| // Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style |
| // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| // Package x509 implements a subset of the X.509 standard. |
| // |
| // It allows parsing and generating certificates, certificate signing |
| // requests, certificate revocation lists, and encoded public and private keys. |
| // It provides a certificate verifier, complete with a chain builder. |
| // |
| // The package targets the X.509 technical profile defined by the IETF (RFC |
| // 2459/3280/5280), and as further restricted by the CA/Browser Forum Baseline |
| // Requirements. There is minimal support for features outside of these |
| // profiles, as the primary goal of the package is to provide compatibility |
| // with the publicly trusted TLS certificate ecosystem and its policies and |
| // constraints. |
| // |
| // On macOS and Windows, certificate verification is handled by system APIs, but |
| // the package aims to apply consistent validation rules across operating |
| // systems. |
| package x509 |
| |
| import ( |
| "bytes" |
| "crypto" |
| "crypto/ecdh" |
| "crypto/ecdsa" |
| "crypto/ed25519" |
| "crypto/elliptic" |
| "crypto/rsa" |
| "crypto/sha1" |
| "crypto/x509/pkix" |
| "encoding/asn1" |
| "encoding/pem" |
| "errors" |
| "fmt" |
| "internal/godebug" |
| "io" |
| "math/big" |
| "net" |
| "net/url" |
| "strconv" |
| "time" |
| "unicode" |
| |
| // Explicitly import these for their crypto.RegisterHash init side-effects. |
| // Keep these as blank imports, even if they're imported above. |
| _ "crypto/sha1" |
| _ "crypto/sha256" |
| _ "crypto/sha512" |
| |
| "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte" |
| cryptobyte_asn1 "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1" |
| ) |
| |
| // pkixPublicKey reflects a PKIX public key structure. See SubjectPublicKeyInfo |
| // in RFC 3280. |
| type pkixPublicKey struct { |
| Algo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier |
| BitString asn1.BitString |
| } |
| |
| // ParsePKIXPublicKey parses a public key in PKIX, ASN.1 DER form. The encoded |
| // public key is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure (see RFC 5280, Section 4.1). |
| // |
| // It returns a *[rsa.PublicKey], *[dsa.PublicKey], *[ecdsa.PublicKey], |
| // [ed25519.PublicKey] (not a pointer), or *[ecdh.PublicKey] (for X25519). |
| // More types might be supported in the future. |
| // |
| // This kind of key is commonly encoded in PEM blocks of type "PUBLIC KEY". |
| func ParsePKIXPublicKey(derBytes []byte) (pub any, err error) { |
| var pki publicKeyInfo |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(derBytes, &pki); err != nil { |
| if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(derBytes, &pkcs1PublicKey{}); err == nil { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to parse public key (use ParsePKCS1PublicKey instead for this key format)") |
| } |
| return nil, err |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after ASN.1 of public-key") |
| } |
| return parsePublicKey(&pki) |
| } |
| |
| func marshalPublicKey(pub any) (publicKeyBytes []byte, publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier, err error) { |
| switch pub := pub.(type) { |
| case *rsa.PublicKey: |
| publicKeyBytes, err = asn1.Marshal(pkcs1PublicKey{ |
| N: pub.N, |
| E: pub.E, |
| }) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, err |
| } |
| publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyRSA |
| // This is a NULL parameters value which is required by |
| // RFC 3279, Section 2.3.1. |
| publicKeyAlgorithm.Parameters = asn1.NullRawValue |
| case *ecdsa.PublicKey: |
| oid, ok := oidFromNamedCurve(pub.Curve) |
| if !ok { |
| return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, errors.New("x509: unsupported elliptic curve") |
| } |
| if !pub.Curve.IsOnCurve(pub.X, pub.Y) { |
| return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, errors.New("x509: invalid elliptic curve public key") |
| } |
| publicKeyBytes = elliptic.Marshal(pub.Curve, pub.X, pub.Y) |
| publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyECDSA |
| var paramBytes []byte |
| paramBytes, err = asn1.Marshal(oid) |
| if err != nil { |
| return |
| } |
| publicKeyAlgorithm.Parameters.FullBytes = paramBytes |
| case ed25519.PublicKey: |
| publicKeyBytes = pub |
| publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyEd25519 |
| case *ecdh.PublicKey: |
| publicKeyBytes = pub.Bytes() |
| if pub.Curve() == ecdh.X25519() { |
| publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyX25519 |
| } else { |
| oid, ok := oidFromECDHCurve(pub.Curve()) |
| if !ok { |
| return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, errors.New("x509: unsupported elliptic curve") |
| } |
| publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyECDSA |
| var paramBytes []byte |
| paramBytes, err = asn1.Marshal(oid) |
| if err != nil { |
| return |
| } |
| publicKeyAlgorithm.Parameters.FullBytes = paramBytes |
| } |
| default: |
| return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, fmt.Errorf("x509: unsupported public key type: %T", pub) |
| } |
| |
| return publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, nil |
| } |
| |
| // MarshalPKIXPublicKey converts a public key to PKIX, ASN.1 DER form. |
| // The encoded public key is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure |
| // (see RFC 5280, Section 4.1). |
| // |
| // The following key types are currently supported: *[rsa.PublicKey], |
| // *[ecdsa.PublicKey], [ed25519.PublicKey] (not a pointer), and *[ecdh.PublicKey]. |
| // Unsupported key types result in an error. |
| // |
| // This kind of key is commonly encoded in PEM blocks of type "PUBLIC KEY". |
| func MarshalPKIXPublicKey(pub any) ([]byte, error) { |
| var publicKeyBytes []byte |
| var publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier |
| var err error |
| |
| if publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err = marshalPublicKey(pub); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| pkix := pkixPublicKey{ |
| Algo: publicKeyAlgorithm, |
| BitString: asn1.BitString{ |
| Bytes: publicKeyBytes, |
| BitLength: 8 * len(publicKeyBytes), |
| }, |
| } |
| |
| ret, _ := asn1.Marshal(pkix) |
| return ret, nil |
| } |
| |
| // These structures reflect the ASN.1 structure of X.509 certificates.: |
| |
| type certificate struct { |
| TBSCertificate tbsCertificate |
| SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier |
| SignatureValue asn1.BitString |
| } |
| |
| type tbsCertificate struct { |
| Raw asn1.RawContent |
| Version int `asn1:"optional,explicit,default:0,tag:0"` |
| SerialNumber *big.Int |
| SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier |
| Issuer asn1.RawValue |
| Validity validity |
| Subject asn1.RawValue |
| PublicKey publicKeyInfo |
| UniqueId asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:1"` |
| SubjectUniqueId asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:2"` |
| Extensions []pkix.Extension `asn1:"omitempty,optional,explicit,tag:3"` |
| } |
| |
| type dsaAlgorithmParameters struct { |
| P, Q, G *big.Int |
| } |
| |
| type validity struct { |
| NotBefore, NotAfter time.Time |
| } |
| |
| type publicKeyInfo struct { |
| Raw asn1.RawContent |
| Algorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier |
| PublicKey asn1.BitString |
| } |
| |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.1 |
| type authKeyId struct { |
| Id []byte `asn1:"optional,tag:0"` |
| } |
| |
| type SignatureAlgorithm int |
| |
| const ( |
| UnknownSignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm = iota |
| |
| MD2WithRSA // Unsupported. |
| MD5WithRSA // Only supported for signing, not verification. |
| SHA1WithRSA // Only supported for signing, and verification of CRLs, CSRs, and OCSP responses. |
| SHA256WithRSA |
| SHA384WithRSA |
| SHA512WithRSA |
| DSAWithSHA1 // Unsupported. |
| DSAWithSHA256 // Unsupported. |
| ECDSAWithSHA1 // Only supported for signing, and verification of CRLs, CSRs, and OCSP responses. |
| ECDSAWithSHA256 |
| ECDSAWithSHA384 |
| ECDSAWithSHA512 |
| SHA256WithRSAPSS |
| SHA384WithRSAPSS |
| SHA512WithRSAPSS |
| PureEd25519 |
| ) |
| |
| func (algo SignatureAlgorithm) isRSAPSS() bool { |
| switch algo { |
| case SHA256WithRSAPSS, SHA384WithRSAPSS, SHA512WithRSAPSS: |
| return true |
| default: |
| return false |
| } |
| } |
| |
| func (algo SignatureAlgorithm) String() string { |
| for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails { |
| if details.algo == algo { |
| return details.name |
| } |
| } |
| return strconv.Itoa(int(algo)) |
| } |
| |
| type PublicKeyAlgorithm int |
| |
| const ( |
| UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm PublicKeyAlgorithm = iota |
| RSA |
| DSA // Only supported for parsing. |
| ECDSA |
| Ed25519 |
| ) |
| |
| var publicKeyAlgoName = [...]string{ |
| RSA: "RSA", |
| DSA: "DSA", |
| ECDSA: "ECDSA", |
| Ed25519: "Ed25519", |
| } |
| |
| func (algo PublicKeyAlgorithm) String() string { |
| if 0 < algo && int(algo) < len(publicKeyAlgoName) { |
| return publicKeyAlgoName[algo] |
| } |
| return strconv.Itoa(int(algo)) |
| } |
| |
| // OIDs for signature algorithms |
| // |
| // pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { |
| // iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } |
| // |
| // RFC 3279 2.2.1 RSA Signature Algorithms |
| // |
| // md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 2 } |
| // |
| // md5WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 4 } |
| // |
| // sha-1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 5 } |
| // |
| // dsaWithSha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { |
| // iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 3 } |
| // |
| // RFC 3279 2.2.3 ECDSA Signature Algorithm |
| // |
| // ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { |
| // iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x962(10045) |
| // signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA1(1)} |
| // |
| // RFC 4055 5 PKCS #1 Version 1.5 |
| // |
| // sha256WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 11 } |
| // |
| // sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 12 } |
| // |
| // sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 13 } |
| // |
| // RFC 5758 3.1 DSA Signature Algorithms |
| // |
| // dsaWithSha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { |
| // joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) |
| // csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 2} |
| // |
| // RFC 5758 3.2 ECDSA Signature Algorithm |
| // |
| // ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) |
| // us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 } |
| // |
| // ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) |
| // us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 } |
| // |
| // ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) |
| // us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 } |
| // |
| // RFC 8410 3 Curve25519 and Curve448 Algorithm Identifiers |
| // |
| // id-Ed25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 112 } |
| var ( |
| oidSignatureMD2WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 2} |
| oidSignatureMD5WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 4} |
| oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 5} |
| oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 11} |
| oidSignatureSHA384WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 12} |
| oidSignatureSHA512WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 13} |
| oidSignatureRSAPSS = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 10} |
| oidSignatureDSAWithSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10040, 4, 3} |
| oidSignatureDSAWithSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 3, 2} |
| oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 1} |
| oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 2} |
| oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 3} |
| oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 4} |
| oidSignatureEd25519 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 101, 112} |
| |
| oidSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 1} |
| oidSHA384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 2} |
| oidSHA512 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 3} |
| |
| oidMGF1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 8} |
| |
| // oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA means the same as oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA |
| // but it's specified by ISO. Microsoft's makecert.exe has been known |
| // to produce certificates with this OID. |
| oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 14, 3, 2, 29} |
| ) |
| |
| var signatureAlgorithmDetails = []struct { |
| algo SignatureAlgorithm |
| name string |
| oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier |
| pubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm |
| hash crypto.Hash |
| }{ |
| {MD2WithRSA, "MD2-RSA", oidSignatureMD2WithRSA, RSA, crypto.Hash(0) /* no value for MD2 */}, |
| {MD5WithRSA, "MD5-RSA", oidSignatureMD5WithRSA, RSA, crypto.MD5}, |
| {SHA1WithRSA, "SHA1-RSA", oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA1}, |
| {SHA1WithRSA, "SHA1-RSA", oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA1}, |
| {SHA256WithRSA, "SHA256-RSA", oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA256}, |
| {SHA384WithRSA, "SHA384-RSA", oidSignatureSHA384WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA384}, |
| {SHA512WithRSA, "SHA512-RSA", oidSignatureSHA512WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA512}, |
| {SHA256WithRSAPSS, "SHA256-RSAPSS", oidSignatureRSAPSS, RSA, crypto.SHA256}, |
| {SHA384WithRSAPSS, "SHA384-RSAPSS", oidSignatureRSAPSS, RSA, crypto.SHA384}, |
| {SHA512WithRSAPSS, "SHA512-RSAPSS", oidSignatureRSAPSS, RSA, crypto.SHA512}, |
| {DSAWithSHA1, "DSA-SHA1", oidSignatureDSAWithSHA1, DSA, crypto.SHA1}, |
| {DSAWithSHA256, "DSA-SHA256", oidSignatureDSAWithSHA256, DSA, crypto.SHA256}, |
| {ECDSAWithSHA1, "ECDSA-SHA1", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA1, ECDSA, crypto.SHA1}, |
| {ECDSAWithSHA256, "ECDSA-SHA256", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256, ECDSA, crypto.SHA256}, |
| {ECDSAWithSHA384, "ECDSA-SHA384", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384, ECDSA, crypto.SHA384}, |
| {ECDSAWithSHA512, "ECDSA-SHA512", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512, ECDSA, crypto.SHA512}, |
| {PureEd25519, "Ed25519", oidSignatureEd25519, Ed25519, crypto.Hash(0) /* no pre-hashing */}, |
| } |
| |
| // hashToPSSParameters contains the DER encoded RSA PSS parameters for the |
| // SHA256, SHA384, and SHA512 hashes as defined in RFC 3447, Appendix A.2.3. |
| // The parameters contain the following values: |
| // - hashAlgorithm contains the associated hash identifier with NULL parameters |
| // - maskGenAlgorithm always contains the default mgf1SHA1 identifier |
| // - saltLength contains the length of the associated hash |
| // - trailerField always contains the default trailerFieldBC value |
| var hashToPSSParameters = map[crypto.Hash]asn1.RawValue{ |
| crypto.SHA256: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: []byte{48, 52, 160, 15, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 1, 5, 0, 161, 28, 48, 26, 6, 9, 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 8, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 1, 5, 0, 162, 3, 2, 1, 32}}, |
| crypto.SHA384: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: []byte{48, 52, 160, 15, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 2, 5, 0, 161, 28, 48, 26, 6, 9, 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 8, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 2, 5, 0, 162, 3, 2, 1, 48}}, |
| crypto.SHA512: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: []byte{48, 52, 160, 15, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 3, 5, 0, 161, 28, 48, 26, 6, 9, 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 8, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 3, 5, 0, 162, 3, 2, 1, 64}}, |
| } |
| |
| // pssParameters reflects the parameters in an AlgorithmIdentifier that |
| // specifies RSA PSS. See RFC 3447, Appendix A.2.3. |
| type pssParameters struct { |
| // The following three fields are not marked as |
| // optional because the default values specify SHA-1, |
| // which is no longer suitable for use in signatures. |
| Hash pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier `asn1:"explicit,tag:0"` |
| MGF pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier `asn1:"explicit,tag:1"` |
| SaltLength int `asn1:"explicit,tag:2"` |
| TrailerField int `asn1:"optional,explicit,tag:3,default:1"` |
| } |
| |
| func getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(ai pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier) SignatureAlgorithm { |
| if ai.Algorithm.Equal(oidSignatureEd25519) { |
| // RFC 8410, Section 3 |
| // > For all of the OIDs, the parameters MUST be absent. |
| if len(ai.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 { |
| return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if !ai.Algorithm.Equal(oidSignatureRSAPSS) { |
| for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails { |
| if ai.Algorithm.Equal(details.oid) { |
| return details.algo |
| } |
| } |
| return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm |
| } |
| |
| // RSA PSS is special because it encodes important parameters |
| // in the Parameters. |
| |
| var params pssParameters |
| if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(ai.Parameters.FullBytes, ¶ms); err != nil { |
| return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm |
| } |
| |
| var mgf1HashFunc pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier |
| if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(params.MGF.Parameters.FullBytes, &mgf1HashFunc); err != nil { |
| return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm |
| } |
| |
| // PSS is greatly overburdened with options. This code forces them into |
| // three buckets by requiring that the MGF1 hash function always match the |
| // message hash function (as recommended in RFC 3447, Section 8.1), that the |
| // salt length matches the hash length, and that the trailer field has the |
| // default value. |
| if (len(params.Hash.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 && !bytes.Equal(params.Hash.Parameters.FullBytes, asn1.NullBytes)) || |
| !params.MGF.Algorithm.Equal(oidMGF1) || |
| !mgf1HashFunc.Algorithm.Equal(params.Hash.Algorithm) || |
| (len(mgf1HashFunc.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 && !bytes.Equal(mgf1HashFunc.Parameters.FullBytes, asn1.NullBytes)) || |
| params.TrailerField != 1 { |
| return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm |
| } |
| |
| switch { |
| case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA256) && params.SaltLength == 32: |
| return SHA256WithRSAPSS |
| case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA384) && params.SaltLength == 48: |
| return SHA384WithRSAPSS |
| case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA512) && params.SaltLength == 64: |
| return SHA512WithRSAPSS |
| } |
| |
| return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm |
| } |
| |
| var ( |
| // RFC 3279, 2.3 Public Key Algorithms |
| // |
| // pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) |
| // rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } |
| // |
| // rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { pkcs1-1 1 } |
| // |
| // id-dsa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) |
| // x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 1 } |
| oidPublicKeyRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 1} |
| oidPublicKeyDSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10040, 4, 1} |
| // RFC 5480, 2.1.1 Unrestricted Algorithm Identifier and Parameters |
| // |
| // id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { |
| // iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 } |
| oidPublicKeyECDSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 2, 1} |
| // RFC 8410, Section 3 |
| // |
| // id-X25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 110 } |
| // id-Ed25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 112 } |
| oidPublicKeyX25519 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 101, 110} |
| oidPublicKeyEd25519 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 101, 112} |
| ) |
| |
| // getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID returns the exposed PublicKeyAlgorithm |
| // identifier for public key types supported in certificates and CSRs. Marshal |
| // and Parse functions may support a different set of public key types. |
| func getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) PublicKeyAlgorithm { |
| switch { |
| case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyRSA): |
| return RSA |
| case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyDSA): |
| return DSA |
| case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyECDSA): |
| return ECDSA |
| case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyEd25519): |
| return Ed25519 |
| } |
| return UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm |
| } |
| |
| // RFC 5480, 2.1.1.1. Named Curve |
| // |
| // secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { |
| // iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 } |
| // |
| // secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { |
| // iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) |
| // prime(1) 7 } |
| // |
| // secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { |
| // iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 } |
| // |
| // secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { |
| // iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 } |
| // |
| // NB: secp256r1 is equivalent to prime256v1 |
| var ( |
| oidNamedCurveP224 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 33} |
| oidNamedCurveP256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 3, 1, 7} |
| oidNamedCurveP384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 34} |
| oidNamedCurveP521 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 35} |
| ) |
| |
| func namedCurveFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) elliptic.Curve { |
| switch { |
| case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP224): |
| return elliptic.P224() |
| case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP256): |
| return elliptic.P256() |
| case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP384): |
| return elliptic.P384() |
| case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP521): |
| return elliptic.P521() |
| } |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| func oidFromNamedCurve(curve elliptic.Curve) (asn1.ObjectIdentifier, bool) { |
| switch curve { |
| case elliptic.P224(): |
| return oidNamedCurveP224, true |
| case elliptic.P256(): |
| return oidNamedCurveP256, true |
| case elliptic.P384(): |
| return oidNamedCurveP384, true |
| case elliptic.P521(): |
| return oidNamedCurveP521, true |
| } |
| |
| return nil, false |
| } |
| |
| func oidFromECDHCurve(curve ecdh.Curve) (asn1.ObjectIdentifier, bool) { |
| switch curve { |
| case ecdh.X25519(): |
| return oidPublicKeyX25519, true |
| case ecdh.P256(): |
| return oidNamedCurveP256, true |
| case ecdh.P384(): |
| return oidNamedCurveP384, true |
| case ecdh.P521(): |
| return oidNamedCurveP521, true |
| } |
| |
| return nil, false |
| } |
| |
| // KeyUsage represents the set of actions that are valid for a given key. It's |
| // a bitmap of the KeyUsage* constants. |
| type KeyUsage int |
| |
| const ( |
| KeyUsageDigitalSignature KeyUsage = 1 << iota |
| KeyUsageContentCommitment |
| KeyUsageKeyEncipherment |
| KeyUsageDataEncipherment |
| KeyUsageKeyAgreement |
| KeyUsageCertSign |
| KeyUsageCRLSign |
| KeyUsageEncipherOnly |
| KeyUsageDecipherOnly |
| ) |
| |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.12 Extended Key Usage |
| // |
| // anyExtendedKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-extKeyUsage 0 } |
| // |
| // id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 } |
| // |
| // id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 } |
| // id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 } |
| // id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 3 } |
| // id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 4 } |
| // id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 } |
| // id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 } |
| var ( |
| oidExtKeyUsageAny = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 5, 29, 37, 0} |
| oidExtKeyUsageServerAuth = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 1} |
| oidExtKeyUsageClientAuth = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 2} |
| oidExtKeyUsageCodeSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 3} |
| oidExtKeyUsageEmailProtection = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 4} |
| oidExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 5} |
| oidExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 6} |
| oidExtKeyUsageIPSECUser = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 7} |
| oidExtKeyUsageTimeStamping = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 8} |
| oidExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 9} |
| oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 10, 3, 3} |
| oidExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 113730, 4, 1} |
| oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 2, 1, 22} |
| oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 61, 1, 1} |
| ) |
| |
| // ExtKeyUsage represents an extended set of actions that are valid for a given key. |
| // Each of the ExtKeyUsage* constants define a unique action. |
| type ExtKeyUsage int |
| |
| const ( |
| ExtKeyUsageAny ExtKeyUsage = iota |
| ExtKeyUsageServerAuth |
| ExtKeyUsageClientAuth |
| ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning |
| ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection |
| ExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem |
| ExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel |
| ExtKeyUsageIPSECUser |
| ExtKeyUsageTimeStamping |
| ExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning |
| ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto |
| ExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto |
| ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning |
| ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning |
| ) |
| |
| // extKeyUsageOIDs contains the mapping between an ExtKeyUsage and its OID. |
| var extKeyUsageOIDs = []struct { |
| extKeyUsage ExtKeyUsage |
| oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier |
| }{ |
| {ExtKeyUsageAny, oidExtKeyUsageAny}, |
| {ExtKeyUsageServerAuth, oidExtKeyUsageServerAuth}, |
| {ExtKeyUsageClientAuth, oidExtKeyUsageClientAuth}, |
| {ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning, oidExtKeyUsageCodeSigning}, |
| {ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection, oidExtKeyUsageEmailProtection}, |
| {ExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem}, |
| {ExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel}, |
| {ExtKeyUsageIPSECUser, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECUser}, |
| {ExtKeyUsageTimeStamping, oidExtKeyUsageTimeStamping}, |
| {ExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning, oidExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning}, |
| {ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto, oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto}, |
| {ExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto, oidExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto}, |
| {ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning, oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning}, |
| {ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning, oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning}, |
| } |
| |
| func extKeyUsageFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) (eku ExtKeyUsage, ok bool) { |
| for _, pair := range extKeyUsageOIDs { |
| if oid.Equal(pair.oid) { |
| return pair.extKeyUsage, true |
| } |
| } |
| return |
| } |
| |
| func oidFromExtKeyUsage(eku ExtKeyUsage) (oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier, ok bool) { |
| for _, pair := range extKeyUsageOIDs { |
| if eku == pair.extKeyUsage { |
| return pair.oid, true |
| } |
| } |
| return |
| } |
| |
| // A Certificate represents an X.509 certificate. |
| type Certificate struct { |
| Raw []byte // Complete ASN.1 DER content (certificate, signature algorithm and signature). |
| RawTBSCertificate []byte // Certificate part of raw ASN.1 DER content. |
| RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo []byte // DER encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo. |
| RawSubject []byte // DER encoded Subject |
| RawIssuer []byte // DER encoded Issuer |
| |
| Signature []byte |
| SignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm |
| |
| PublicKeyAlgorithm PublicKeyAlgorithm |
| PublicKey any |
| |
| Version int |
| SerialNumber *big.Int |
| Issuer pkix.Name |
| Subject pkix.Name |
| NotBefore, NotAfter time.Time // Validity bounds. |
| KeyUsage KeyUsage |
| |
| // Extensions contains raw X.509 extensions. When parsing certificates, |
| // this can be used to extract non-critical extensions that are not |
| // parsed by this package. When marshaling certificates, the Extensions |
| // field is ignored, see ExtraExtensions. |
| Extensions []pkix.Extension |
| |
| // ExtraExtensions contains extensions to be copied, raw, into any |
| // marshaled certificates. Values override any extensions that would |
| // otherwise be produced based on the other fields. The ExtraExtensions |
| // field is not populated when parsing certificates, see Extensions. |
| ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension |
| |
| // UnhandledCriticalExtensions contains a list of extension IDs that |
| // were not (fully) processed when parsing. Verify will fail if this |
| // slice is non-empty, unless verification is delegated to an OS |
| // library which understands all the critical extensions. |
| // |
| // Users can access these extensions using Extensions and can remove |
| // elements from this slice if they believe that they have been |
| // handled. |
| UnhandledCriticalExtensions []asn1.ObjectIdentifier |
| |
| ExtKeyUsage []ExtKeyUsage // Sequence of extended key usages. |
| UnknownExtKeyUsage []asn1.ObjectIdentifier // Encountered extended key usages unknown to this package. |
| |
| // BasicConstraintsValid indicates whether IsCA, MaxPathLen, |
| // and MaxPathLenZero are valid. |
| BasicConstraintsValid bool |
| IsCA bool |
| |
| // MaxPathLen and MaxPathLenZero indicate the presence and |
| // value of the BasicConstraints' "pathLenConstraint". |
| // |
| // When parsing a certificate, a positive non-zero MaxPathLen |
| // means that the field was specified, -1 means it was unset, |
| // and MaxPathLenZero being true mean that the field was |
| // explicitly set to zero. The case of MaxPathLen==0 with MaxPathLenZero==false |
| // should be treated equivalent to -1 (unset). |
| // |
| // When generating a certificate, an unset pathLenConstraint |
| // can be requested with either MaxPathLen == -1 or using the |
| // zero value for both MaxPathLen and MaxPathLenZero. |
| MaxPathLen int |
| // MaxPathLenZero indicates that BasicConstraintsValid==true |
| // and MaxPathLen==0 should be interpreted as an actual |
| // maximum path length of zero. Otherwise, that combination is |
| // interpreted as MaxPathLen not being set. |
| MaxPathLenZero bool |
| |
| SubjectKeyId []byte |
| AuthorityKeyId []byte |
| |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.2.1 (Authority Information Access) |
| OCSPServer []string |
| IssuingCertificateURL []string |
| |
| // Subject Alternate Name values. (Note that these values may not be valid |
| // if invalid values were contained within a parsed certificate. For |
| // example, an element of DNSNames may not be a valid DNS domain name.) |
| DNSNames []string |
| EmailAddresses []string |
| IPAddresses []net.IP |
| URIs []*url.URL |
| |
| // Name constraints |
| PermittedDNSDomainsCritical bool // if true then the name constraints are marked critical. |
| PermittedDNSDomains []string |
| ExcludedDNSDomains []string |
| PermittedIPRanges []*net.IPNet |
| ExcludedIPRanges []*net.IPNet |
| PermittedEmailAddresses []string |
| ExcludedEmailAddresses []string |
| PermittedURIDomains []string |
| ExcludedURIDomains []string |
| |
| // CRL Distribution Points |
| CRLDistributionPoints []string |
| |
| // PolicyIdentifiers contains asn1.ObjectIdentifiers, the components |
| // of which are limited to int32. If a certificate contains a policy which |
| // cannot be represented by asn1.ObjectIdentifier, it will not be included in |
| // PolicyIdentifiers, but will be present in Policies, which contains all parsed |
| // policy OIDs. |
| PolicyIdentifiers []asn1.ObjectIdentifier |
| |
| // Policies contains all policy identifiers included in the certificate. |
| // In Go 1.22, encoding/gob cannot handle and ignores this field. |
| Policies []OID |
| } |
| |
| // ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm results from attempting to perform an operation that |
| // involves algorithms that are not currently implemented. |
| var ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm = errors.New("x509: cannot verify signature: algorithm unimplemented") |
| |
| // An InsecureAlgorithmError indicates that the [SignatureAlgorithm] used to |
| // generate the signature is not secure, and the signature has been rejected. |
| // |
| // To temporarily restore support for SHA-1 signatures, include the value |
| // "x509sha1=1" in the GODEBUG environment variable. Note that this option will |
| // be removed in a future release. |
| type InsecureAlgorithmError SignatureAlgorithm |
| |
| func (e InsecureAlgorithmError) Error() string { |
| var override string |
| if SignatureAlgorithm(e) == SHA1WithRSA || SignatureAlgorithm(e) == ECDSAWithSHA1 { |
| override = " (temporarily override with GODEBUG=x509sha1=1)" |
| } |
| return fmt.Sprintf("x509: cannot verify signature: insecure algorithm %v", SignatureAlgorithm(e)) + override |
| } |
| |
| // ConstraintViolationError results when a requested usage is not permitted by |
| // a certificate. For example: checking a signature when the public key isn't a |
| // certificate signing key. |
| type ConstraintViolationError struct{} |
| |
| func (ConstraintViolationError) Error() string { |
| return "x509: invalid signature: parent certificate cannot sign this kind of certificate" |
| } |
| |
| func (c *Certificate) Equal(other *Certificate) bool { |
| if c == nil || other == nil { |
| return c == other |
| } |
| return bytes.Equal(c.Raw, other.Raw) |
| } |
| |
| func (c *Certificate) hasSANExtension() bool { |
| return oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectAltName, c.Extensions) |
| } |
| |
| // CheckSignatureFrom verifies that the signature on c is a valid signature from parent. |
| // |
| // This is a low-level API that performs very limited checks, and not a full |
| // path verifier. Most users should use [Certificate.Verify] instead. |
| func (c *Certificate) CheckSignatureFrom(parent *Certificate) error { |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.9: |
| // "If the basic constraints extension is not present in a version 3 |
| // certificate, or the extension is present but the cA boolean is not |
| // asserted, then the certified public key MUST NOT be used to verify |
| // certificate signatures." |
| if parent.Version == 3 && !parent.BasicConstraintsValid || |
| parent.BasicConstraintsValid && !parent.IsCA { |
| return ConstraintViolationError{} |
| } |
| |
| if parent.KeyUsage != 0 && parent.KeyUsage&KeyUsageCertSign == 0 { |
| return ConstraintViolationError{} |
| } |
| |
| if parent.PublicKeyAlgorithm == UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm { |
| return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm |
| } |
| |
| return checkSignature(c.SignatureAlgorithm, c.RawTBSCertificate, c.Signature, parent.PublicKey, false) |
| } |
| |
| // CheckSignature verifies that signature is a valid signature over signed from |
| // c's public key. |
| // |
| // This is a low-level API that performs no validity checks on the certificate. |
| // |
| // [MD5WithRSA] signatures are rejected, while [SHA1WithRSA] and [ECDSAWithSHA1] |
| // signatures are currently accepted. |
| func (c *Certificate) CheckSignature(algo SignatureAlgorithm, signed, signature []byte) error { |
| return checkSignature(algo, signed, signature, c.PublicKey, true) |
| } |
| |
| func (c *Certificate) hasNameConstraints() bool { |
| return oidInExtensions(oidExtensionNameConstraints, c.Extensions) |
| } |
| |
| func (c *Certificate) getSANExtension() []byte { |
| for _, e := range c.Extensions { |
| if e.Id.Equal(oidExtensionSubjectAltName) { |
| return e.Value |
| } |
| } |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| func signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(expectedPubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm, pubKey any) error { |
| return fmt.Errorf("x509: signature algorithm specifies an %s public key, but have public key of type %T", expectedPubKeyAlgo.String(), pubKey) |
| } |
| |
| var x509sha1 = godebug.New("x509sha1") |
| |
| // checkSignature verifies that signature is a valid signature over signed from |
| // a crypto.PublicKey. |
| func checkSignature(algo SignatureAlgorithm, signed, signature []byte, publicKey crypto.PublicKey, allowSHA1 bool) (err error) { |
| var hashType crypto.Hash |
| var pubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm |
| |
| for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails { |
| if details.algo == algo { |
| hashType = details.hash |
| pubKeyAlgo = details.pubKeyAlgo |
| break |
| } |
| } |
| |
| switch hashType { |
| case crypto.Hash(0): |
| if pubKeyAlgo != Ed25519 { |
| return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm |
| } |
| case crypto.MD5: |
| return InsecureAlgorithmError(algo) |
| case crypto.SHA1: |
| // SHA-1 signatures are mostly disabled. See go.dev/issue/41682. |
| if !allowSHA1 { |
| if x509sha1.Value() != "1" { |
| return InsecureAlgorithmError(algo) |
| } |
| x509sha1.IncNonDefault() |
| } |
| fallthrough |
| default: |
| if !hashType.Available() { |
| return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm |
| } |
| h := hashType.New() |
| h.Write(signed) |
| signed = h.Sum(nil) |
| } |
| |
| switch pub := publicKey.(type) { |
| case *rsa.PublicKey: |
| if pubKeyAlgo != RSA { |
| return signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(pubKeyAlgo, pub) |
| } |
| if algo.isRSAPSS() { |
| return rsa.VerifyPSS(pub, hashType, signed, signature, &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash}) |
| } else { |
| return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pub, hashType, signed, signature) |
| } |
| case *ecdsa.PublicKey: |
| if pubKeyAlgo != ECDSA { |
| return signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(pubKeyAlgo, pub) |
| } |
| if !ecdsa.VerifyASN1(pub, signed, signature) { |
| return errors.New("x509: ECDSA verification failure") |
| } |
| return |
| case ed25519.PublicKey: |
| if pubKeyAlgo != Ed25519 { |
| return signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(pubKeyAlgo, pub) |
| } |
| if !ed25519.Verify(pub, signed, signature) { |
| return errors.New("x509: Ed25519 verification failure") |
| } |
| return |
| } |
| return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm |
| } |
| |
| // CheckCRLSignature checks that the signature in crl is from c. |
| // |
| // Deprecated: Use [RevocationList.CheckSignatureFrom] instead. |
| func (c *Certificate) CheckCRLSignature(crl *pkix.CertificateList) error { |
| algo := getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(crl.SignatureAlgorithm) |
| return c.CheckSignature(algo, crl.TBSCertList.Raw, crl.SignatureValue.RightAlign()) |
| } |
| |
| type UnhandledCriticalExtension struct{} |
| |
| func (h UnhandledCriticalExtension) Error() string { |
| return "x509: unhandled critical extension" |
| } |
| |
| type basicConstraints struct { |
| IsCA bool `asn1:"optional"` |
| MaxPathLen int `asn1:"optional,default:-1"` |
| } |
| |
| // RFC 5280 4.2.1.4 |
| type policyInformation struct { |
| Policy asn1.ObjectIdentifier |
| // policyQualifiers omitted |
| } |
| |
| const ( |
| nameTypeEmail = 1 |
| nameTypeDNS = 2 |
| nameTypeURI = 6 |
| nameTypeIP = 7 |
| ) |
| |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.2.1 |
| type authorityInfoAccess struct { |
| Method asn1.ObjectIdentifier |
| Location asn1.RawValue |
| } |
| |
| // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.14 |
| type distributionPoint struct { |
| DistributionPoint distributionPointName `asn1:"optional,tag:0"` |
| Reason asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:1"` |
| CRLIssuer asn1.RawValue `asn1:"optional,tag:2"` |
| } |
| |
| type distributionPointName struct { |
| FullName []asn1.RawValue `asn1:"optional,tag:0"` |
| RelativeName pkix.RDNSequence `asn1:"optional,tag:1"` |
| } |
| |
| func reverseBitsInAByte(in byte) byte { |
| b1 := in>>4 | in<<4 |
| b2 := b1>>2&0x33 | b1<<2&0xcc |
| b3 := b2>>1&0x55 | b2<<1&0xaa |
| return b3 |
| } |
| |
| // asn1BitLength returns the bit-length of bitString by considering the |
| // most-significant bit in a byte to be the "first" bit. This convention |
| // matches ASN.1, but differs from almost everything else. |
| func asn1BitLength(bitString []byte) int { |
| bitLen := len(bitString) * 8 |
| |
| for i := range bitString { |
| b := bitString[len(bitString)-i-1] |
| |
| for bit := uint(0); bit < 8; bit++ { |
| if (b>>bit)&1 == 1 { |
| return bitLen |
| } |
| bitLen-- |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 0 |
| } |
| |
| var ( |
| oidExtensionSubjectKeyId = []int{2, 5, 29, 14} |
| oidExtensionKeyUsage = []int{2, 5, 29, 15} |
| oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage = []int{2, 5, 29, 37} |
| oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId = []int{2, 5, 29, 35} |
| oidExtensionBasicConstraints = []int{2, 5, 29, 19} |
| oidExtensionSubjectAltName = []int{2, 5, 29, 17} |
| oidExtensionCertificatePolicies = []int{2, 5, 29, 32} |
| oidExtensionNameConstraints = []int{2, 5, 29, 30} |
| oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints = []int{2, 5, 29, 31} |
| oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess = []int{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 1} |
| oidExtensionCRLNumber = []int{2, 5, 29, 20} |
| oidExtensionReasonCode = []int{2, 5, 29, 21} |
| ) |
| |
| var ( |
| oidAuthorityInfoAccessOcsp = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 1} |
| oidAuthorityInfoAccessIssuers = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 2} |
| ) |
| |
| // oidInExtensions reports whether an extension with the given oid exists in |
| // extensions. |
| func oidInExtensions(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier, extensions []pkix.Extension) bool { |
| for _, e := range extensions { |
| if e.Id.Equal(oid) { |
| return true |
| } |
| } |
| return false |
| } |
| |
| // marshalSANs marshals a list of addresses into a the contents of an X.509 |
| // SubjectAlternativeName extension. |
| func marshalSANs(dnsNames, emailAddresses []string, ipAddresses []net.IP, uris []*url.URL) (derBytes []byte, err error) { |
| var rawValues []asn1.RawValue |
| for _, name := range dnsNames { |
| if err := isIA5String(name); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeDNS, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)}) |
| } |
| for _, email := range emailAddresses { |
| if err := isIA5String(email); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeEmail, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(email)}) |
| } |
| for _, rawIP := range ipAddresses { |
| // If possible, we always want to encode IPv4 addresses in 4 bytes. |
| ip := rawIP.To4() |
| if ip == nil { |
| ip = rawIP |
| } |
| rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeIP, Class: 2, Bytes: ip}) |
| } |
| for _, uri := range uris { |
| uriStr := uri.String() |
| if err := isIA5String(uriStr); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeURI, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(uriStr)}) |
| } |
| return asn1.Marshal(rawValues) |
| } |
| |
| func isIA5String(s string) error { |
| for _, r := range s { |
| // Per RFC5280 "IA5String is limited to the set of ASCII characters" |
| if r > unicode.MaxASCII { |
| return fmt.Errorf("x509: %q cannot be encoded as an IA5String", s) |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return nil |
| } |
| |
| var usePoliciesField = godebug.New("x509usepolicies") |
| |
| func buildCertExtensions(template *Certificate, subjectIsEmpty bool, authorityKeyId []byte, subjectKeyId []byte) (ret []pkix.Extension, err error) { |
| ret = make([]pkix.Extension, 10 /* maximum number of elements. */) |
| n := 0 |
| |
| if template.KeyUsage != 0 && |
| !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionKeyUsage, template.ExtraExtensions) { |
| ret[n], err = marshalKeyUsage(template.KeyUsage) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| n++ |
| } |
| |
| if (len(template.ExtKeyUsage) > 0 || len(template.UnknownExtKeyUsage) > 0) && |
| !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage, template.ExtraExtensions) { |
| ret[n], err = marshalExtKeyUsage(template.ExtKeyUsage, template.UnknownExtKeyUsage) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| n++ |
| } |
| |
| if template.BasicConstraintsValid && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionBasicConstraints, template.ExtraExtensions) { |
| ret[n], err = marshalBasicConstraints(template.IsCA, template.MaxPathLen, template.MaxPathLenZero) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| n++ |
| } |
| |
| if len(subjectKeyId) > 0 && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectKeyId, template.ExtraExtensions) { |
| ret[n].Id = oidExtensionSubjectKeyId |
| ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(subjectKeyId) |
| if err != nil { |
| return |
| } |
| n++ |
| } |
| |
| if len(authorityKeyId) > 0 && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId, template.ExtraExtensions) { |
| ret[n].Id = oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId |
| ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{authorityKeyId}) |
| if err != nil { |
| return |
| } |
| n++ |
| } |
| |
| if (len(template.OCSPServer) > 0 || len(template.IssuingCertificateURL) > 0) && |
| !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess, template.ExtraExtensions) { |
| ret[n].Id = oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess |
| var aiaValues []authorityInfoAccess |
| for _, name := range template.OCSPServer { |
| aiaValues = append(aiaValues, authorityInfoAccess{ |
| Method: oidAuthorityInfoAccessOcsp, |
| Location: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)}, |
| }) |
| } |
| for _, name := range template.IssuingCertificateURL { |
| aiaValues = append(aiaValues, authorityInfoAccess{ |
| Method: oidAuthorityInfoAccessIssuers, |
| Location: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)}, |
| }) |
| } |
| ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(aiaValues) |
| if err != nil { |
| return |
| } |
| n++ |
| } |
| |
| if (len(template.DNSNames) > 0 || len(template.EmailAddresses) > 0 || len(template.IPAddresses) > 0 || len(template.URIs) > 0) && |
| !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectAltName, template.ExtraExtensions) { |
| ret[n].Id = oidExtensionSubjectAltName |
| // From RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.6: |
| // “If the subject field contains an empty sequence ... then |
| // subjectAltName extension ... is marked as critical” |
| ret[n].Critical = subjectIsEmpty |
| ret[n].Value, err = marshalSANs(template.DNSNames, template.EmailAddresses, template.IPAddresses, template.URIs) |
| if err != nil { |
| return |
| } |
| n++ |
| } |
| |
| usePolicies := usePoliciesField.Value() == "1" |
| if ((!usePolicies && len(template.PolicyIdentifiers) > 0) || (usePolicies && len(template.Policies) > 0)) && |
| !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionCertificatePolicies, template.ExtraExtensions) { |
| ret[n], err = marshalCertificatePolicies(template.Policies, template.PolicyIdentifiers) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| n++ |
| } |
| |
| if (len(template.PermittedDNSDomains) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedDNSDomains) > 0 || |
| len(template.PermittedIPRanges) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedIPRanges) > 0 || |
| len(template.PermittedEmailAddresses) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedEmailAddresses) > 0 || |
| len(template.PermittedURIDomains) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedURIDomains) > 0) && |
| !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionNameConstraints, template.ExtraExtensions) { |
| ret[n].Id = oidExtensionNameConstraints |
| ret[n].Critical = template.PermittedDNSDomainsCritical |
| |
| ipAndMask := func(ipNet *net.IPNet) []byte { |
| maskedIP := ipNet.IP.Mask(ipNet.Mask) |
| ipAndMask := make([]byte, 0, len(maskedIP)+len(ipNet.Mask)) |
| ipAndMask = append(ipAndMask, maskedIP...) |
| ipAndMask = append(ipAndMask, ipNet.Mask...) |
| return ipAndMask |
| } |
| |
| serialiseConstraints := func(dns []string, ips []*net.IPNet, emails []string, uriDomains []string) (der []byte, err error) { |
| var b cryptobyte.Builder |
| |
| for _, name := range dns { |
| if err = isIA5String(name); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(2).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { |
| b.AddBytes([]byte(name)) |
| }) |
| }) |
| } |
| |
| for _, ipNet := range ips { |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(7).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { |
| b.AddBytes(ipAndMask(ipNet)) |
| }) |
| }) |
| } |
| |
| for _, email := range emails { |
| if err = isIA5String(email); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { |
| b.AddBytes([]byte(email)) |
| }) |
| }) |
| } |
| |
| for _, uriDomain := range uriDomains { |
| if err = isIA5String(uriDomain); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(6).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { |
| b.AddBytes([]byte(uriDomain)) |
| }) |
| }) |
| } |
| |
| return b.Bytes() |
| } |
| |
| permitted, err := serialiseConstraints(template.PermittedDNSDomains, template.PermittedIPRanges, template.PermittedEmailAddresses, template.PermittedURIDomains) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| excluded, err := serialiseConstraints(template.ExcludedDNSDomains, template.ExcludedIPRanges, template.ExcludedEmailAddresses, template.ExcludedURIDomains) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| var b cryptobyte.Builder |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { |
| if len(permitted) > 0 { |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(0).ContextSpecific().Constructed(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { |
| b.AddBytes(permitted) |
| }) |
| } |
| |
| if len(excluded) > 0 { |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific().Constructed(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { |
| b.AddBytes(excluded) |
| }) |
| } |
| }) |
| |
| ret[n].Value, err = b.Bytes() |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| n++ |
| } |
| |
| if len(template.CRLDistributionPoints) > 0 && |
| !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints, template.ExtraExtensions) { |
| ret[n].Id = oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints |
| |
| var crlDp []distributionPoint |
| for _, name := range template.CRLDistributionPoints { |
| dp := distributionPoint{ |
| DistributionPoint: distributionPointName{ |
| FullName: []asn1.RawValue{ |
| {Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)}, |
| }, |
| }, |
| } |
| crlDp = append(crlDp, dp) |
| } |
| |
| ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(crlDp) |
| if err != nil { |
| return |
| } |
| n++ |
| } |
| |
| // Adding another extension here? Remember to update the maximum number |
| // of elements in the make() at the top of the function and the list of |
| // template fields used in CreateCertificate documentation. |
| |
| return append(ret[:n], template.ExtraExtensions...), nil |
| } |
| |
| func marshalKeyUsage(ku KeyUsage) (pkix.Extension, error) { |
| ext := pkix.Extension{Id: oidExtensionKeyUsage, Critical: true} |
| |
| var a [2]byte |
| a[0] = reverseBitsInAByte(byte(ku)) |
| a[1] = reverseBitsInAByte(byte(ku >> 8)) |
| |
| l := 1 |
| if a[1] != 0 { |
| l = 2 |
| } |
| |
| bitString := a[:l] |
| var err error |
| ext.Value, err = asn1.Marshal(asn1.BitString{Bytes: bitString, BitLength: asn1BitLength(bitString)}) |
| return ext, err |
| } |
| |
| func marshalExtKeyUsage(extUsages []ExtKeyUsage, unknownUsages []asn1.ObjectIdentifier) (pkix.Extension, error) { |
| ext := pkix.Extension{Id: oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage} |
| |
| oids := make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, len(extUsages)+len(unknownUsages)) |
| for i, u := range extUsages { |
| if oid, ok := oidFromExtKeyUsage(u); ok { |
| oids[i] = oid |
| } else { |
| return ext, errors.New("x509: unknown extended key usage") |
| } |
| } |
| |
| copy(oids[len(extUsages):], unknownUsages) |
| |
| var err error |
| ext.Value, err = asn1.Marshal(oids) |
| return ext, err |
| } |
| |
| func marshalBasicConstraints(isCA bool, maxPathLen int, maxPathLenZero bool) (pkix.Extension, error) { |
| ext := pkix.Extension{Id: oidExtensionBasicConstraints, Critical: true} |
| // Leaving MaxPathLen as zero indicates that no maximum path |
| // length is desired, unless MaxPathLenZero is set. A value of |
| // -1 causes encoding/asn1 to omit the value as desired. |
| if maxPathLen == 0 && !maxPathLenZero { |
| maxPathLen = -1 |
| } |
| var err error |
| ext.Value, err = asn1.Marshal(basicConstraints{isCA, maxPathLen}) |
| return ext, err |
| } |
| |
| func marshalCertificatePolicies(policies []OID, policyIdentifiers []asn1.ObjectIdentifier) (pkix.Extension, error) { |
| ext := pkix.Extension{Id: oidExtensionCertificatePolicies} |
| |
| b := cryptobyte.NewBuilder(make([]byte, 0, 128)) |
| b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(child *cryptobyte.Builder) { |
| if usePoliciesField.Value() == "1" { |
| usePoliciesField.IncNonDefault() |
| for _, v := range policies { |
| child.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(child *cryptobyte.Builder) { |
| child.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, func(child *cryptobyte.Builder) { |
| if len(v.der) == 0 { |
| child.SetError(errors.New("invalid policy object identifier")) |
| return |
| } |
| child.AddBytes(v.der) |
| }) |
| }) |
| } |
| } else { |
| for _, v := range policyIdentifiers { |
| child.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(child *cryptobyte.Builder) { |
| child.AddASN1ObjectIdentifier(v) |
| }) |
| } |
| } |
| }) |
| |
| var err error |
| ext.Value, err = b.Bytes() |
| return ext, err |
| } |
| |
| func buildCSRExtensions(template *CertificateRequest) ([]pkix.Extension, error) { |
| var ret []pkix.Extension |
| |
| if (len(template.DNSNames) > 0 || len(template.EmailAddresses) > 0 || len(template.IPAddresses) > 0 || len(template.URIs) > 0) && |
| !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectAltName, template.ExtraExtensions) { |
| sanBytes, err := marshalSANs(template.DNSNames, template.EmailAddresses, template.IPAddresses, template.URIs) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| ret = append(ret, pkix.Extension{ |
| Id: oidExtensionSubjectAltName, |
| Value: sanBytes, |
| }) |
| } |
| |
| return append(ret, template.ExtraExtensions...), nil |
| } |
| |
| func subjectBytes(cert *Certificate) ([]byte, error) { |
| if len(cert.RawSubject) > 0 { |
| return cert.RawSubject, nil |
| } |
| |
| return asn1.Marshal(cert.Subject.ToRDNSequence()) |
| } |
| |
| // signingParamsForPublicKey returns the parameters to use for signing with |
| // priv. If requestedSigAlgo is not zero then it overrides the default |
| // signature algorithm. |
| func signingParamsForPublicKey(pub any, requestedSigAlgo SignatureAlgorithm) (hashFunc crypto.Hash, sigAlgo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier, err error) { |
| var pubType PublicKeyAlgorithm |
| |
| switch pub := pub.(type) { |
| case *rsa.PublicKey: |
| pubType = RSA |
| hashFunc = crypto.SHA256 |
| sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA |
| sigAlgo.Parameters = asn1.NullRawValue |
| |
| case *ecdsa.PublicKey: |
| pubType = ECDSA |
| |
| switch pub.Curve { |
| case elliptic.P224(), elliptic.P256(): |
| hashFunc = crypto.SHA256 |
| sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256 |
| case elliptic.P384(): |
| hashFunc = crypto.SHA384 |
| sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384 |
| case elliptic.P521(): |
| hashFunc = crypto.SHA512 |
| sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512 |
| default: |
| err = errors.New("x509: unknown elliptic curve") |
| } |
| |
| case ed25519.PublicKey: |
| pubType = Ed25519 |
| sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureEd25519 |
| |
| default: |
| err = errors.New("x509: only RSA, ECDSA and Ed25519 keys supported") |
| } |
| |
| if err != nil { |
| return |
| } |
| |
| if requestedSigAlgo == 0 { |
| return |
| } |
| |
| found := false |
| for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails { |
| if details.algo == requestedSigAlgo { |
| if details.pubKeyAlgo != pubType { |
| err = errors.New("x509: requested SignatureAlgorithm does not match private key type") |
| return |
| } |
| sigAlgo.Algorithm, hashFunc = details.oid, details.hash |
| if hashFunc == 0 && pubType != Ed25519 { |
| err = errors.New("x509: cannot sign with hash function requested") |
| return |
| } |
| if hashFunc == crypto.MD5 { |
| err = errors.New("x509: signing with MD5 is not supported") |
| return |
| } |
| if requestedSigAlgo.isRSAPSS() { |
| sigAlgo.Parameters = hashToPSSParameters[hashFunc] |
| } |
| found = true |
| break |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if !found { |
| err = errors.New("x509: unknown SignatureAlgorithm") |
| } |
| |
| return |
| } |
| |
| // emptyASN1Subject is the ASN.1 DER encoding of an empty Subject, which is |
| // just an empty SEQUENCE. |
| var emptyASN1Subject = []byte{0x30, 0} |
| |
| // CreateCertificate creates a new X.509 v3 certificate based on a template. |
| // The following members of template are currently used: |
| // |
| // - AuthorityKeyId |
| // - BasicConstraintsValid |
| // - CRLDistributionPoints |
| // - DNSNames |
| // - EmailAddresses |
| // - ExcludedDNSDomains |
| // - ExcludedEmailAddresses |
| // - ExcludedIPRanges |
| // - ExcludedURIDomains |
| // - ExtKeyUsage |
| // - ExtraExtensions |
| // - IPAddresses |
| // - IsCA |
| // - IssuingCertificateURL |
| // - KeyUsage |
| // - MaxPathLen |
| // - MaxPathLenZero |
| // - NotAfter |
| // - NotBefore |
| // - OCSPServer |
| // - PermittedDNSDomains |
| // - PermittedDNSDomainsCritical |
| // - PermittedEmailAddresses |
| // - PermittedIPRanges |
| // - PermittedURIDomains |
| // - PolicyIdentifiers (see note below) |
| // - Policies (see note below) |
| // - SerialNumber |
| // - SignatureAlgorithm |
| // - Subject |
| // - SubjectKeyId |
| // - URIs |
| // - UnknownExtKeyUsage |
| // |
| // The certificate is signed by parent. If parent is equal to template then the |
| // certificate is self-signed. The parameter pub is the public key of the |
| // certificate to be generated and priv is the private key of the signer. |
| // |
| // The returned slice is the certificate in DER encoding. |
| // |
| // The currently supported key types are *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey and |
| // ed25519.PublicKey. pub must be a supported key type, and priv must be a |
| // crypto.Signer with a supported public key. |
| // |
| // The AuthorityKeyId will be taken from the SubjectKeyId of parent, if any, |
| // unless the resulting certificate is self-signed. Otherwise the value from |
| // template will be used. |
| // |
| // If SubjectKeyId from template is empty and the template is a CA, SubjectKeyId |
| // will be generated from the hash of the public key. |
| // |
| // The PolicyIdentifier and Policies fields are both used to marshal certificate |
| // policy OIDs. By default, only the PolicyIdentifier is marshaled, but if the |
| // GODEBUG setting "x509usepolicies" has the value "1", the Policies field will |
| // be marshalled instead of the PolicyIdentifier field. The Policies field can |
| // be used to marshal policy OIDs which have components that are larger than 31 |
| // bits. |
| func CreateCertificate(rand io.Reader, template, parent *Certificate, pub, priv any) ([]byte, error) { |
| key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer) |
| if !ok { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer") |
| } |
| |
| if template.SerialNumber == nil { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: no SerialNumber given") |
| } |
| |
| // RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.2: serial number must positive |
| // |
| // We _should_ also restrict serials to <= 20 octets, but it turns out a lot of people |
| // get this wrong, in part because the encoding can itself alter the length of the |
| // serial. For now we accept these non-conformant serials. |
| if template.SerialNumber.Sign() == -1 { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: serial number must be positive") |
| } |
| |
| if template.BasicConstraintsValid && !template.IsCA && template.MaxPathLen != -1 && (template.MaxPathLen != 0 || template.MaxPathLenZero) { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: only CAs are allowed to specify MaxPathLen") |
| } |
| |
| hashFunc, signatureAlgorithm, err := signingParamsForPublicKey(key.Public(), template.SignatureAlgorithm) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err := marshalPublicKey(pub) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| if getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm) == UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm { |
| return nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: unsupported public key type: %T", pub) |
| } |
| |
| asn1Issuer, err := subjectBytes(parent) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| asn1Subject, err := subjectBytes(template) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| authorityKeyId := template.AuthorityKeyId |
| if !bytes.Equal(asn1Issuer, asn1Subject) && len(parent.SubjectKeyId) > 0 { |
| authorityKeyId = parent.SubjectKeyId |
| } |
| |
| subjectKeyId := template.SubjectKeyId |
| if len(subjectKeyId) == 0 && template.IsCA { |
| // SubjectKeyId generated using method 1 in RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.2: |
| // (1) The keyIdentifier is composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the |
| // value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey (excluding the tag, |
| // length, and number of unused bits). |
| h := sha1.Sum(publicKeyBytes) |
| subjectKeyId = h[:] |
| } |
| |
| // Check that the signer's public key matches the private key, if available. |
| type privateKey interface { |
| Equal(crypto.PublicKey) bool |
| } |
| if privPub, ok := key.Public().(privateKey); !ok { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: internal error: supported public key does not implement Equal") |
| } else if parent.PublicKey != nil && !privPub.Equal(parent.PublicKey) { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: provided PrivateKey doesn't match parent's PublicKey") |
| } |
| |
| extensions, err := buildCertExtensions(template, bytes.Equal(asn1Subject, emptyASN1Subject), authorityKeyId, subjectKeyId) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| encodedPublicKey := asn1.BitString{BitLength: len(publicKeyBytes) * 8, Bytes: publicKeyBytes} |
| c := tbsCertificate{ |
| Version: 2, |
| SerialNumber: template.SerialNumber, |
| SignatureAlgorithm: signatureAlgorithm, |
| Issuer: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Issuer}, |
| Validity: validity{template.NotBefore.UTC(), template.NotAfter.UTC()}, |
| Subject: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Subject}, |
| PublicKey: publicKeyInfo{nil, publicKeyAlgorithm, encodedPublicKey}, |
| Extensions: extensions, |
| } |
| |
| tbsCertContents, err := asn1.Marshal(c) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| c.Raw = tbsCertContents |
| |
| signed := tbsCertContents |
| if hashFunc != 0 { |
| h := hashFunc.New() |
| h.Write(signed) |
| signed = h.Sum(nil) |
| } |
| |
| var signerOpts crypto.SignerOpts = hashFunc |
| if template.SignatureAlgorithm != 0 && template.SignatureAlgorithm.isRSAPSS() { |
| signerOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{ |
| SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, |
| Hash: hashFunc, |
| } |
| } |
| |
| var signature []byte |
| signature, err = key.Sign(rand, signed, signerOpts) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| signedCert, err := asn1.Marshal(certificate{ |
| c, |
| signatureAlgorithm, |
| asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8}, |
| }) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| // Check the signature to ensure the crypto.Signer behaved correctly. |
| if err := checkSignature(getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(signatureAlgorithm), c.Raw, signature, key.Public(), true); err != nil { |
| return nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: signature over certificate returned by signer is invalid: %w", err) |
| } |
| |
| return signedCert, nil |
| } |
| |
| // pemCRLPrefix is the magic string that indicates that we have a PEM encoded |
| // CRL. |
| var pemCRLPrefix = []byte("-----BEGIN X509 CRL") |
| |
| // pemType is the type of a PEM encoded CRL. |
| var pemType = "X509 CRL" |
| |
| // ParseCRL parses a CRL from the given bytes. It's often the case that PEM |
| // encoded CRLs will appear where they should be DER encoded, so this function |
| // will transparently handle PEM encoding as long as there isn't any leading |
| // garbage. |
| // |
| // Deprecated: Use [ParseRevocationList] instead. |
| func ParseCRL(crlBytes []byte) (*pkix.CertificateList, error) { |
| if bytes.HasPrefix(crlBytes, pemCRLPrefix) { |
| block, _ := pem.Decode(crlBytes) |
| if block != nil && block.Type == pemType { |
| crlBytes = block.Bytes |
| } |
| } |
| return ParseDERCRL(crlBytes) |
| } |
| |
| // ParseDERCRL parses a DER encoded CRL from the given bytes. |
| // |
| // Deprecated: Use [ParseRevocationList] instead. |
| func ParseDERCRL(derBytes []byte) (*pkix.CertificateList, error) { |
| certList := new(pkix.CertificateList) |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(derBytes, certList); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after CRL") |
| } |
| return certList, nil |
| } |
| |
| // CreateCRL returns a DER encoded CRL, signed by this Certificate, that |
| // contains the given list of revoked certificates. |
| // |
| // Deprecated: this method does not generate an RFC 5280 conformant X.509 v2 CRL. |
| // To generate a standards compliant CRL, use [CreateRevocationList] instead. |
| func (c *Certificate) CreateCRL(rand io.Reader, priv any, revokedCerts []pkix.RevokedCertificate, now, expiry time.Time) (crlBytes []byte, err error) { |
| key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer) |
| if !ok { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer") |
| } |
| |
| hashFunc, signatureAlgorithm, err := signingParamsForPublicKey(key.Public(), 0) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| // Force revocation times to UTC per RFC 5280. |
| revokedCertsUTC := make([]pkix.RevokedCertificate, len(revokedCerts)) |
| for i, rc := range revokedCerts { |
| rc.RevocationTime = rc.RevocationTime.UTC() |
| revokedCertsUTC[i] = rc |
| } |
| |
| tbsCertList := pkix.TBSCertificateList{ |
| Version: 1, |
| Signature: signatureAlgorithm, |
| Issuer: c.Subject.ToRDNSequence(), |
| ThisUpdate: now.UTC(), |
| NextUpdate: expiry.UTC(), |
| RevokedCertificates: revokedCertsUTC, |
| } |
| |
| // Authority Key Id |
| if len(c.SubjectKeyId) > 0 { |
| var aki pkix.Extension |
| aki.Id = oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId |
| aki.Value, err = asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{Id: c.SubjectKeyId}) |
| if err != nil { |
| return |
| } |
| tbsCertList.Extensions = append(tbsCertList.Extensions, aki) |
| } |
| |
| tbsCertListContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCertList) |
| if err != nil { |
| return |
| } |
| |
| signed := tbsCertListContents |
| if hashFunc != 0 { |
| h := hashFunc.New() |
| h.Write(signed) |
| signed = h.Sum(nil) |
| } |
| |
| var signature []byte |
| signature, err = key.Sign(rand, signed, hashFunc) |
| if err != nil { |
| return |
| } |
| |
| return asn1.Marshal(pkix.CertificateList{ |
| TBSCertList: tbsCertList, |
| SignatureAlgorithm: signatureAlgorithm, |
| SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8}, |
| }) |
| } |
| |
| // CertificateRequest represents a PKCS #10, certificate signature request. |
| type CertificateRequest struct { |
| Raw []byte // Complete ASN.1 DER content (CSR, signature algorithm and signature). |
| RawTBSCertificateRequest []byte // Certificate request info part of raw ASN.1 DER content. |
| RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo []byte // DER encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo. |
| RawSubject []byte // DER encoded Subject. |
| |
| Version int |
| Signature []byte |
| SignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm |
| |
| PublicKeyAlgorithm PublicKeyAlgorithm |
| PublicKey any |
| |
| Subject pkix.Name |
| |
| // Attributes contains the CSR attributes that can parse as |
| // pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET. |
| // |
| // Deprecated: Use Extensions and ExtraExtensions instead for parsing and |
| // generating the requestedExtensions attribute. |
| Attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET |
| |
| // Extensions contains all requested extensions, in raw form. When parsing |
| // CSRs, this can be used to extract extensions that are not parsed by this |
| // package. |
| Extensions []pkix.Extension |
| |
| // ExtraExtensions contains extensions to be copied, raw, into any CSR |
| // marshaled by CreateCertificateRequest. Values override any extensions |
| // that would otherwise be produced based on the other fields but are |
| // overridden by any extensions specified in Attributes. |
| // |
| // The ExtraExtensions field is not populated by ParseCertificateRequest, |
| // see Extensions instead. |
| ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension |
| |
| // Subject Alternate Name values. |
| DNSNames []string |
| EmailAddresses []string |
| IPAddresses []net.IP |
| URIs []*url.URL |
| } |
| |
| // These structures reflect the ASN.1 structure of X.509 certificate |
| // signature requests (see RFC 2986): |
| |
| type tbsCertificateRequest struct { |
| Raw asn1.RawContent |
| Version int |
| Subject asn1.RawValue |
| PublicKey publicKeyInfo |
| RawAttributes []asn1.RawValue `asn1:"tag:0"` |
| } |
| |
| type certificateRequest struct { |
| Raw asn1.RawContent |
| TBSCSR tbsCertificateRequest |
| SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier |
| SignatureValue asn1.BitString |
| } |
| |
| // oidExtensionRequest is a PKCS #9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER that indicates requested |
| // extensions in a CSR. |
| var oidExtensionRequest = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9, 14} |
| |
| // newRawAttributes converts AttributeTypeAndValueSETs from a template |
| // CertificateRequest's Attributes into tbsCertificateRequest RawAttributes. |
| func newRawAttributes(attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET) ([]asn1.RawValue, error) { |
| var rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue |
| b, err := asn1.Marshal(attributes) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(b, &rawAttributes) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| if len(rest) != 0 { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to unmarshal raw CSR Attributes") |
| } |
| return rawAttributes, nil |
| } |
| |
| // parseRawAttributes Unmarshals RawAttributes into AttributeTypeAndValueSETs. |
| func parseRawAttributes(rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue) []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET { |
| var attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET |
| for _, rawAttr := range rawAttributes { |
| var attr pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET |
| rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(rawAttr.FullBytes, &attr) |
| // Ignore attributes that don't parse into pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET |
| // (i.e.: challengePassword or unstructuredName). |
| if err == nil && len(rest) == 0 { |
| attributes = append(attributes, attr) |
| } |
| } |
| return attributes |
| } |
| |
| // parseCSRExtensions parses the attributes from a CSR and extracts any |
| // requested extensions. |
| func parseCSRExtensions(rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue) ([]pkix.Extension, error) { |
| // pkcs10Attribute reflects the Attribute structure from RFC 2986, Section 4.1. |
| type pkcs10Attribute struct { |
| Id asn1.ObjectIdentifier |
| Values []asn1.RawValue `asn1:"set"` |
| } |
| |
| var ret []pkix.Extension |
| requestedExts := make(map[string]bool) |
| for _, rawAttr := range rawAttributes { |
| var attr pkcs10Attribute |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(rawAttr.FullBytes, &attr); err != nil || len(rest) != 0 || len(attr.Values) == 0 { |
| // Ignore attributes that don't parse. |
| continue |
| } |
| |
| if !attr.Id.Equal(oidExtensionRequest) { |
| continue |
| } |
| |
| var extensions []pkix.Extension |
| if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(attr.Values[0].FullBytes, &extensions); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| for _, ext := range extensions { |
| oidStr := ext.Id.String() |
| if requestedExts[oidStr] { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate request contains duplicate requested extensions") |
| } |
| requestedExts[oidStr] = true |
| } |
| ret = append(ret, extensions...) |
| } |
| |
| return ret, nil |
| } |
| |
| // CreateCertificateRequest creates a new certificate request based on a |
| // template. The following members of template are used: |
| // |
| // - SignatureAlgorithm |
| // - Subject |
| // - DNSNames |
| // - EmailAddresses |
| // - IPAddresses |
| // - URIs |
| // - ExtraExtensions |
| // - Attributes (deprecated) |
| // |
| // priv is the private key to sign the CSR with, and the corresponding public |
| // key will be included in the CSR. It must implement crypto.Signer and its |
| // Public() method must return a *rsa.PublicKey or a *ecdsa.PublicKey or a |
| // ed25519.PublicKey. (A *rsa.PrivateKey, *ecdsa.PrivateKey or |
| // ed25519.PrivateKey satisfies this.) |
| // |
| // The returned slice is the certificate request in DER encoding. |
| func CreateCertificateRequest(rand io.Reader, template *CertificateRequest, priv any) (csr []byte, err error) { |
| key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer) |
| if !ok { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer") |
| } |
| |
| var hashFunc crypto.Hash |
| var sigAlgo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier |
| hashFunc, sigAlgo, err = signingParamsForPublicKey(key.Public(), template.SignatureAlgorithm) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| var publicKeyBytes []byte |
| var publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier |
| publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err = marshalPublicKey(key.Public()) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| extensions, err := buildCSRExtensions(template) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| // Make a copy of template.Attributes because we may alter it below. |
| attributes := make([]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET, 0, len(template.Attributes)) |
| for _, attr := range template.Attributes { |
| values := make([][]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue, len(attr.Value)) |
| copy(values, attr.Value) |
| attributes = append(attributes, pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET{ |
| Type: attr.Type, |
| Value: values, |
| }) |
| } |
| |
| extensionsAppended := false |
| if len(extensions) > 0 { |
| // Append the extensions to an existing attribute if possible. |
| for _, atvSet := range attributes { |
| if !atvSet.Type.Equal(oidExtensionRequest) || len(atvSet.Value) == 0 { |
| continue |
| } |
| |
| // specifiedExtensions contains all the extensions that we |
| // found specified via template.Attributes. |
| specifiedExtensions := make(map[string]bool) |
| |
| for _, atvs := range atvSet.Value { |
| for _, atv := range atvs { |
| specifiedExtensions[atv.Type.String()] = true |
| } |
| } |
| |
| newValue := make([]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue, 0, len(atvSet.Value[0])+len(extensions)) |
| newValue = append(newValue, atvSet.Value[0]...) |
| |
| for _, e := range extensions { |
| if specifiedExtensions[e.Id.String()] { |
| // Attributes already contained a value for |
| // this extension and it takes priority. |
| continue |
| } |
| |
| newValue = append(newValue, pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue{ |
| // There is no place for the critical |
| // flag in an AttributeTypeAndValue. |
| Type: e.Id, |
| Value: e.Value, |
| }) |
| } |
| |
| atvSet.Value[0] = newValue |
| extensionsAppended = true |
| break |
| } |
| } |
| |
| rawAttributes, err := newRawAttributes(attributes) |
| if err != nil { |
| return |
| } |
| |
| // If not included in attributes, add a new attribute for the |
| // extensions. |
| if len(extensions) > 0 && !extensionsAppended { |
| attr := struct { |
| Type asn1.ObjectIdentifier |
| Value [][]pkix.Extension `asn1:"set"` |
| }{ |
| Type: oidExtensionRequest, |
| Value: [][]pkix.Extension{extensions}, |
| } |
| |
| b, err := asn1.Marshal(attr) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to serialise extensions attribute: " + err.Error()) |
| } |
| |
| var rawValue asn1.RawValue |
| if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(b, &rawValue); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| rawAttributes = append(rawAttributes, rawValue) |
| } |
| |
| asn1Subject := template.RawSubject |
| if len(asn1Subject) == 0 { |
| asn1Subject, err = asn1.Marshal(template.Subject.ToRDNSequence()) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| } |
| |
| tbsCSR := tbsCertificateRequest{ |
| Version: 0, // PKCS #10, RFC 2986 |
| Subject: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Subject}, |
| PublicKey: publicKeyInfo{ |
| Algorithm: publicKeyAlgorithm, |
| PublicKey: asn1.BitString{ |
| Bytes: publicKeyBytes, |
| BitLength: len(publicKeyBytes) * 8, |
| }, |
| }, |
| RawAttributes: rawAttributes, |
| } |
| |
| tbsCSRContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCSR) |
| if err != nil { |
| return |
| } |
| tbsCSR.Raw = tbsCSRContents |
| |
| signed := tbsCSRContents |
| if hashFunc != 0 { |
| h := hashFunc.New() |
| h.Write(signed) |
| signed = h.Sum(nil) |
| } |
| |
| var signature []byte |
| signature, err = key.Sign(rand, signed, hashFunc) |
| if err != nil { |
| return |
| } |
| |
| return asn1.Marshal(certificateRequest{ |
| TBSCSR: tbsCSR, |
| SignatureAlgorithm: sigAlgo, |
| SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{ |
| Bytes: signature, |
| BitLength: len(signature) * 8, |
| }, |
| }) |
| } |
| |
| // ParseCertificateRequest parses a single certificate request from the |
| // given ASN.1 DER data. |
| func ParseCertificateRequest(asn1Data []byte) (*CertificateRequest, error) { |
| var csr certificateRequest |
| |
| rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, &csr) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { |
| return nil, asn1.SyntaxError{Msg: "trailing data"} |
| } |
| |
| return parseCertificateRequest(&csr) |
| } |
| |
| func parseCertificateRequest(in *certificateRequest) (*CertificateRequest, error) { |
| out := &CertificateRequest{ |
| Raw: in.Raw, |
| RawTBSCertificateRequest: in.TBSCSR.Raw, |
| RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo: in.TBSCSR.PublicKey.Raw, |
| RawSubject: in.TBSCSR.Subject.FullBytes, |
| |
| Signature: in.SignatureValue.RightAlign(), |
| SignatureAlgorithm: getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(in.SignatureAlgorithm), |
| |
| PublicKeyAlgorithm: getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(in.TBSCSR.PublicKey.Algorithm.Algorithm), |
| |
| Version: in.TBSCSR.Version, |
| Attributes: parseRawAttributes(in.TBSCSR.RawAttributes), |
| } |
| |
| var err error |
| if out.PublicKeyAlgorithm != UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm { |
| out.PublicKey, err = parsePublicKey(&in.TBSCSR.PublicKey) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| } |
| |
| var subject pkix.RDNSequence |
| if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(in.TBSCSR.Subject.FullBytes, &subject); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } else if len(rest) != 0 { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 Subject") |
| } |
| |
| out.Subject.FillFromRDNSequence(&subject) |
| |
| if out.Extensions, err = parseCSRExtensions(in.TBSCSR.RawAttributes); err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| for _, extension := range out.Extensions { |
| switch { |
| case extension.Id.Equal(oidExtensionSubjectAltName): |
| out.DNSNames, out.EmailAddresses, out.IPAddresses, out.URIs, err = parseSANExtension(extension.Value) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return out, nil |
| } |
| |
| // CheckSignature reports whether the signature on c is valid. |
| func (c *CertificateRequest) CheckSignature() error { |
| return checkSignature(c.SignatureAlgorithm, c.RawTBSCertificateRequest, c.Signature, c.PublicKey, true) |
| } |
| |
| // RevocationListEntry represents an entry in the revokedCertificates |
| // sequence of a CRL. |
| type RevocationListEntry struct { |
| // Raw contains the raw bytes of the revokedCertificates entry. It is set when |
| // parsing a CRL; it is ignored when generating a CRL. |
| Raw []byte |
| |
| // SerialNumber represents the serial number of a revoked certificate. It is |
| // both used when creating a CRL and populated when parsing a CRL. It must not |
| // be nil. |
| SerialNumber *big.Int |
| // RevocationTime represents the time at which the certificate was revoked. It |
| // is both used when creating a CRL and populated when parsing a CRL. It must |
| // not be the zero time. |
| RevocationTime time.Time |
| // ReasonCode represents the reason for revocation, using the integer enum |
| // values specified in RFC 5280 Section 5.3.1. When creating a CRL, the zero |
| // value will result in the reasonCode extension being omitted. When parsing a |
| // CRL, the zero value may represent either the reasonCode extension being |
| // absent (which implies the default revocation reason of 0/Unspecified), or |
| // it may represent the reasonCode extension being present and explicitly |
| // containing a value of 0/Unspecified (which should not happen according to |
| // the DER encoding rules, but can and does happen anyway). |
| ReasonCode int |
| |
| // Extensions contains raw X.509 extensions. When parsing CRL entries, |
| // this can be used to extract non-critical extensions that are not |
| // parsed by this package. When marshaling CRL entries, the Extensions |
| // field is ignored, see ExtraExtensions. |
| Extensions []pkix.Extension |
| // ExtraExtensions contains extensions to be copied, raw, into any |
| // marshaled CRL entries. Values override any extensions that would |
| // otherwise be produced based on the other fields. The ExtraExtensions |
| // field is not populated when parsing CRL entries, see Extensions. |
| ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension |
| } |
| |
| // RevocationList represents a [Certificate] Revocation List (CRL) as specified |
| // by RFC 5280. |
| type RevocationList struct { |
| // Raw contains the complete ASN.1 DER content of the CRL (tbsCertList, |
| // signatureAlgorithm, and signatureValue.) |
| Raw []byte |
| // RawTBSRevocationList contains just the tbsCertList portion of the ASN.1 |
| // DER. |
| RawTBSRevocationList []byte |
| // RawIssuer contains the DER encoded Issuer. |
| RawIssuer []byte |
| |
| // Issuer contains the DN of the issuing certificate. |
| Issuer pkix.Name |
| // AuthorityKeyId is used to identify the public key associated with the |
| // issuing certificate. It is populated from the authorityKeyIdentifier |
| // extension when parsing a CRL. It is ignored when creating a CRL; the |
| // extension is populated from the issuing certificate itself. |
| AuthorityKeyId []byte |
| |
| Signature []byte |
| // SignatureAlgorithm is used to determine the signature algorithm to be |
| // used when signing the CRL. If 0 the default algorithm for the signing |
| // key will be used. |
| SignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm |
| |
| // RevokedCertificateEntries represents the revokedCertificates sequence in |
| // the CRL. It is used when creating a CRL and also populated when parsing a |
| // CRL. When creating a CRL, it may be empty or nil, in which case the |
| // revokedCertificates ASN.1 sequence will be omitted from the CRL entirely. |
| RevokedCertificateEntries []RevocationListEntry |
| |
| // RevokedCertificates is used to populate the revokedCertificates |
| // sequence in the CRL if RevokedCertificateEntries is empty. It may be empty |
| // or nil, in which case an empty CRL will be created. |
| // |
| // Deprecated: Use RevokedCertificateEntries instead. |
| RevokedCertificates []pkix.RevokedCertificate |
| |
| // Number is used to populate the X.509 v2 cRLNumber extension in the CRL, |
| // which should be a monotonically increasing sequence number for a given |
| // CRL scope and CRL issuer. It is also populated from the cRLNumber |
| // extension when parsing a CRL. |
| Number *big.Int |
| |
| // ThisUpdate is used to populate the thisUpdate field in the CRL, which |
| // indicates the issuance date of the CRL. |
| ThisUpdate time.Time |
| // NextUpdate is used to populate the nextUpdate field in the CRL, which |
| // indicates the date by which the next CRL will be issued. NextUpdate |
| // must be greater than ThisUpdate. |
| NextUpdate time.Time |
| |
| // Extensions contains raw X.509 extensions. When creating a CRL, |
| // the Extensions field is ignored, see ExtraExtensions. |
| Extensions []pkix.Extension |
| |
| // ExtraExtensions contains any additional extensions to add directly to |
| // the CRL. |
| ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension |
| } |
| |
| // These structures reflect the ASN.1 structure of X.509 CRLs better than |
| // the existing crypto/x509/pkix variants do. These mirror the existing |
| // certificate structs in this file. |
| // |
| // Notably, we include issuer as an asn1.RawValue, mirroring the behavior of |
| // tbsCertificate and allowing raw (unparsed) subjects to be passed cleanly. |
| type certificateList struct { |
| TBSCertList tbsCertificateList |
| SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier |
| SignatureValue asn1.BitString |
| } |
| |
| type tbsCertificateList struct { |
| Raw asn1.RawContent |
| Version int `asn1:"optional,default:0"` |
| Signature pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier |
| Issuer asn1.RawValue |
| ThisUpdate time.Time |
| NextUpdate time.Time `asn1:"optional"` |
| RevokedCertificates []pkix.RevokedCertificate `asn1:"optional"` |
| Extensions []pkix.Extension `asn1:"tag:0,optional,explicit"` |
| } |
| |
| // CreateRevocationList creates a new X.509 v2 [Certificate] Revocation List, |
| // according to RFC 5280, based on template. |
| // |
| // The CRL is signed by priv which should be the private key associated with |
| // the public key in the issuer certificate. |
| // |
| // The issuer may not be nil, and the crlSign bit must be set in [KeyUsage] in |
| // order to use it as a CRL issuer. |
| // |
| // The issuer distinguished name CRL field and authority key identifier |
| // extension are populated using the issuer certificate. issuer must have |
| // SubjectKeyId set. |
| func CreateRevocationList(rand io.Reader, template *RevocationList, issuer *Certificate, priv crypto.Signer) ([]byte, error) { |
| if template == nil { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: template can not be nil") |
| } |
| if issuer == nil { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer can not be nil") |
| } |
| if (issuer.KeyUsage & KeyUsageCRLSign) == 0 { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer must have the crlSign key usage bit set") |
| } |
| if len(issuer.SubjectKeyId) == 0 { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer certificate doesn't contain a subject key identifier") |
| } |
| if template.NextUpdate.Before(template.ThisUpdate) { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: template.ThisUpdate is after template.NextUpdate") |
| } |
| if template.Number == nil { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: template contains nil Number field") |
| } |
| |
| hashFunc, signatureAlgorithm, err := signingParamsForPublicKey(priv.Public(), template.SignatureAlgorithm) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| var revokedCerts []pkix.RevokedCertificate |
| // Only process the deprecated RevokedCertificates field if it is populated |
| // and the new RevokedCertificateEntries field is not populated. |
| if len(template.RevokedCertificates) > 0 && len(template.RevokedCertificateEntries) == 0 { |
| // Force revocation times to UTC per RFC 5280. |
| revokedCerts = make([]pkix.RevokedCertificate, len(template.RevokedCertificates)) |
| for i, rc := range template.RevokedCertificates { |
| rc.RevocationTime = rc.RevocationTime.UTC() |
| revokedCerts[i] = rc |
| } |
| } else { |
| // Convert the ReasonCode field to a proper extension, and force revocation |
| // times to UTC per RFC 5280. |
| revokedCerts = make([]pkix.RevokedCertificate, len(template.RevokedCertificateEntries)) |
| for i, rce := range template.RevokedCertificateEntries { |
| if rce.SerialNumber == nil { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: template contains entry with nil SerialNumber field") |
| } |
| if rce.RevocationTime.IsZero() { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: template contains entry with zero RevocationTime field") |
| } |
| |
| rc := pkix.RevokedCertificate{ |
| SerialNumber: rce.SerialNumber, |
| RevocationTime: rce.RevocationTime.UTC(), |
| } |
| |
| // Copy over any extra extensions, except for a Reason Code extension, |
| // because we'll synthesize that ourselves to ensure it is correct. |
| exts := make([]pkix.Extension, 0, len(rce.ExtraExtensions)) |
| for _, ext := range rce.ExtraExtensions { |
| if ext.Id.Equal(oidExtensionReasonCode) { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: template contains entry with ReasonCode ExtraExtension; use ReasonCode field instead") |
| } |
| exts = append(exts, ext) |
| } |
| |
| // Only add a reasonCode extension if the reason is non-zero, as per |
| // RFC 5280 Section 5.3.1. |
| if rce.ReasonCode != 0 { |
| reasonBytes, err := asn1.Marshal(asn1.Enumerated(rce.ReasonCode)) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| exts = append(exts, pkix.Extension{ |
| Id: oidExtensionReasonCode, |
| Value: reasonBytes, |
| }) |
| } |
| |
| if len(exts) > 0 { |
| rc.Extensions = exts |
| } |
| revokedCerts[i] = rc |
| } |
| } |
| |
| aki, err := asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{Id: issuer.SubjectKeyId}) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| if numBytes := template.Number.Bytes(); len(numBytes) > 20 || (len(numBytes) == 20 && numBytes[0]&0x80 != 0) { |
| return nil, errors.New("x509: CRL number exceeds 20 octets") |
| } |
| crlNum, err := asn1.Marshal(template.Number) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| // Correctly use the issuer's subject sequence if one is specified. |
| issuerSubject, err := subjectBytes(issuer) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| tbsCertList := tbsCertificateList{ |
| Version: 1, // v2 |
| Signature: signatureAlgorithm, |
| Issuer: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: issuerSubject}, |
| ThisUpdate: template.ThisUpdate.UTC(), |
| NextUpdate: template.NextUpdate.UTC(), |
| Extensions: []pkix.Extension{ |
| { |
| Id: oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId, |
| Value: aki, |
| }, |
| { |
| Id: oidExtensionCRLNumber, |
| Value: crlNum, |
| }, |
| }, |
| } |
| if len(revokedCerts) > 0 { |
| tbsCertList.RevokedCertificates = revokedCerts |
| } |
| |
| if len(template.ExtraExtensions) > 0 { |
| tbsCertList.Extensions = append(tbsCertList.Extensions, template.ExtraExtensions...) |
| } |
| |
| tbsCertListContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCertList) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| // Optimization to only marshal this struct once, when signing and |
| // then embedding in certificateList below. |
| tbsCertList.Raw = tbsCertListContents |
| |
| input := tbsCertListContents |
| if hashFunc != 0 { |
| h := hashFunc.New() |
| h.Write(tbsCertListContents) |
| input = h.Sum(nil) |
| } |
| var signerOpts crypto.SignerOpts = hashFunc |
| if template.SignatureAlgorithm.isRSAPSS() { |
| signerOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{ |
| SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, |
| Hash: hashFunc, |
| } |
| } |
| |
| signature, err := priv.Sign(rand, input, signerOpts) |
| if err != nil { |
| return nil, err |
| } |
| |
| return asn1.Marshal(certificateList{ |
| TBSCertList: tbsCertList, |
| SignatureAlgorithm: signatureAlgorithm, |
| SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8}, |
| }) |
| } |
| |
| // CheckSignatureFrom verifies that the signature on rl is a valid signature |
| // from issuer. |
| func (rl *RevocationList) CheckSignatureFrom(parent *Certificate) error { |
| if parent.Version == 3 && !parent.BasicConstraintsValid || |
| parent.BasicConstraintsValid && !parent.IsCA { |
| return ConstraintViolationError{} |
| } |
| |
| if parent.KeyUsage != 0 && parent.KeyUsage&KeyUsageCRLSign == 0 { |
| return ConstraintViolationError{} |
| } |
| |
| if parent.PublicKeyAlgorithm == UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm { |
| return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm |
| } |
| |
| return parent.CheckSignature(rl.SignatureAlgorithm, rl.RawTBSRevocationList, rl.Signature) |
| } |
