// Copyright 2025 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.

//go:build !go1.25

package https

// This implementation of CrossOriginProtection is copied
// from Go 1.25.3's net/http.CrossOriginProtection.
//
// TODO: Delete after go.mod is updated to 1.25.0 or higher.

import (
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"net/http"
	"net/url"
	"sync"
	"sync/atomic"
)

// CrossOriginProtection implements protections against [Cross-Site Request
// Forgery (CSRF)] by rejecting non-safe cross-origin browser requests.
//
// Cross-origin requests are currently detected with the [Sec-Fetch-Site]
// header, available in all browsers since 2023, or by comparing the hostname of
// the [Origin] header with the Host header.
//
// The GET, HEAD, and OPTIONS methods are [safe methods] and are always allowed.
// It's important that applications do not perform any state changing actions
// due to requests with safe methods.
//
// Requests without Sec-Fetch-Site or Origin headers are currently assumed to be
// either same-origin or non-browser requests, and are allowed.
//
// The zero value of CrossOriginProtection is valid and has no trusted origins
// or bypass patterns.
//
// [Sec-Fetch-Site]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Sec-Fetch-Site
// [Origin]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Origin
// [Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/CSRF
// [safe methods]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Glossary/Safe/HTTP
type CrossOriginProtection struct {
	bypass    atomic.Pointer[http.ServeMux]
	trustedMu sync.RWMutex
	trusted   map[string]bool
	deny      atomic.Pointer[http.Handler]
}

// AddTrustedOrigin allows all requests with an [Origin] header
// which exactly matches the given value.
//
// Origin header values are of the form "scheme://host[:port]".
//
// AddTrustedOrigin can be called concurrently with other methods
// or request handling, and applies to future requests.
//
// [Origin]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Origin
func (c *CrossOriginProtection) AddTrustedOrigin(origin string) error {
	u, err := url.Parse(origin)
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("invalid origin %q: %w", origin, err)
	}
	if u.Scheme == "" {
		return fmt.Errorf("invalid origin %q: scheme is required", origin)
	}
	if u.Host == "" {
		return fmt.Errorf("invalid origin %q: host is required", origin)
	}
	if u.Path != "" || u.RawQuery != "" || u.Fragment != "" {
		return fmt.Errorf("invalid origin %q: path, query, and fragment are not allowed", origin)
	}
	c.trustedMu.Lock()
	defer c.trustedMu.Unlock()
	if c.trusted == nil {
		c.trusted = make(map[string]bool)
	}
	c.trusted[origin] = true
	return nil
}

type noopHandler struct{}

func (noopHandler) ServeHTTP(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {}

var sentinelHandler http.Handler = &noopHandler{}

// AddInsecureBypassPattern permits all requests that match the given pattern.
//
// The pattern syntax and precedence rules are the same as [ServeMux]. Only
// requests that match the pattern directly are permitted. Those that ServeMux
// would redirect to a pattern (e.g. after cleaning the path or adding a
// trailing slash) are not.
//
// AddInsecureBypassPattern can be called concurrently with other methods or
// request handling, and applies to future requests.
func (c *CrossOriginProtection) AddInsecureBypassPattern(pattern string) {
	var bypass *http.ServeMux

	// Lazily initialize c.bypass
	for {
		bypass = c.bypass.Load()
		if bypass != nil {
			break
		}
		bypass = http.NewServeMux()
		if c.bypass.CompareAndSwap(nil, bypass) {
			break
		}
	}

	bypass.Handle(pattern, sentinelHandler)
}

// SetDenyHandler sets a handler to invoke when a request is rejected.
// The default error handler responds with a 403 Forbidden status.
//
// SetDenyHandler can be called concurrently with other methods
// or request handling, and applies to future requests.
//
// Check does not call the error handler.
func (c *CrossOriginProtection) SetDenyHandler(h http.Handler) {
	if h == nil {
		c.deny.Store(nil)
		return
	}
	c.deny.Store(&h)
}

// Check applies cross-origin checks to a request.
// It returns an error if the request should be rejected.
func (c *CrossOriginProtection) Check(req *http.Request) error {
	switch req.Method {
	case "GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS":
		// Safe methods are always allowed.
		return nil
	}

	switch req.Header.Get("Sec-Fetch-Site") {
	case "":
		// No Sec-Fetch-Site header is present.
		// Fallthrough to check the Origin header.
	case "same-origin", "none":
		return nil
	default:
		if c.isRequestExempt(req) {
			return nil
		}
		return errCrossOriginRequest
	}

	origin := req.Header.Get("Origin")
	if origin == "" {
		// Neither Sec-Fetch-Site nor Origin headers are present.
		// Either the request is same-origin or not a browser request.
		return nil
	}

	if o, err := url.Parse(origin); err == nil && o.Host == req.Host {
		// The Origin header matches the Host header. Note that the Host header
		// doesn't include the scheme, so we don't know if this might be an
		// HTTP→HTTPS cross-origin request. We fail open, since all modern
		// browsers support Sec-Fetch-Site since 2023, and running an older
		// browser makes a clear security trade-off already. Sites can mitigate
		// this with HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS).
		return nil
	}

	if c.isRequestExempt(req) {
		return nil
	}
	return errCrossOriginRequestFromOldBrowser
}

var (
	errCrossOriginRequest               = errors.New("cross-origin request detected from Sec-Fetch-Site header")
	errCrossOriginRequestFromOldBrowser = errors.New("cross-origin request detected, and/or browser is out of date: " +
		"Sec-Fetch-Site is missing, and Origin does not match Host")
)

// isRequestExempt checks the bypasses which require taking a lock, and should
// be deferred until the last moment.
func (c *CrossOriginProtection) isRequestExempt(req *http.Request) bool {
	if bypass := c.bypass.Load(); bypass != nil {
		if h, _ := bypass.Handler(req); h == sentinelHandler {
			// The request matches a bypass pattern.
			return true
		}
	}

	c.trustedMu.RLock()
	defer c.trustedMu.RUnlock()
	origin := req.Header.Get("Origin")
	// The request matches a trusted origin.
	return origin != "" && c.trusted[origin]
}

// Handler returns a handler that applies cross-origin checks
// before invoking the handler h.
//
// If a request fails cross-origin checks, the request is rejected
// with a 403 Forbidden status or handled with the handler passed
// to [CrossOriginProtection.SetDenyHandler].
func (c *CrossOriginProtection) Handler(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		if err := c.Check(r); err != nil {
			if deny := c.deny.Load(); deny != nil {
				(*deny).ServeHTTP(w, r)
				return
			}
			http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusForbidden)
			return
		}
		h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
	})
}