	k := (priv.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
	if k < tLen+11 {
	return nil, ErrMessageTooLong
	}

	// EM = 0x00 \|\| 0x01 \|\| PS \|\| 0x00 \|\| T
	em := make([]byte, k)
	em[1] = 1
	for i := 2; i < k-tLen-1; i++ {
	em[i] = 0xff
	}
	copy(em[k-tLen:k-hashLen], prefix)
	copy(em[k-hashLen:k], hashed)

	m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)
	c, err := decrypt(rand, priv, m)
	if err != nil {
	return
	}

	copyWithLeftPad(em, c.Bytes())
	s = em
	return
	}

	// VerifyPKCS1v15 verifies an RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature.
	// hashed is the result of hashing the input message using the given hash
	// function and sig is the signature. A valid signature is indicated by
	// returning a nil error. If hash is zero then hashed is used directly. This
	// isn't advisable except for interopability.
	func VerifyPKCS1v15(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte) (err error) {
	hashLen, prefix, err := pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash, len(hashed))
	if err != nil {
	return
	}

	tLen := len(prefix) + hashLen
	k := (pub.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
	if k < tLen+11 {
	err = ErrVerification
	return
	}

	c := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig)
	m := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, c)
	em := leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)
	// EM = 0x00 \|\| 0x01 \|\| PS \|\| 0x00 \|\| T

	ok := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[1], 1)
	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(em[k-hashLen:k], hashed)
	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(em[k-tLen:k-hashLen], prefix)
	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[k-tLen-1], 0)

	for i := 2; i < k-tLen-1; i++ {
	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[i], 0xff)
	}

	if ok != 1 {
	return ErrVerification
	}

	return nil
	}

	func pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash crypto.Hash, inLen int) (hashLen int, prefix []byte, err error) {
	// Special case: crypto.Hash(0) is used to indicate that the data is
	// signed directly.
	if hash == 0 {
	return inLen, nil, nil
	}

	hashLen = hash.Size()
	if inLen != hashLen {
	return 0, nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: input must be hashed message")
	}
	prefix, ok := hashPrefixes[hash]
	if !ok {
	return 0, nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: unsupported hash function")
	}
	return
	}

	// copyWithLeftPad copies src to the end of dest, padding with zero bytes as
	// needed.
	func copyWithLeftPad(dest, src []byte) {
	numPaddingBytes := len(dest) - len(src)
	for i := 0; i < numPaddingBytes; i++ {
	dest[i] = 0
	}
	copy(dest[numPaddingBytes:], src)
	}